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     I began writing my account on the relationship between Japan and Russia 
focussing on the peace treaty negotiations from the summer of 2002, after my retirement 
from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The account was based on my personal 
experience in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, particularly from 1985, when Gorbachev 
came to power, until 2001, when Putin completed his first year as president. At the same 
time, I went through other primary sources and major researches made by scholars in 
this field. My teaching on the subject at the University of Leiden in the spring of 2004 
helped me a great deal to gather my thoughts. Incorporating all my thoughts developed 
from my days in the Foreign Ministry and as an academic afterwards, finally, the book 
was published in Japanese by Shinchosha in Tokyo in May 2007. 
 
     The English critical summary is based on that book but it re-introduces in 
particular the results of my researches of other primary and secondary sources. 
 
     The other four articles in the annex were all published between 2005 and 2008, 
and are all related to the common subject of Japanese foreign policy. One binding theme 
for all four articles is the question of historical memory. If the fundamental root of the 
territorial issue is the sense of victimization and honour to recover from it, the historical 
memory issues are exactly the opposite side of the same coin: Japan’s role as a 
perpetrator. As for the three first articles, my attention is evenly directed to the issue of 
power, security and peace as well. The four articles are annexed in order to show to the 
examiners the development of my analysis on wider areas of Japanese foreign policy, 
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The Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territories:  
Five Lost Windows of Opportunity 
 




At the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986-88, the Cold War 
rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one 
another. The relations may been manipulated by Russian political forces not desiring an 
improvement, but there was corresponding structural weakness on the Japanese side as 
well. 
At the second missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1989, some structural 
rigidity on the part of Japanese policy makers hampered faster development of the 
relationship. At the time, the author felt that he made the right decision, but 
retrospectively he questions whether, had he or the Japanese leadership been more 
emancipated from Cold War thinking, they might not have been able to produce a 
different outcome: a more content-rich Gorbachev visit earlier  1991. 
Concerning the third missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1992, the author, who 
did not take part in it, contends very seriously that there was a failure in policy choices 
on the Japanese side, and that policy makers did not fulfill their responsibility at that 
point. There is no evidence that other policy makers learned from the experience under 
Gorbachev and tried to adopt a more realistic policy for Japan to achieve its goal. 
At the fourth missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1997-98, the Japanese side 
learned lessons from past mistakes and did not hesitate to propose a courageous 
proposal to break the impasse. President Yeltsin was impressed by this proposal, but the 
Russian side as a whole did not accept it as a basis for negotiations. Nevertheless, 
recognition on both sides of the need for some mutual concession soared in those years.  
Before the fifth missed opportunity, awareness of past failures was very much at 
the forefront of the author’s mind. The negotiations with President Putin began, and the 
author very consciously tried to fulfill the responsibility of grasping the opportunity as it 
opened out in front of him in 2000-01. The negotiations proceeded unexpectedly fast 
and effectively, and then were suddenly crushed because of Japan’s domestic issue. The 
author did not expect the fifth window of opportunity to close in this way. Individual 





The purpose of this paper is to examine Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union/ 
Russian Federation for the 16 years between Gorbachev’s coming to power in 1985 and 
Putin’s completion of his first year as president in the spring of 2001. These years span 
the period in which Japan’s policy towards the Soviet Union/ Russian Federation was 
most active, and it was at the end of this period that relations reached their peak.  
 
Sources of analysis 
The analysis relies on published primary sources, checking their consistency with major 
secondary sources on the subject. At the center of the primary sources is a book by the 
author himself, Hopporyodo Koshohiroku: Ushinawareta gotabino Kikai (The Inside 
Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territory: Five Lost Windows of Opportunity): 
hereafter referred to as ‘Hopporyodo’１, which is a memoir of the events that he directly 
experienced in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) during this period. 
Other memoirs and articles analyzed in this paper include those written by Sumio 
Edamura and Minoru Tamba on the Japanese side, and by Mikhail Gorbachev, Anatolii 
Chernyaev, Alexander Panov and Georgi Kunadze on the Russian side. 
     As for the secondary sources, books and articles referred to in this paper include 
those written by Kimie Hara, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Hiroshi Kimura, Kazuo Sato and 
Akiyoshi Komaki, Muneo Suzuki and Masaru Sato, and Haruki Wada as regards 
Japanese analysts, and Joachim Glaubitz, Joseph Ferguson, Gilbert Rozman and 
Konstantin Sarkisov from other countries. 
 
Background 
Why do the Japanese attach so much importance to the territorial issue with the Soviet 
Union/Russian Federation? The author gives his view in the epilogue of Hopporyodo 
that “the territorial issue is a reminder of pain in the hearts of the Japanese people 
directly related to how Japan fought the Pacific War and how it faced defeat. It has its 
origin in the unfortunate events that took place from the spring to the autumn of 1945 
between Japan and the Soviet Union.” Japan was deeply scarred psychologically by the 
Soviet participation in the Pacific War. It was a breach of the Neutrality Pact, which was 
still effectively binding on the Soviet Union. It entailed hardships to those Japanese who 
fell under Soviet occupation, including about 600,000 detainees, more than 60,000 of 
whom perished in the Soviet Union. It developed into the occupation of the four islands, 
Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which came under Japanese sovereignty 
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through the 1855 Russo-Japanese Pact of Friendship, and which had subsequently been 
uncontestedly under Japanese rule. Japan accepted the post-war reality in signing the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1956 Joint Declaration with the Soviet Union, but 
the four islands issue remained as the last vestige of unresolved pain from the Pacific 
War.２ 
     Wider analysis would put Japanese perceptions in the context of Russo-Japanese 
history as imperial rivals from the middle of the 19th century, World War II, and the role 
of the United States and Great Britain. However, the perceptions of many Japanese, 
formulated in the post-war period, are nonetheless accurately summarized in the 
abovementioned description.３ 
     What happened at San Francisco, then, where Japan accepted post-war reality? 
The author reiterates in Hopporyodo the standard explanation given by the Japanese 
government: Japan “renounced all right, title and claim to the Kurile islands” in Article 
2 (c) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but where these islands belong is not 
determined in the treaty, nor does it give a definition of the Kuriles. Japan came to 
clarify (meikakukashita) its interpretation as not including four islands: Habomai, 
Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu. The Soviet side objected vehemently to the 
interpretation that “Japan had not renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu in San Francisco” 
stating that there were many public statements clarifying that the Kuriles include these 
islands.４ 
     There were indeed many public statements and documents stating that Kunashiri 
and Etorofu were part of the Kurile Islands. In this context the fact that the author used 
the expression “came to clarify” above, without specifying its timing, might need some 
attention.５ What happened in 1956 when Japan and the Soviet Union issued a Joint 
Declaration? The author records in Hopporyodo that the two sides resolved all issues 
related to WWII except for the territorial issue. The Soviet side proposed in August in 
London negotiations that they were ready to resolve this issue by transferring Habomai 
and Shikotan but no more. They kept this position throughout the 1955-56 negotiations. 
The Japanese side responded to this proposal at the end of August, requesting the 
reversion of all four islands, and since then has never withdrawn from that position. The 
negotiations failed, and the adopted Joint Declaration Clause 9 prescribed that 
negotiations should continue and Habomai and Shikotan should be transferred to Japan 
after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The author thus stated that “what was not resolved 
was the issue of Kunashiri and Etorofu, and this is the issue to be resolved in a peace 
treaty.”６ 
     In 1960, when Japan concluded a new security treaty with the United States, the 
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Soviet Union saw it as a dangerous action against its interests and declared that unless 
foreign troops were withdrawn from Japan they would not be ready to transfer Habomai 
and Shikotan to Japan. In the period of détente, the two sides explored a way out that 
would improve relations, and in October 1973, in Moscow, Kakuei Tanaka and Leonid 
Brezhnev issued a Joint Communiqué in which they agreed to resolve “unresolved 
issues from World War II” and Brezhnev orally confirmed to Tanaka that this included 
the four islands issue. Economic relations were advancing, including substantial 
Japanese investment in the development of Siberian resources. However, from the latter 
part of the 1970s, in what some call “the second Cold War,” political relations between 
Japan and the Soviet Union began to deteriorate. From 1978, when Foreign Minister 
Sunao Sonoda visited Moscow, Gromyko decided not to visit Japan if the Japanese side 
continued to raise the territorial issue. No ministerial visits to the capital of the other 
state occurred for many years after that.  
 
The Gorbachev Period 
 
In Hopporyodo, the author divides the six Gorbachev years into three periods: 1) from 
March 1985 until July 1988, when relations began to warm up rapidly in the course of 
the first year, but deteriorated rapidly from the fall of 1986 for nearly two years; 2) from 
July 1988 to April 1991, when negotiations continued for nearly three further years until 
Gorbachev’s visit finally took place in April 1991; and 3) the short period from 
Gorbachev’s visit to Japan until the August 1991 coup, when Gorbachev’s power was 
undercut, and he was replaced by Boris Yeltsin in December 1991. 
 
The first lost window of opportunity  
Prime Minister Nakasone’s response to Gorbachev’s assumption of power in the 
Kremlin was very quick. Nakasone attended Chernyenko’s funeral on March 13 1985, 
and realized a meeting on March 14. This positive approach of the Japanese side was 
reciprocated by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s visit to Japan on January 15-19, 1986, 
where he stated that he was prepared to listen to whatever his Japanese counterpart 
might say, even if he would not agree with its contents. This was a breath of fresh air, 
compared to Gromyko’s stance of not visiting if the Japanese side raised the territorial 
issue. Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe reciprocated with a visit to Moscow in May, and 
although Gorbachev made a stern statement on the territorial issue that “you have raised 
an issue which should not be raised”, exchanges between the two sides began to be 
animated. A visit by Gorbachev as early as 1987 thus became one of the priorities of 
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Japan’s foreign policy in the summer of 1986. 
     However, from then on relations began to deteriorate rapidly. The Soviets reacted 
quite negatively to Japan’s decision to join the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 
September 1986. In 1987, Gorbachev’s possible visit to Japan was erased from the 
diplomatic agenda. The arrest of members of a Toshiba-affiliated company in May for 
selling submarine screws, which could make monitoring difficult, contributed to 
worsening relations. In the summer, a mutual expulsion of diplomats took place, and in 
the autumn, some Russian staff at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow suddenly had to 
leave their positions.７ Thus, until July 1988, when former Prime Minister Nakasone 
visited Moscow and had a breakthrough meeting with Gorbachev, relations were frozen 
for nearly two years. This was the first lost window of opportunity.８ 
     Why did this deterioration occur, when Gorbachev’s perestroika and new thinking 
diplomacy were bearing fruit practically everywhere else? The author gave four reasons 
when, as his private secretary, he briefed Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari: Gorbachev 
gave a higher priority to foreign policy regarding relations with the U.S. after the failure 
at the Reykjavik summit meeting with President Reagan; he was also absorbed by 
domestic issues which were becoming increasingly difficult; relations deteriorated 
because of Japan’s accession to SDI and the Toshiba incident; and lastly, Gorbachev 
was not interested in addressing the territorial issue seriously.９ 
     Kimura also gave four reasons for Gorbachev’s decision to cancel his visit: 
preoccupation with U.S. relations; Nakasone, whose tenure was due to end in October 
1987, was considered to be too weak to reach a deal; there was no clear perspective on 
what was to be gained by a Japan trip; and Gorbachev’s unwillingness to deal with the 
territorial issue, which the Japanese side pressed strongly.１０ Hasegawa added one 
more point to Kimura’s list: challenges that Gorbachev had to face on his domestic 
agenda.１１  
     From the Soviet side, Chernyaev later confirmed that Gorbachev’s initial concern 
over Japan was to prevent it from joining the SDI, and that he was totally uninterested 
in dealing with the territorial issue. １２  Panov also later gave an explanation: 
“Japan-Soviet relations entered into a positive phase under the new Soviet leadership, 
although not with dramatic speed. But then they encountered a long ‘break’. That was 
due to the fact that the Soviet leadership was busy on ‘other issues’, and that there was 
deep distrust between the two sides particularly from the latter part of the 1970’s. I am 
bound to point out that the Japanese side did not intend to rush resolution of the issue. 
In Japan, it was perceived that sooner or later, the Soviet perestroika would reach Japan 
and that the Soviet side was unable to implement its economic reform without Japan’s 
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assistance.”１３ 
     The lines of analysis, in general, converge. All indicate a lack of priority and 
unwillingness to address the difficult issue on the Soviet side, and a lack of attractive 
incentives to be given from the Japanese side. Several incidents resulted in a vicious 
circle in bilateral relations. After the publication of Hopporyodo, Masaru Sato indicated 
to the author that he had information from a credible Russian source that from the 
autumn of 1986, an organized operation by the Soviet secret service (KGB) started to 
block further development of Soviet-Japanese relations. Expulsion of Japanese 
diplomats and withdrawal of Russian employees from the Japanese embassy could not 
be implemented without a decision by the KGB. Until further information can be 
obtained, it is difficult to draw a complete picture as to why there was a two-year hiatus 
in the political relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. In addition to the reasons 
mentioned above, one might add that there was no effective buffer, i.e. contacts between 
individuals from the two governments to prevent this, or to minimize its impact in the 
event of such a break occurring.   
 
The second lost window of opportunity 
After Gorbachev’s decision to agree to abrogate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
in December 1987 and to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan from April 1988, the 
leadership of the Foreign Ministry became aware that the Japanese side needed to take 
certain initiatives to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Former Prime Minister 
Nakasone’s visit to Moscow in July 1988 became a turning point in the relationship. He 
had nearly three hours of substantive talks with Gorbachev, covering such major issues 
as the concept of perestroika, new thinking diplomacy in Asia, international relations 
after the Cold War, and historical perspectives on the territorial issue. Gorbachev gave 
the impression that he was about to start focusing on Japan; there was no change in his 
view on the territorial issue, but he was ready to explore it. The author, having just been 
appointed Director of the Soviet Union Division, accompanied Nakasone, and was 
immensely impressed by these exchanges.１４ 
     Given the fact that Gorbachev’s visit to Japan took place nearly three years after 
his meeting with Nakasone, a serious question addressed by the author and other 
analysts is why it took so long. Shevardnadze’s second visit in December 1988 was 
crowned with many successes, including the establishment of a peace treaty working 
group to discuss thoroughly the territorial issue. Other substantive exchanges on 
bilateral and regional issues took place. Shevardnadze proposed an early Gorbachev 
visit with the conclusion of six treaties on that occasion, while waiting for Japanese 
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counterproposals. Notwithstanding this success, in January 1989 Japanese Foreign 
Minister Sosuke Uno told Shevardnadze in Paris, at a meeting on the fringes of an 
international conference to abolish chemical weapons, that Gorbachev’s visit to Japan 
could not succeed without progress on the territorial issue. Shevardnadze very angrily 
replied, saying that “it is not a good idea to link all issues to one question.” Then, all-out 
criticism started on the Russian side to rebuke Japan for its attempt to set prior 
conditions. It took until May to overcome this split, when Uno visited Moscow and 
proposed a “balanced expansion” approach. With this new concept, the Japanese side 
conveyed that it did not want to see relations set back, but that it wanted development 
along the entire spectrum. 
     In his earlier book on Japan-Russia relations, published in 1993, the author had 
already stated that Uno’s statement angered Shevardnadze in Paris, and it took nearly a 
half year to bring negotiations back to normal in May. It was then explained that the 
Japanese side feared that the Soviet side wrongly believed that relations could develop 
to the exclusion of the territorial issue.１５ The author added a subtle but important 
point in his later book. “There emerged an inescapable anxiety on the Japanese side 
after Shevardnadze’s visit. It was a concern that there could have been an ‘unintended 
green light’ in the way the Japanese side expressed that relations could develop to the 
exclusion of the territorial issue. In retrospect, there might not have been any necessity 
to worry so much, but all Foreign Ministry officials starting from the Vice Minister 
shared the same concern.”１６ The author is under oath not to disclose confidential 
information; therefore he was unable to say exactly what this ‘unintended green light’ 
was. However, his writing suggests that some unintended occurrence on the Japanese 
side aroused this concern, and that this coincidental situation had grave consequences 
for Japan’s decision making. 
     Based on what the author wrote in his first book, Hasegawa emphasized that 
“Japan’s back pedaling cost it dearly. It weakened the position of Soviet reformers, and 
important decision making on Japan-Russia relations was retarded. It was a failure on 
the Japanese side to have put a brake on the policy of balanced expansion. A 
breakthrough in the relationship should have happened before the summer of 1989.”１７ 
Panov wrote in his first book published in Japanese in 1992 that “Uno’s statement was 
perceived as a prior condition to Gorbachev’s visit, so naturally, enthusiasm waned on 
the Russian side to fix the date of Gorbachev’s visit.”１８ 
     Whatever the real reason for Uno’s statement in Paris, the author shares the 
criticisms raised by Hasegawa and Panov, and he seriously analyzes the policy 
implication of that decision in Hopporyodo. “Sometimes in history, a delay in the 
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negotiations due to one incident may fatally retard those negotiations to the point of 
divorcing them from the environment that had taken shape. The approach which the 
Japanese side took in Paris in January 1989 might have fatally delayed Gorbachev’s 
visit, and this delay might have made the content of his visit thin. If the second window 
of opportunity was closed because of this incident, it was highly regrettable for Japan.  
     I began to think time and again whether our decision in January 1989 was right. 
Had we not made a decision which led the negotiations into an unnecessary detour? If 
so, how can we prevent such a situation from happening again? Was there not another 
way to handle the negotiations without causing the delay? 
     I eventually concluded that the two administrations were so far apart without any 
basis of mutual trust, and that this distance caused that unnecessary detour. The Soviet 
side thought that Japan was only interested in the territorial issue without paying any 
attention to the big picture of the relationship. The Japanese side thought that the Soviet 
side was only interested in expanding relations to the exclusion of the territorial issue. 
In retrospect, in reality neither was true. But there was no way to check it then. There 
was deep distrust on both sides. 
     There was an absolute need to overcome that distrust and find a roadmap on 
which the two sides could agree. The Japanese side had to create that roadmap and 
propose it to the Soviet side. Then the two sides had to discuss it seriously. A genuine 
sense of trust can emerge only through this process. If a trustworthy channel emerges 
between the two sides, then each side can signal to the other when it feels that a red 
light is on. This can prevent the situation from getting worse. This is the only way to 
prevent a fatal delay in crucial negotiations.”１９ 
     The principle of “balanced expansion” was the first clear policy direction 
reflecting the reasoning described above, and this view became, for the author, the 
guiding principle for Japanese-Soviet/Russian relations, as seen below. 
 
Gorbachev’s visit in April 1991 and thereafter 
Gorbachev visited Japan in April 1991, and he could not take a decisive step on the 
territorial question. His domestic position was by then substantially weakened by 
mounting difficulties in economic reform, ethnic troubles, and rising criticism from the 
political right and radical reformers. Awaiting Gorbachev, the Japanese government had 
two major objectives on the territorial issue: to get Gorbachev to recognize in writing 
that the issue needing to be resolved was the issue of four islands: Habomai, Shikotan, 
Kunashiri and Etorofu; and to get Gorbachev to confirm the validity of the 1956 Joint 
Declaration in which the Soviet side agreed to transfer Habomai and Shikotan to Japan 
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after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Russian Foreign Ministry prepared two 
options for Gorbachev’s consideration: either to acknowledge the existence of four 
islands as the object of negotiations or to confirm the obligation based on the 1956 Joint 
Declaration. 
Gorbachev adopted the first option. Japan succeeded in the first objective but 
failed in the second. This process, where one sees almost a mirror image on both sides 
in preparing the negotiations, is explained in detail in Togo and Panov’s respective first 
books.２０ 
Gorbachev’s delay in coming to Tokyo cost dearly for the radical improvement of 
Japan-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, the visit also allowed many issues to be addressed 
and saw some substantial improvements in dealing with them: 
 Thorough debates took place on the historical and legal aspects of the territorial 
issue conducted through seven rounds of the peace treaty working group. Regarding 
the legal aspect, particularly concerning the San Francisco Peace Treaty, there was 
no convergence of views, but regarding historical recognition of how these islands 
had been approached by the two sides from the 17th century there was some 
meeting of minds.２１ 
 An agreement was reached during Gorbachev’s visit to allow the Japanese to travel 
to the four islands based on a so-called ‘non-visa system’. 
 Substantial materials concerning Japanese detainees were transmitted to the 
Japanese side; Gorbachev expressed “sympathy” toward them, though this wording 
was not well received in Japan. 
 The newly introduced concept of “balanced expansion” was incorporated in the 
communiqué adopted during Gorbachev’s visit, with 15 signed agreements 
symbolizing this new approach. 
 In the years leading to Gorbachev’s visit, increasingly wider exchanges took place 
between Japanese and Russian politicians. Contacts among diplomats bore greater 
fruit, including the author’s in-depth talks with Alexander Panov, newly appointed 
Director General of the Asia-Pacific Department.２２ 
Thus, although the visit itself did not bring about a real breakthrough on the 
territorial issue, it succeeded in creating the basis to consider the next steps to develop 






The Yeltsin Period 
 
Yeltsin’s period started in the wake of the failed coup in August 1991. The demise of the 
Soviet Union and birth of the Russian Federation, reform policy toward democracy and 
a market economy, catastrophic inflation and confusion in the economy from 1992, 
political turbulence culminating in the riot in the Duma (parliament) in 
September-October 1993, and gradual steps toward stabilization thereafter backed by 
oligarchs were the characteristics of his first presidency.  
Yeltsin was elected again as president of the Russian Federation in July 1996. His 
deteriorating health allowed him only to engage fully in presidential tasks from the 
spring of 1997 until the summer of 1998. Yeltsin had enormous difficulty in overcoming 
the Russian financial crisis in 1998. He ultimately succeeded in transferring power 
voluntarily and smoothly to Vladimir Putin on December 31, 1999. 
 
The third lost window of opportunity 
For those who study international relations today, the end of the Cold War is almost 
synonymous with the demise of the Soviet Union. That historic event was a result of 
August 19, 1991, when the conservatives waged a coup against Gorbachev. Opposed by 
Yeltsin and his followers in the Russian Federation, the coup disintegrated in three days.  
The dramatic change which erupted then affected Japan-Russia relations. The new 
leadership in Russia under Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and Kunadze began to send messages to 
Tokyo that they were willing to substantially improve relations with Japan. Responding 
to this historic opportunity, a Foreign Ministry team worked enthusiastically and by 
October signaled their willingness to negotiate seriously with Russia and create an 
entirely new relationship. This message comprised three pillars: a new concept based on 
five principles２４, announced by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama at the end of 
September at the United Nations; $2.5 billion of economic assistance pledged in early 
October; and a concessionary proposal made to the Russian side on the territorial issue 
that “Japan is prepared to deal flexibly with the timing, conditions and modality of the 
transfer of the islands, provided that Japan’s sovereignty over the four islands is 
confirmed”, conveyed to Gorbachev and Yeltsin by Nakayama in his visit to Moscow in 
the middle of October. 
After the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the author moved to 
Washington for two years, and then to Moscow for two and a half years to work at the 
respective Japanese embassies. However, the author argues in Hopporyodo that from the 
end of 1991, for about half a year, Japan and Russia entered into an extremely important 
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phase of post-war negotiations. This has been kept confidential by any official version 
of Japan-Russia history published by either side, and because of this, the author has 
chosen his words carefully. In essence, he seems to state that there were reasons to 
believe that a concessionary proposal was made by the Russian side, the Japanese side 
did not take it as the basis of the negotiations, the negotiations collapsed, and Yeltsin’s 
visit in September was cancelled four days before it was scheduled to take place. 
“What happened then might have a strong influence on the fate of future peace 
treaty negotiations. It is therefore not possible to disclose much information. But if one 
does not have some gut feeling as to what took place then, it is not possible to 
understand the essence of the negotiations in the 1990’s. What I write here is my 
‘thinking’ based solely on my responsibility. 
There was convincing reason for the Russian side to make a meaningful counter 
proposal to the three points proposal which was made by the Japanese side: Nakayama’s 
five principles, $2.5 billion in assistance, and flexibility on the timing and modality of 
transfer of the four islands. If Russia truly wanted to resolve the issue, short of 
conceding entirely to the Japanese request for the reversion of four islands, or at least 
for recognition of its sovereignty, what kind of concessions could Russia make? 
The first step should be to confirm the 1956 Joint Declaration and acknowledge 
the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan. Panov actually wrote in his memoir that in 
Kozyrev’s visit to Tokyo in March 1992, ‘Kozyrev apparently proposed to continue the 
negotiations based on the 1956 Joint Declaration.’２５ But this alone does not resolve 
the issue because the Japanese side requested the return of the two larger islands as well. 
How to bridge the gap? What Russia would use is the 1991 Kaifu-Gorbachev 
communiqué in which the Soviet Union acknowledged that the peace treaty should be 
concluded upon resolution of the question of to whom the four islands belong. The only 
way to find a compromise resolution is to respect Japan’s position that ‘the peace treaty 
should be concluded by resolving the issue of to whom the four islands belong’, while 
starting from the position of ‘confirming the 1956 Joint Declaration’. The compromise 
solution must satisfy these two requirements simultaneously. 
I did not know anything about this proposal, because I had already been 
transferred to Washington when it was made. But several years later, I became 
convinced that a decisive compromise proposal was then made by the Russian side. But 
as it turned out, that proposal never bore fruit. I think that the greatest reason for that 
failure is due to the fact that the Japanese side did not accept it as the basis of the 
negotiations. The Japanese side might have thought that the proposal ran the risk of 
damaging Japan’s traditional position of returning ‘the four islands in a bunch’. They 
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might have failed to recognize that they were negotiating at the unprecedented historical 
occasion of the demise of the Soviet Union, when the possibility for a breakthrough was 
so real. Or possibly they could not resist the temptation of ‘asking too much’ at a time 
when the negotiations were advancing favorably. Finally, there might not have been 
sufficient trust among negotiators on both sides. 
At the same time, the drastic reform which was introduced at the beginning of 
1992 created politico-economic chaos, and nationalism grew in Russia. This could have 
made the Russian proposal unsustainable. Even so, Japan could have started 
negotiations based on the Russian proposal, and if an immediate agreement failed 
because of the Russian situation, at least the joint work that had been conducted would 
have become the basis of future negotiations. But the Japanese side did not take that 
position. Thus the third window of opportunity related to one of the greatest events of 
the 20th century, the demise of the Soviet Union, closed quietly.”２６ 
     An account of this event, which was fairly close to the author’s “thinking” was 
given by Asahi reporters Sato and Komaki. Kozyrev’s confidential proposal to 
Watanabe in March 1992 consisted of two pillars: 1) to conclude a peace treaty, and 
Russia should transfer Habomai and Shikotan to Japan; and 2) the two countries should 
continue discussing the issue of to whom Kunashiri and Etorofu belonged. However, 
Watanabe decided that the Japanese side could not accept the proposal as such, and that 
there had to be some commitment for the future return of Kunashiri and Etorofu.２７ 
     Kunadze later expressed with strong wording his frustration in facing Japan’s 
rigorous position. Talking about Japan’s approach in general in the spring of 1992, 
Kunadze stated that “In Tokyo we received a very cautious and, in fact, cool reception. 
Apparently, our Japanese counterparts were prepared to discuss nothing but the 
conditions and timetable of the transfer of all four islands, which in their view (which 
we found simply not true) was fully stipulated by international law. Amazingly, they 
were sticking to this same ‘residual sovereignty’ position that had already been proven 
to be a patent nonstarter.”２８ Kunadze implied that Yeltsin’s decision to postpone his 
Tokyo visit was due to this rigorous position taken by the Japanese side.  
Panov quoted in his memoir an article of Asahi-shinbun dated May 21, 2002, with 
information the same as in Sato and Komaki’s article, without commenting about its 
authenticity. As for Yeltsin’s decision to postpone his Tokyo visit, Panov stated that 
Japan’s inability to propose any attractive proposal to expand cooperation between the 
two states was the major reason for the postponement. On the territorial issue, he also 
pointed out that the Japanese side was illusionary in believing that the issue could be 
solved by Russian recognition of “residual sovereignty”, but at the same time, some 
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responsibility should be born by the Russian side for having misled the Japanese 
side.２９  
Edamura placed major responsibility for the postponement on the Russian side. 
He wrote that at Watanabe’s last visit to Moscow from the end of August until early 
September, his meeting with Kozyrev and Burburis went very smoothly, but at Yeltsin’s 
meeting the President suddenly showed a negative response. Edamura suggested that 
disinformation about the negative mood in Tokyo must have been transmitted to the 
President, and that this must have influenced his decision for postponement.  
Edamura also introduced an interesting episode, which could be related to what 
happened in spring/summer of 1992. Edamura had strongly criticized Russian 
disinformation after Yeltsin’s decision in September to postpone his visit to Tokyo. In 
that context, he quoted a “mysterious document” which was circulated by the Russian 
side after the postponement, indicating that at the last visit made by Watanabe at the end 
of August until early September, the Russian side made an important concessionary 
proposal, but Watanabe rejected it and the Russian side concluded that Watanabe was 
not a wise diplomat.３０ If one interprets this proposal as actually having been made in 
March by Kozyrev and not in September, the chain of events may begin to become 
clear. 
Hasegawa also introduced information, which he heard from a “credible” Russian 
source, to the effect that at some point in the negotiations, the Russian side suggested to 
the Japanese side that the latter should propose the reversion of Habomai and Shikotan 
and continuation of negotiations on Kunashiri and Etorofu, but regrettably this proposal 
was refused by the Japanese side.３１ 
What really happened in this crucial period of negotiations from January to early 
September 1992 is still unknown. However, these primary source statements and 
information collected by journalists and researchers are compatible with the author’s 
description that a decisive concessionary proposal from the Russian side was not 
accepted by the Japanese side. The author carefully avoided in Hopporyodo direct 
criticism of the Tokyo leadership that failed to grasp this historic opportunity to reach a 
breakthrough in the relationship, but reading between the lines, his anger and regret 
seem to be immeasurable. 
 
The Tokyo Declaration and the rest of Yeltsin’s first presidency 
It took more than a year for the two sides to overcome the setback of Yeltsin’s 
cancellation of his visit to Tokyo. It was not an easy process. The US administration was 
determined to assist Yeltsin’s reform policy and in April 1993, despite hardened public 
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opinion, the Japanese government decided to launch another substantial economic 
assistance package of $1.82 billion. In July, it invited Yeltsin to the G7 summit and 
treated him cordially. From the end of September to early October, the domestic 
situation reached a crisis point in Russia, and a bloody power struggle took place in the 
Duma (parliament) building between the president and the Duma leaders. 
Yeltsin’s visit to Tokyo took place in the wake of this bloody battle, out of which 
Yeltsin reappeared as victor. The preparation was made very cautiously so as not to 
repeat the mistakes committed the year before. The Tokyo Declaration, which was 
adopted on October 13, had two pillars. It confirmed what Gorbachev-Kaifu had already 
agreed: that what was at stake was the question of to whom the four islands belonged, 
but also added three new principles of negotiations: historical and legal facts; 
documents already agreed by the two sides; and the principle of law and justice. The 
Japanese side welcomed these new principles, but it was not possible to decide that the 
application of these principles would directly conclude that the four islands belonged to 
Japan. 
The second pillar was related to the 1956 Joint Declaration. It was agreed in the 
Tokyo Declaration that “all treaties and international agreements between the Soviet 
Union and Japan would be applied between the Russian Federation and Japan.” 
However, President Yeltsin, when requested by Prime Minister Hosokawa not to 
contradict him at the Press Conference when he would state that there was no doubt that 
the 1956 Joint Declaration was included in those agreements, got very angry and replied 
‘I will only say what we have agreed today.’ In reality, at the press conference, when 
asked, Yeltsin conceded that the 1956 Declaration was included in the international 
agreements.３２ However, the fact that nothing concrete was written in the Tokyo 
Declaration and that the President did not say anything affirmative during his official 
negotiations with Prime Minister Hosokawa left some ambiguity regarding the validity 
of the 1956 Joint Declaration. 
Relations were brought back roughly to the stage where they had been in the 
preparatory stage awaiting Yeltsin’s visit to Tokyo in 1992. However, in the interval 
Yeltsin had become absorbed in domestic politics, trying to stabilize the economy and to 
overcome political strife. His decision to wage war against Chechnya from December 
1994 heightened tensions. Japan-Russia relations were not central in Russian political 
attention. After Yeltsin was re-elected president in July 1996, his heart failure prevented 




The fourth lost window of opportunity 
Yeltsin’s health recovered and he returned to the forefront of Russian governance from 
March 1997. Reform policy was activated internally, and externally Yeltsin took a series 
of important decisions. An agreement was reached between Russia and NATO in May, 
to eventually allow NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
Relations with Byelorussia and Ukraine were stabilized, and agreement was reached 
with Chechnya. However, NATO’s eastward expansion was not easy for the Russians to 
swallow. Russia’s initial naïve expectation that it would be accepted as a member of the 
European family by terminating the Cold War was betrayed, and NATO, whose mission 
was still perceived as opposing the Soviet Union, expanded its sphere closer to the 
Russian border. This turned Russian attention toward the east, where there was first of 
all China. Already, Russia-China relations were proceeding along the right track, 
particularly after Yeltsin cancelled his trip to Japan in 1992, and just before the 
presidential election in April 1996 upgraded bilateral relations by visiting China and 
establishing a “strategic cooperative partnership” accompanied by many concrete 
agreements. Japan was the major unaccomplished agenda in the east. 
     The author observed this development at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where 
he was after returning from Moscow in July 1996 as Deputy Director General of the 
Department of Europe and Oceania. Together with his colleagues at the Ministry, he 
strongly advised Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to grasp this opportunity and 
activate Russian policy. Hashimoto began to act. First of all, he agreed with President 
Clinton to let Russia become a member of the G8, while asking him to convey to Yeltsin 
that “Hashimoto is really serious about normalizing the relationship.” At the 
Hashimoto-Yeltsin meeting in Denver in June 1997 on the fringe of the G8 Summit, 
Hashimoto took the initiative to propose a summit somewhere east of the Urals 
specifically to consolidate personal trust. Hashimoto then made a historic speech on 
July 24 at the Keizai Doyukai, where he proposed to establish new relations based on 
the principles of trust, mutual interests, and long-term perspectives. Sarkisov noted that 
this marked “significant progress”３３in Hashimoto’s approach, and Wada analyzed that 
“for the Russian leadership, Hashimoto’s approach to go hand in hand with Russia was 
a pleasant message that went straight to their hearts”.３４ 
    Hashimoto’s initiative was reciprocated by Yeltsin, and the two leaders met in 
Krasnoyarsk on November 2-3, where Yeltsin proposed concluding a peace treaty by the 
year 2000. It was a proposal that genuinely shook the Tokyo leadership. For about half a 
year, Hashimoto and top officials working on Russia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
did their best to expand relations with Russia on all fronts. First, in November 1997, 
 21 
Hashimoto and Tamba, deputy foreign minister for political affairs, took the initiative to 
invite Russia to join APEC from 1998.３５ Second, Hashimoto proposed a cooperative 
scheme of economic cooperation, which was called the “Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan” at 
Krasnoyarsk, and followed it up in February 1998 with a decision to extend $1.5 billion 
of non-project financial loans to Russia. Third, he proposed an extremely important 
concessionary proposal to Russia on the territorial issue at the Kawana meeting with 
Yeltsin on 18-19 April 1998. 
     Because of a regrettable leakage of information, the contents of the Kawana 
proposal by Hashimoto were widely reported in the media from the day after it was 
proposed. However, the government took a cautious attitude, and refused to confirm this 
for years. Tamba, who was responsible for formulating this proposal, does not give any 
explanation about its nature in his memoir. The author explains in Hopporyodo what can 
be confirmed as authentic in the sea of public information. 
     Two years after the proposal was made, MOFA briefed the press that it was “a 
proposal which contained maximum possible compromise by the two sides, based on 
the delineation of the border between Etorofu and Uruppu.” The concept of ‘delineation 
of the border’ as such was one step towards a compromise from the Japanese side, 
compared with ‘return of the territory’. However, the delineation of the border between 
Etorofu and Uruppu entails Japan’s sovereignty over the four islands, and as such, does 
not include any element of concession. How, therefore could this be claimed as a 
proposal comprising maximum concessions from the Japanese side? As late as January 
4 2005, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shotaro Yachi briefed the press that in the 
Kawana proposal, “Japan accepts Russian administration for the time being”. The 
author states that there is no further information disclosed by the government on what 
“for the time being” means, but he reaffirms that since MOFA states that it was a 
proposal with maximum compromise, there should be substantial concessions in this 
notion of “for the time being”.３６ 
     Yeltsin showed a keen interest in this proposal at Kawana, but his advisors 
strongly discouraged him from jumping at it. After Kawana, Russia was struck by a 
financial crisis, Yeltsin’s health deteriorated, and Hashimoto had to leave office in July 
because of the LDP’s defeat in the House of Councilors’ election in July. By August the 
Russian financial situation reached the height of the crisis. 
     “Thus ten months after the Krasnoyarsk meeting, the fourth window of 
opportunity was closed. What was decisive then was general caution on the Russian side. 
President Yeltsin seemed to have understood intuitively that it was a compromise 
proposal considered deeply by the Japanese side. But because of its general caution, the 
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Russian side failed to grasp a historic opportunity to resolve this issue swiftly.”３７ 
     From September, Primakov was chosen as prime minister and the economic 
situation began to stabilize, but Yeltsin’s health continued to decline. Keizo Obuchi, 
who replaced Hashimoto, visited Moscow in November and the Russian side made their 
compromise proposal, i.e., to conclude two treaties, the first to introduce some kind of 
joint governance on the islands, and after some time, to conclude the second treaty to 
resolve the issue of border demarcation. However, the Japanese side did not agree to 
consider this as the basis of further negotiations. In 1999, apart from a ten-minute 
meeting on the fringe of the G8 summit in June in Köln, no meetings took place 
between the two leaders. 
     In August Yeltsin chose Vladimir Putin as the new prime minister, concurrently 
designating him his preferred candidate to be the next president. The author assumed the 
post of Director General of the European and Oceania Department at the end of August. 
By this time it was clear that the Russian side had no intention of agreeing to the 
Kawana proposal, and that the Japanese side was not ready to consider the Moscow 
proposal as the basis of negotiations. Obuchi met Putin at Auckland in September on the 
fringe of the APEC meeting, Hashimoto visited Moscow in October and had a telephone 
conversation with Yeltsin, but the negotiations were in deadlock. 
 
The Putin Period 
 
On December 31 1999, President Yeltsin announced his resignation and designated 
Vladimir Putin as acting-president, and asserted that the presidential election should 
take place in March. From that point, the negotiations acquired a completely different 
dynamic. 
 
The first stage of negotiations with Putin until September 2000  
The restructuring of negotiations was carried out logically, without any big surprises. 
The author hinted here and there of some signs of Japanese domestic strife. An open 
collision on Russian policy took place in August between Ichiro Suetsugu, a 
long-standing leader of the private sector movement for the reversion of the four islands 
and an influential fundamentalist, and Muneo Suzuki, a rising parliamentarian of a new 
breed advocating the need for a more flexible approach.３８ At MOFA the seeds of 
discord were reported between conservatives who did not dare to challenge a past policy 
for fear of taking risks and those who considered that maximum efforts should be made 
in order to determine what could be achieved in the peace treaty negotiations.３９ These 
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differences ultimately were crucial for the demise of negotiations after May 2001, but in 
the initial months after Putin’s rise to power, they did not appear too serious. 
     The negotiations were structured as follows. The Japanese side envisaged three 
phases to conclude a peace treaty by 2000. The first phase was until Putin’s formal 
election at the end of March. There should be no pressuring in the negotiations, and 
basically this should be a period of familiarization. The second phase was a preparatory 
stage for in-depth talk on the territorial issue. There should be one meeting in the spring, 
when the two leaders would focus on the big picture and introduce themselves to each 
other. Then, President Putin was due to come to Okinawa for the G8 summit in July, 
where they would have opportunities to deepen their contact both in the multilateral 
forum and in bilateral talks. The third stage started with Putin’s official visit, to take 
place either in conjunction with his Okinawa visit or soon after, and this was the point 
when they would have serious talks on the territorial issue. That third stage should be 
concluded by at least one more meeting at the very end of the term, because Russia’s 
possible ultimate concession might be made only at this final stage. 
     Thus, on April 29 Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, who replaced Obuchi formally 
after Obuchi fell into a coma, visited St. Petersburg and met with Putin. As intended 
they exchanged views on broad issues pertaining to Japan-Russia relations, and 
discussed critical issues concerning the upcoming G8 summit in Okinawa. Mori 
received Putin warmly in Okinawa on July 21-23, and bilateral talks were held bearing 
the character of a preparatory meeting for Putin’s official visit, which was arranged on 
September 3-5. On the peace treaty negotiations, the Japanese side planned a strategy of 
agreeing on a paper incorporating those items which the two sides could accept without 
much pressuring, such as confirmation of the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, a list of 
confidence-building measures taken around the four islands, and determination to 
continue efforts to realize the agreement reached at Krasnoyarsk by the end of the year. 
In other words, through this agreement, the Tokyo side intended to ensure that there 
would be one more meeting before the countdown of the Krasnoyarsk meeting was 
over. 
   
Seven months of negotiations and the Irkutsk meeting 
Putin made his official visit to Tokyo as scheduled on September 3-5 2000. Mori and 
Putin had in-depth exchanges on the territorial issue, and signed a paper exactly as 
intended by the Japanese side. However, this visit had an unexpected development. 
Putin stated at his first plenary meeting with Mori on September 4 that he considered 
the 1956 Joint Declaration to be in effect. It was the point that Gorbachev had openly 
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negated in 1991 and Yeltsin had avoided addressing in the official meeting in 1993. 
     From this point onward, until the Irkutsk meeting in March 2001, for seven 
months the negotiations were conducted with an entirely different vigor. The most vivid 
part of Hopporyodo is the description of the process of these seven months and the 
author’s interpretation as to what happened, how it happened and why it happened.  
     First, the author outlined his basic position taken in September-October 2000 on 
how the Japanese government should deal with Putin’s new stance on the 1956 Joint 
Declaration. He proposed to take it as the new basis of negotiations with the Russian 
side. He hinted that his own views were questioned and sometimes contradicted, but 
they finally achieved a consensus within the foreign ministry debate. There were three 
reasons for him to pursue this line: first, Putin’s answer was in response to the Japanese 
request in 1991 and in 1993, and Japan had no reason to back away from it; second, 
given Russian logic displayed thus far, there were grounds for considering that, by way 
of following up the 1956 Joint Declaration approach, Russia would move to the point of 
agreeing to the transfer of the two smaller islands and enter into genuine talks on what 
to do about the two larger islands; third, even if these negotiations failed and the 
Russian side ultimately refused to make any compromise on Kunashiri and Etorofu, the 
Japanese side had nothing to lose because then Japan simply might close this round of 
negotiations and wait for the next occasion to arise.４０ 
     Second, the author gives a detailed description in Hopporyodo of how the 
negotiations were held rhythmically, shifting between three levels: the official, foreign 
minister, and prime minister. The gist of the negotiations was how to consider the issue 
of Kunashiri and Etorofu, based on the acknowledgement of the 1956 Joint Declaration. 
The chronology of events was as follows. 
 October 23, Tokyo: meeting between Kato, deputy foreign minister for political 
affairs, and Losyukov, deputy foreign minister on Asian affairs: better 
understanding of the legal position of the two sides; 
 November 3, Moscow: meeting between Foreign Minister Kono and Foreign 
Minister Ivanov: discussing all issues raised by President Putin in September in 
Tokyo; 
 November 15, Brunei, on the fringe of the ASEM meeting: meeting between Mori 
and Putin: in-depth talks on the issue of the two (smaller islands) vs. the two (larger 
islands), and agreement reached to hold the last meeting for this round of 
negotiations in Irkutsk; 
 November 30, December 1, Moscow: meeting between Togo and Losyukov: 
in-depth talks on the issue of the two vs. the two, starting the discussion of the 
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document to be adopted in Irkutsk; 
 January 16, 2001, Moscow: meeting between Kono and Ivanov: in-depth talks on 
the issue of the two vs. the two and agreement reached on the date of the Irkutsk 
meeting, but confusion then occurred because the Russian side proposed to 
postpone the date for one month; 
 February 13: telephone conversation between Mori and Putin: agreement on the 
date of the Irkutsk meeting; 
 March 5, Tokyo: meeting between Kato and Losyukov: substantial discussion on 
the document to be adopted at Irkutsk; 
 March 19, Moscow: meeting between Togo and Losyukov, basic agreement on the 
document to be adopted at Irkutsk; 
 March 25, Irkutsk: meeting between Mori and Putin 
     Third, thus the two leaders met at Irkutsk and adopted a joint communiqué in 
which they agreed that “the 1956 Joint Declaration is a basic legal document to mark 
the starting point of negotiations” and that “the purpose of the conclusion of the peace 
treaty is to resolve the issue of where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai 
belong.”  
     Furthermore, as the result of all-out efforts on the Japanese side, Mori proposed a 
format of exchanges, which later came to be called “parallel talks”, namely, to “talk 
about the issue of the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan and the issue of the sovereignty 
of Kunashiri and Etorofu in a parallel manner, like two wheels of a car. It is hoped that 
we may be able to conduct dynamic negotiations so that progress at the talks regarding 
Habomai and Shikotan and progress regarding Kunashiri and Etorofu would influence 
each other in a positive way”. Mori backed up this proposal with his position that the 
“Japanese side will not give up, either in the past, present or future, Kunashiri and 
Etorofu.”４１To this proposal, Putin’s answer was: “Let us see.”４２ 
     Putin’s response was critically important. Mori’s proposal was not rejected, and 
this left grounds to think that the parallel talks might really start. At the same time there 
was a certain vagueness to his answer. Thus, the author traveled to Moscow and had his 
last meeting with Losyukov on April 5, questioning whether the negotiations would 
continue with the same momentum as in the past seven months. Losyukov pondered a 
while and then said: “Yes, Mr. Togo, there are reasonable grounds to think that way. But 
unfortunately this will not happen during your tenure in the present position.” The 
author was due to leave the post of Director General at the end of April. Despite this 
expectation of a delay, the author did become convinced that the Russian side was 
prepared to start the parallel talks. 
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     Fourth, if the parallel talks had proceeded, what would have happened? The 
author explains that the purpose of the parallel talks was to discuss two issues: one 
being the transfer of two smaller islands, and the other the sovereignty of the two larger 
islands. What could one expect at the end of those talks, particularly regarding the two 
larger islands? Logically, there are only three possibilities. First, after serious talks, the 
Russian side concludes that there is no room for any concessions on Kunashiri and 
Etorofu. Japan would respond by closing this round of negotiations. Second, the 
Russian side might conclude that the only way to ultimately resolve this issue is to 
transfer Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan, or at least to agree to delineate the border 
between Etorofu and Uruppu. The Japanese side would accept it and the peace treaty 
would be concluded. Third, what if the Russian side proposed something in between? 
For instance, the “Russian side does not object that the Japanese side raises the issue of 
Kunashiri and Etorofu, but at this point, X,Y,Z is the maximum to which Russia can 
agree.” This would result in a formula which can be called “two islands first”. The 
author makes it clear that this formula has never been placed on the table of negotiations, 
and that the Japanese side never decided to base its official position on it. He just gives 
his own view that should the Russian side make this proposal, there would be a need for 
sincere study by the Japanese side. As we all now know, since the negotiations did not 
advance even an inch after Irkutsk, there is no real way to guess in which direction the 
negotiations would have proceeded had they continued.  
Fifth, the author emphasized and illustrated that trust among negotiators was at a 
completely different level, particularly in contrast to the bitter situation he found for 
himself from January to May 1989. In conjunction with the October talks at the 
officials’ level, the author wrote that “From this meeting there emerged an atmosphere 
of greater trust among the negotiators, particularly at the officials’ level, and there 
emerged many more opportunities to discuss matters outside official contacts and 
exchange personal views, not constrained by official position. This became an important 
undercurrent leading the negotiations toward Irkutsk.”４３ The author does not give 
many concrete examples, but one example is the frank and straightforward talk between 
Panov and the author on March 24 in Irkutsk on the eve of the Heads of States meeting, 
trying to maximize the outcome on the following day.４４  
The author left the following messages to Panov and Losyukov with whom he 
had worked closely. To Panov: “It is certainly true that Putin’s rise to the presidency 
became a critical factor to enhance negotiations. But as far as I am concerned, what 
really counted was Panov’s presence in Tokyo as Russian ambassador. It is no 
exaggeration for both of us, that without the presence of the other, the seven months of 
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negotiations, as they turned out, could not have taken place.”４５ To Losyukov: “(At the 
last meeting with him on April 5, 2001) At the end of the meeting, when others had left 
the room, I told the deputy minister how fortunate it was to have been able to have him 
as my counterpart in Moscow, and I thanked him for his courage and enthusiasm in 
acting so decisively to advance the negotiations, and asked him for his continuous 
support for the negotiations. Losyukov greeted me with warm words and said at the end 
that he was slightly concerned how the Japanese side would deal with the negotiations 
after my departure. I told him not to worry, because we worked as a team, and that we 
would continue to do so.” 
Sixth, this message proved to be erroneous. Some of the seeds for the later 
collapse of the Japanese negotiating position had been planted during those seven 
months. The author described his efforts trying to overcome these seeds of domestic 
constraint. Some examples were as follows. 
 In an evening edition of one of the major newspapers on September 4, the day the 
first round of talks between Mori and Putin was held in Tokyo, there appeared an 
article that “Director General Togo briefed Prime Minister Mori with an idea of 
getting back the sovereignty of two smaller islands first.” This was totally 
unfounded disinformation, but its impact cannot be underestimated. Despite being 
untrue, it created such a negative atmosphere and harmed MOFA’s credibility that it 
took about two months to recover from it. In fact, at the end of August there had 
already been a press leak about a draft proposal of the document to be adopted 
during Putin’s visit to Tokyo in September. Judging from the contents of the leak, 
only a tiny circle within the Foreign Ministry was in a position to have passed along 
that document. Something weird was haunting our relationship with the press.４６ 
 By the end of 2000, there emerged in the press reports that the negotiations were 
drifting to the “two islands first approach” which was tantamount to a “two islands 
only approach”: Muneo Suzuki was taking the lead in this direction, and weak and 
unprincipled MOFA diplomats such as Kazuhiko Togo were being pressured to 
adopt such an unprincipled and risky line; MOFA was spilt between traditional 
principled diplomats who adhered to ‘the four islands in a bunch’ approach and 
unprincipled diplomats. Against this tide, I did everything I could to meet with the 
media, and explain that what we were aiming at was to enter into serious and 
substantive negotiations on Kunashiri and Etorofu.４７ 
 In order to cope with this impossible situation of press leakage, following the hint 
of another director general, I began convening a meeting of the top five senior 
MOFA officials without the attendance of any subordinates: the vice minister for 
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foreign affairs, deputy minister for foreign affairs on political matters, director 
general on long term policy planning, director general of the treaties bureau and 
director general of European affairs. In accord with the framework of open 
discussion inside MOFA, I decided to raise really sensitive political issues (both 
domestically and externally) exclusively in this forum from October onwards. 
Nothing that was discussed there leaked to the press.４８ 
 
The fifth lost window of opportunity 
Unfortunately, all these achievements and efforts were reduced practically to naught 
after Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka assumed 
their posts on April 26 2001. The purpose of Hopporyodo is not to give a detailed 
analysis on this domestic front. Nevertheless, key aspects are described. The first point 
that needs to be understood is the role that Foreign Minister Tanaka played in that 
turmoil. On Russian policy, her thinking was fixated on the idea that what her father, 
Kakuei Tanaka, did in negotiating with Brezhnev in 1973 marked the height of 
negotiations and that negotiations should be returned to that point.４９ All efforts, 
including the author’s efforts in the brief period between April 26 and May 1 when he 
left the post of Director General of European Affairs, to explain to her that progress has 
been made since 1973 and that now there was a new road map to follow proved to be 
useless. Tanaka was simply unwilling or incapable of understanding them. Not only did 
Tanaka scramble the policy direction, but she also imposed her will on personnel 
matters and openly reversed official assignments decided by her predecessor Kono. This 
added to the confusion in the ministry, which was reported by the media in a dramatic 
manner that further aggravated matters. 
     The net result was the first real political turmoil. Muneo Suzuki, who strongly 
supported the proactive policy toward Russia, including the Krasnoyarsk-Kawana 
process and the Irkutsk Mori-Putin meeting, began to take an open stance against 
Tanaka. MOFA was thrown into confusion by this political rivalry, but the ministry 
leadership sided on the whole with Suzuki to check Tanaka, who was becoming 
increasingly unbearable. 
     On the Russian policy aspect, again the ministry was split, but the line advanced 
by Mori still had some life, and at the Shanghai APEC meeting in October 2001, 
Koizumi proposed to go back to the parallel talk approach, and it was reported that 
Putin accepted it. However, in early 2002 a second blow overwhelmed Russian policy. 
At the Tokyo Afghanistan assistance conference in January Suzuki and Tanaka clashed 
head on over whether to allow the participation of an influential NGO. This resulted in 
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the ministry using Suzuki’s political clout to have Tanaka removed from the position of 
minister for foreign affairs, while the top diplomat at home, the vice-minister for foreign 
affairs, had to resign as well. After this dual resignation, the ministry’s new leadership 
decided to excise Suzuki’s power over the ministry, because they feared that it was 
considerably strengthened through the cooperation he achieved in fighting against 
Tanaka. Suzuki bashing, and the bashing of those who were considered to be close to 
Suzuki, including Togo and Masaru Sato, an influential specialist on Russian affairs, 
became the ministry’s direction, and this evolved into a big political scandal from 
February to the summer of 2002. Thus, Togo was forced to resign from the ministry at 
the end of April; Sato was arrested in May on charges of misappropriation of financial 
expenses for a symposium which was held in Israel in 2000; and Suzuki was also 
arrested in June on several counts involving bribery.  
Panov’s memoir as the Russian ambassador at the time of Koizumi’s assumption 
of power may be another primary source describing concisely the state of confusion. 
His line of analysis is basically the same as Hopporyodo, and he publicly defended 
those who were discredited in this period in Tokyo: “Those discredited diplomats 
sincerely worked in order to create a new type of relations between Russia and Japan, 
relations which fundamentally differ from the Cold War period, and which meet the 
needs of the era. They were professionals with high quality and a deep sense of 
responsibility. None of them in any formal or informal occasion ever expressed their 
readiness to resolve this issue with Habomai and Shikotan alone.”５０ Gilbert Rozman’s 
early analysis on the demise of Japan’s policy in this period catches astutely the state of 
confusion and turmoil that occurred in this period.５１ Joseph Ferguson recently 
published an overall analysis of Japanese-Russian relations 1907-2007, and outlined in 
a comprehensive manner events which took place during the Putin’s years.５２ 
On a personal note, both Sato and Suzuki were found guilty in the district court, 
appealed to the high court and are waiting for a Supreme Court final verdict. However, 
in March 2005 Sato published the book Kokkano Wana (Trap of the State), describing 
the whole process of his arrest and the political intrigues behind it. The book became a 
best-seller, and since then Sato has re-emerged as a prolific writer and influential voice 
in Japanese society. Muneo Suzuki was re-elected to the Diet in September 2005, and 
since then has become a representative of a one-man party Daichi (Soil) and, thus, was 
rehabilitated in his own way. Togo spent four years abroad and came back to Japan in 
June and July 2006 to testify on Sato’s behalf at the Tokyo high court, and in May 2007 
he published Hopporyodo and since then has normalized his situation in Japan. 
However, Japan’s relations with Russia never became the same. Koizumi visited 
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Moscow in January 2003, and agreed to an Action Plan on a broad range of relations. It 
was reported that the Japanese government reverted to the Kawana approach after 
Putin’s reelection in 2004. Putin’s urge to go back to the 1956 Joint Declaration in 
December 2004 was met with a cold shoulder, and Putin almost instantaneously 
hardened his position by stating that the Russian offer excludes Kunashiri and Etorofu. 
Putin’s official visit in 2005 was made in this atmosphere of rift, and no communiqué on 
political matters could be issued. After Abe’s succession to power in September 2006 
and Fukuda’s rise in September 2007 on the Japanese side, and Medvedev’s assumption 
of the presidency in May 2008, the language used by the two sides became less 
provocative and the overall atmosphere more forthcoming. However, nothing 




Firstly, Hopporyodo traces in unprecedented detail the centrality of the logic that 
shaped the negotiations for the 16 years from 1985 to 2001, around the issue of the two 
(smaller islands) vs. the two (larger islands). It tries to analyze the outcome of each 
stage of negotiations, which side did what, who conceded what and why did they not 
succeed. A unique conclusion that there were altogether five missed opportunities is 
drawn. The author, unusually for a former diplomat who negotiated on behalf of his own 
country, does not hide his views that mistakes were made by not only the other side, but 
also his own. Indeed, he acknowledges a lot of shortcomings in the way negotiations 
were carried out by the Japanese side. In general one gets an impression that the first 
(Gorbachev’s first period) and the fourth (Yeltsin’s second period) failed due to Russian 
rigidity, whereas the second (Gorbachev’s second period), the third (Yeltsin’s first 
period) and the fifth (Putin’s period) failed because of Japanese inability to grasp the 
opportunity afforded. 
Secondly, in reviewing the 16 years of negotiations, the role and responsibility of 
individuals who were in charge are amply emphasized in Hopporyodo. Each round of 
negotiations depended on the way it was handled by policy makers and negotiators. 
There were structural factors that conditioned their decision-making process. However, 
there were areas of decision making where freedom of choice and individual 
responsibility counted heavily.  
At the first missed opportunity (Gorbachev’s first period), the Cold War rigidity in 
dealing with each other still affected deeply the relationship. The relations could have 
been manipulated by those political forces which did not want to see improvement in 
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them. However, there was no effective buffer to prevent this from happening or waging 
effective counter measures against them. One may consider this as structural behavior 
on the Soviet side, and corresponding structural weakness on the Japanese side. 
At the second missed opportunity (Gorbachev’s second period) some structural 
rigidity on the side of Japanese policy makers and negotiators was pointed out in 
conjunction with Foreign Minister Uno’s rigid statement in Paris in 1989. That rigidity 
originated from the vestiges of Cold War thinking. The author, having been in a 
responsible position in formulating policy in Paris, seriously questioned retrospectively 
that had he, or the Japanese leadership, been more emancipated from Cold War thinking, 
they might have been able to produce a different outcome, a more content-rich 
Gorbachev visit. 
At the third missed opportunity (Yeltsin’s first period), the author was not 
involved personally in the crucial decision-making process. However, having learned 
afterwards what happened during this period, he makes it clear that there was a failure 
in policy choices, and policy makers at that point did not fulfill their responsibility. 
There was no evidence that other policy makers learned from the experience under 
Gorbachev and tried to adopt a more realistic policy for Japan to achieve its goal. 
At the fourth missed opportunity (Yeltsin’s second period), the Japanese side 
learned lessons from past mistakes and did not hesitate to propose a courageous 
proposal to break the impasse. Unfortunately, this was not accepted, but there are no 
grounds to argue that the Japanese proposal was a mistake that should not have been 
launched. 
Awareness of the past failures was very much in the mind of the author when the 
first round of negotiations started with President Putin. There was a resolute and 
conscious awareness not to make this round the fifth missed opportunity. Very 
consciously the author tried to fulfill the responsibility to grasp the opportunity as it was 
opened in front of him. The negotiations proceeded unexpectedly well, and then, they 
were crushed for domestic reasons. The author did not expect that the fifth window of 
opportunity would close in this way. Individual responsibility was fulfilled in 
negotiating with the Russians, but it failed in overcoming domestic constraint. Was this 
domestic resistance structural? How should we consider the responsibility of other 
negotiators who bent their heads in the face of domestic pressure? What the author 
stated at the very end of the Epilogue indicated that he regretted very much that he 
could not have overcome domestic constraints as they existed, was critical of those who 
did not act effectively to pursue the policy line to achieve a breakthrough, and hoped 
that this would not be repeated: “I hope that young diplomats will have the courage to 
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propose a policy, which realistically can solve the problem, in a situation where they 
alone might see the practicability of that policy, taking into account the reality which 
exists on the other side.”５３ 
Thirdly, the analysis of the book is not limited only to the territorial negotiations. 
Rather, the author is also trying to direct attention to where the territorial issue stands in 
the overall policy toward Russia. The author reports his basic perception in preparation 
for Shevardnadze’s visit in December 1988: that Japan-Russia relations are comprised 
of three pillars: resolution of the territorial issue; expansion of bilateral relations at the 
center of which lie economic issues; and adequate handling of security issues and 
international issues particularly related to the Asia Pacific region.５４ 
The five rounds of negotiations were a continuing process, according to the author, 
whereby the Japanese side tried to expand, step by step as it were, the scope of the 
relationship. Under Gorbachev, it started with the concept of balanced equilibrium in 
1989, and a series of relatively small agreements were concluded in 1991. Under Yeltsin, 
economic assistance toward reforming Russia started with $2.5 billion of project 
assistance (1991), adding another $1.83 billion in the same category (1993), 
culminating with an additional $1.5 billion of non-project loans (1998). Security 
cooperation saw its breakthrough in 1996 by a ministerial visit and escort vessel’s port 
visit. Japan took considerable leadership in accepting Russia into APEC in 1997. Thus, 
although the author does not say so explicitly in Hopporyodo, he gives the impression 
that in the first year under Putin, resolution of the territorial issue remained as the major 
unresolved issue within the broad spectrum of the relationship.  
This evaluation may not be supported fully on the Russian side. In fact, Panov 
was constantly critical of a lack of initiative on the Japanese side to strengthen 
Japan-Russia relations in areas other than the territorial issue. As stated above, for 
Panov, Japan’s slowness to create attractive economic projects was one of the reasons 
for the failure of the first window of opportunity in 1986-88. Even for the failure of the 
third window of opportunity before Yeltsin’s postponed visit in 1991, Panov singled out 
Japan’s lack of initiative in attractive economic projects, as mentioned above. In the 
concluding part of his memoir covering his period as Ambassador to Japan from 1996 to 
2003, Panov emphasized his hope that “I expect that the locomotive called ‘economic 
cooperation’ would put the train called ‘Russo-Japanese relations’ on the right track and 
gradually succeed in speeding up that train.”５５ 
     Fourthly, we come finally to the theoretical assumption underlying Hopporyodo. 
The essence of the territorial issue as seen by the author derives from a nation’s concept 
of honor, how it was betrayed and what to do to regain it. It is strongly associated with 
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perceptions of a country’s self-identity. However, the international context within which 
the 16 years of negotiations took place from 1985 to 2001 was a turbulent period 
encompassing the demise of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian Federation. It 
was a period of fundamental changes in power and values. The Soviet Union lost its 
position as one of the two superpowers, and transformed itself into a new Russian 
Federation: weakened, less militaristic, more democratic and market-oriented. The 
territorial negotiations were conducted against the background of this phenomenal 
change. Thus, the major three factors that are critical to contemporary theories of 
International Relations, namely, identity, power and values, all play an important role in 
Hopporyodo.  
However, the author does not take a structuralist approach towards any IR 
theories. His approach is more eclectic in acknowledging the role of identity, power and 
values respectively, but what is characteristic of his writing is seeing the interplay of 
these factors through the function of individuals who were in positions of decision 
making and conducting negotiations. What is the theoretical basis of understanding the 
role of individuals in the current social sciences?  
The author finds a part of this theoretical basis in foreign policy analysis dealing 
with crisis situations, advanced by Graham Allison５６, Irving Janis５７ and James 
Richardson５８. These analyses offer rich insight into the decision-making process and 
the role of individuals therein. Analysis of the decision-making process is better 
understood when it is properly integrated within the holistic range of International 
Relations theory. The author thinks that, rather than rigid determinism, whether in the 
form of structural realism or institutional liberalism, constructivism gives proper light to 
the role of individuals. Constructivism, based on the analysis given by Alexander Wendt, 
puts socially constructed ideas or perceptions at the center of state action, and it is 
identities and interests which underline these ideas and perceptions.５９ The role of 
individuals, including their freedom of action and entailing responsibility, is best 





                                                   
１ Kazuhiko Togo, Hopporyodo Koshohiroku: Ushinawareta Gotabino Kikai (The 
Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territory: Five Lost Window of 
Opportunities) (Tokyo, Shinchosha, 2007) 
２ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp.384-85 
３ For further analyses see Tsuyoshi Haegawa, “Russia and Historical Memory in East 
 34 
                                                                                                                                                     
Asia”, in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo (ed.), East Asia’s Haunted Present: 
Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Westport, Praeger Security 
International, 2008) pp.220-36; Kazuhiko Togo, “Nichirokankeiwo Saikochiku 
Surutameni”, Sekai 2008.10, pp.53-62; Kazuhiko Togo, “The Contemporary 
Implications of the Russo-Japanese War: A Japanese Perspective” in Dartmouth 
University (ed.) Russo-Japanese War, to be published in 2008    
４ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp.133-34 
５ The most well-known statement was made by Director General Kumao Nishimura on 
October 19, 1951 at the Diet, that “The Kuriles include Northern and Southern Kurile, 
but American authority confirmed that Habomai and Shikotan are not included.” Haruki 
Wada also quotes the statement made by Parliamentary Deputy Minister to the same 
effect on October 20. (Haruki Wada, Hopporyodo Mondai, (Tokyo, Asahi Shinbunsha, 
1999), pp.225-27.) Nishimura’s statement is also referred to in the Joint Compendium 
on the History of the Japan-Russia Territorial Issue, published by the Japanese and 
Russian Foreign Ministry in September 1992, “Prologue” p.3. Kimie Hara quoted in her 
dissertation a booklet issued in November 1946 in English by the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry, specifying that the Kurile Islands include Kunashiri and Etorofu, but Habomai 
and Shikotan constitute a different entity (Kimie Hara, Japanese- Soviet/Russian 
Relations since 1945, (New York, Routledge, 1998), pp.24-30). 
６ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp.134-35 
７ Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy 
Relationship, 1972 to the 1990’s, (London, Hurst & Company, 1995), p. 78 
８ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Hopporyodo Mondaito Nichirokankei, (Tokyo, Chikuma, 2000), 
pp. 106-13; Togo, Hopporyodo, pp.114-16 
９ Togo, Hopporyodo, p.115 
１０ Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors, Volume 2: Japanese-Russian Relations under 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, (New York, M.E, Sharpe, 2000), pp. 25-26 
１１ Hasegawa, Hopporyodo, pp. 106-07 
１２ Anatolii Chernyaev, Gorubachevto Unmeiwotomonishita 2000nichi,（Tokyo, 
Ushio-shuppan, 1994）pp.416-17 
１３ Alexander Panov, Post-war Japan-Soviet/Japan-Russia relations 1945-1995 and 
Japanese diplomats [in Russian], (Moscow, MGIMO, 1994) pp. 54-55 
１４ Togo, Hopporyodo, p.116-19 
１５ Kazuhiko Togo, Nichiro Shinjidaiheno Jyoso, (Tokyo, Simul-shuppan, 1993) 
pp.13-15, 22-25 
１６ Togo, Hopporyodo, p.124 
１７ Hasegawa, Hopporyodo, p. 140, p.151 
１８ Alexander Panov, Fushinkara Shinraihe, (Tokyo, Simul-shuppankai, 1992), p.34 
１９ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 130-31 
２０ Togo, Nichiro, pp.157-68, Panov, Fushinkara, pp.82-85 
２１ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 132-33 
２２ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 137-38 
２３ Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorubachevu Kaisoroku II, (Tokyo, Shinchosha, 1996), p. 329  
２４ Five principles: support reform in the Soviet Union; expand substantially 
cooperation with the Russian Federation; cooperate to accept the S.U. in the Asia 
 35 
                                                                                                                                                     
Pacific region; cooperate to accept the S.U. to the IMF and World Bank; resolve the 
territorial problem based on the principle of law and justice (Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 159)  
２５ Alexander Panov, Kumori Nochi Hare, (Tokyo, NHK-Shuppan, 2004), p.18 
２６ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp.164-73 
２７ Kazuo Sato and Akiyoshi Komaki, Nichiro Kokkyo Kosho, (Tokyo, Iwanami-shoten, 
2003), p.28 
２８ Georgi Kunadze, “A Russian view of Russo-Japanese Relations, 1991-1993”, in 
Gilbert Rozman (ed.), Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 
1949-1999, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 172 
２９ Panov, Kumori, p.18 
３０ Sumio Edamura, Teikoku Kaitai Zengo, (Tokyo, Toshi-shuppan, 1997), p. 282 
３１ Hasegawa, Hopporyodo, p.286 
３２ Minoru Tamba, Nichiro Gaiko Hiwa, (Tokyo, Chuokoron, 2004), pp. 211-12 
３３ Konstantin Sarkisov, “Russo-Japanese Relations after Yeltsin’s Reelection in 1996”, 
in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 
1949-1999, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 231-33 
３４ Wada, Hopporyodo, pp. 368-70  
３５ In the area of defense-security, it should be noted that as early as 1996, the Minister 
of State for Defense’s visit to Moscow in April and a Maritime Self Defense Force 
escort vessel’s port visit to Vladivostok in July had made a breakthrough in the dormant 
relations（Togo, Hopporyodo, p.192）. 
３６ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp.244-46 
３７ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp.256-57 
３８ Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 315 
３９ Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 314 
４０ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 323-25 
４１ Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 356 
４２ Tamba, Nichiro, p. 289 
４３ Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 328 
４４ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 350-53 
４５ Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 365 
４６ Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 323 
４７ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 334-37 
４８ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 337-38 
４９ Muneo Suzuki and Masaru Sato, Hopporyodo Tokumei Kosho, (Tokyo, Kodansha, 
2007) p. 207 
５０ Panov, Kumori, pp.169-70 
５１ Gilbert Rozman, “A Chance for a breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations: will the 
logic of great power relations prevail?” The Pacific Review, Vol.15 No 3, 2002: pp. 
325-57  
５２ Joseph Ferguson, Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907-2007, (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2008). Ferguson made a particularly relevant analysis for this period in pp. 98-110 
５３ Togo, Hopporyodo, pp. 393-94 
５４ Togo, Hopporyodo, p. 120 
５５ Panov, Kumori, p.227 
５６ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikov, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban 
 36 
                                                                                                                                                     
Missile Crisis (New York, Longman, 1971/1999) 
５７ Irving Janis, Groupthink, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982) 
５８ James Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
５９ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge 




Graham Allison and Philip Zelikov, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (New York, Longman, 1971/1999). 
 
Anatolii Chernyaev, Gorubachevto Unmeiwotomonishita 2000nichi (Tokyo, 
Ushio-shuppan, 1994). 
 
Sumio Edamura, Teikoku Kaitai Zengo (Tokyo, Toshi-shuppan, 1997). 
 
Joseph Ferguson, Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907-2007 (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2008). 
 
Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 
1972 to the 1990’s (London, Hurst & Company, 1995). 
 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorubachevu Kaisoroku II (Tokyo, Shinchosha, 1996). 
 
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Hopporyodo Mondaito Nichirokankei (Tokyo, Chikuma, 2000). 
 
Tsuyoshi Haegawa, “Russia and Historical Memory in East Asia”, in Tsuyoshi  
Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo ed., East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories 
and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Westport, Praeger Security Internationa, 2008).  
 
Kimie Hara, Japanese- Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945 (New York, Routledge, 
1998). 
 
Irving Janis, Groupthink (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982). 
 
Japanese and Russian Foreign Ministry, The Joint Compendium on the History of the 
Japan-Russia Territorial Issue,1992. 
 
Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors Volume two: Japanese Russian Relations under 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin (New York, M.E, Sharpe, 2000). 
 
Georgi Kunadze, “A Russian view of Russo-Japanese Relations, 1991-1993”, in Gilbert 
Rozman ed., Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999 (New 
York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
 
 37 
                                                                                                                                                     
Alexander Panov, Fushinkara Shinraihe (Tokyo, Simul-shuppankai, 1992). 
 
Alexander Panov, Post-war Japan-Soviet/Japan-Russia relations 1945-1995 and 
Japanese diplomats [in Russian], (Moscow, MGIMO, 1994). 
 
Alexander Panov, Kumori Nochi Hare (Tokyo, NHK-Shuppan, 2004). 
 
Gilbert Rozman, “A Chance for a breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations: will the 
logic of great power relations prevail?” The Pacific Review, Vol.15 No 3, (2002: pp. 
325-57) 
 
Konstantin Sarkisov, “Russo-Japanese Relations after Yeltsin’s Reelection in 1996”, in 
Gilbert Rozman ed., Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999 
(New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
 
Kazuo Sato and Akiyoshi Komaki, Nichiro Kokkyo Kosho (Tokyo, Iwanami-shoten, 
2003). 
 
Muneo Suzuki and Masaru Sato, Hopporyodo Tokumei Kosho (Tokyo, Kodansha, 
2007).  
 
James Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 
Minoru Tamba, Nichiro Gaiko Hiwa (Tokyo, Chuokoron, 2004). 
 
Kazuhiko Togo, Nichiro Shinjidaiheno Jyoso (Tokyo, Simul-shuppan, 1993).  
 
Kazuhiko Togo, Hopporyodo Koshohiroku: Ushinawareta Gotabino Kikai (The Inside 
Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territory: Five Lost Window of Opportunities) 
(Tokyo, Shinchosha, 2007). 
 
Kazuhiko Togo, “The Contemporary Implications of the Russo-Japanese War: A 
Japanese Perspective” in Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley ed., The Treaty of 
Portsmouth and its legacies (Hanover, Dartmouth College Press, 2008). 
 
Kazuhiko Togo, “Nichirokankeiwo Saikochiku Surutameni”, Sekai (2008.10, pp.53-62). 
 
Haruki Wada, Hopporyodo Mondai (Tokyo, Asahi Shinbunsha, 1999). 
 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge UK, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
 
 38 
Hopporyodo Kosho Hiroku: Ushinawareta Gotabino Kikai, (The Inside Story of the 
Negotiations on the Northern Territory: Five Lost Windows of Opportunity), Tokyo, 



















                                        目次 
プロローグ 証言台                                          40                   
第一章 ソルジェニーツィンにならって                        46           
第二章 ロシアとの出会い──青年外交官時代                   112        
第三章 ゴルバチョフ書記長の登場                           153             
第四章 ゴルバチョフ大統領の日本訪問                       178          
第五章 ロシア連邦の成立                                   201                
第六章 ロシア「九二年提案」と東京宣言                     215         
第七章 ロシア内政の季節                                   238                
第八章 エリツィン第二期政権の始動                         271           
第九章 クラスノヤルスクと川奈                             303             
第十章 プーチン首相の登場                                 341               
第十一章 プーチン政権との交渉開始                         363           
第十二章 イルクーツクへの七カ月間交渉                     396         
第十三章 二〇〇一年三月イルクーツク──                    429       
第十四章 二〇〇五年三月モスクワ──                        458          




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 「くれてなお 命の限り 蝉しぐれ 
     東郷君   康弘 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ten tijde van de eerste gemiste kans onder Gorbachev in 1986-88, had de starheid in de 
betrekkingen tussen Japan en de Sovjet Unie grote invloed op de wijze waarop beide 
landen met elkaar omgingen. Het kan zijn dat de betrekkingen door Russische politieke 
krachtenvelden werden gemanipuleerd omdat er geen verbetering van de betrekkingen 
werd beoogd maar er was eveneens sprake van structurele zwakte aan Japanse zijde.   
 
Ten aanzien van de tweede gemiste kans onder Gorbachev in  1989, vormde enige 
structurele starheid van de Japanse beleidsmakers een belemmering voor een sneller 
ontwikkeling van de betrekkingen. Destijds had de schrijver het gevoel dat hij de goede 
beslissing had genomen  maar achteraf gezien vraagt hij zich toch af of het Japanse 
leiderschap, indien dit het koude oorlog denken meer ontgroeid zou zijn geweest , niet in 
staat had kunnen zijn om tot een andere uitkomst te komen, namelijk een inhoudelijk 
meer vruchtbaar bezoek van Gorbachev in 1991. 
 
Met betrekking tot de derde gemiste kans onder Yeltsin in 1992, betwist de schrijver - 
die overigens daar niet bij betrokken was - met stelligheid dat er aan Japanse zijde was 
gefaald in het maken van beleidskeuzes. Er bestaat geen indicatie voor het feit dat 
andere beleidsmakers wellicht van de ervaringen onder Gorbachev geleerd zouden 
hebben en een poging gewaagd zouden hebben om in het kader van de Japanse 









Voor wat betreft de vierde gemiste kans onder Yeltsin in 1997-98, zijn er van Japanse 
zijde lessen getrokken uit de vergissingen gemaakt in het verleden en werd er niet 
geaarzeld om een moedig vorstel in te dienen teneinde de impasse te doorbreken. 
President Yeltsin was van dit voorstel onder de indruk maar van de Russische zijde als 
geheel werd dit niet als basis voor de onderhandelingen aanvaard. Niettemin groeide in 
die jaren in hoge mate het besef en de erkenning bij beide partijen dat enige vorm van 





Nog voor de vijfde gemiste kans, was het besef van mislukkingen in het verleden nog 
prominent in de gedachten van de schrijver aanwezig. De onderhandelingen met 
president Putin waren begonnen en de schrijver nam zeer bewust de 
verantwoordelijkheid op zich om van de gelegenheid zoals het zich voordeed in 2000-01 
gebruik te maken. De onderhandelingen vorderden onverwacht snel en effectief om 
vervolgens plotseling de kop te worden ingedrukt door een interne Japanse kwestie. De 
schrijver had niet verwacht dat dit vijfde ‘venster van gelegenheid’ op dergelijke  wijze 
gesloten zou worden. Individuele verantwoordelijkheid was weliswaar vervuld ten 
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Greater Self-Assertion and Nationalism in Japan 
KAZUHIKO TOGO 
Abstract 
Out of the deep spiritual vacuum from defeat in the Second World War, two 
fundamental rifts emerged in Japan. First, on the foreign policy front, the realism 
embraced by the conservative government was opposed by strong idealistic pacifism 
advocated by opposition parties and media, and this rift continued until the end of the 
Cold War. Second, with regard to the war in Asia, the Japanese gradually learned of 
atrocities committed, for which Japan owed an apology. However, views prevailing at 
the time to totally reject the past caused discomfort among many Japanese, and the issue 
of lost identity was left unanswered during the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, 
Japan began to move towards a more responsible and self-assertive security and defence 
policy. A series of initiatives toward clearer apology and reconciliation were confronted 
by a strengthened nationalism, and the issue of lost identity remained unresolved at the 
end of the 1990s. Koizumi has done well to implement a more responsible, proactive, 
realistic and self-assertive security and defence policy; moreover relations with the US 
have been considerably strengthened. But in East Asia, the issue of lost identity has 
reappeared and foreign policy towards Russia, Korea and China has resulted in a 
hardening of Japan's position in the region. Japan needs to have the courage to 
overcome this unresolved issue, while other countries' greater understanding of Japan's 
move toward a re-established identity will facilitate this process. Genuine dialogue is 
needed on all fronts..  
Introduction 
This paper aims to analyse two parallel foreign security policy directions which are 
emerging under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, together with their historical 
background. On the one hand, Japan is becoming a more realistic, proactive, responsible 
and self-assertive country in regional and world affairs. For those who have long 
thought that Japan ought to assume a more prominent role to enhance regional and 
world peace and security, such changes are welcome. On the other hand, recent events 
indicate that nationalistic thinking in search of identity has influenced and hardened 
important Japanese foreign policy decisions in East Asia, and that this will have a major 
impact in the coming decades.  
 This paper argues that these two disparate policy directions share a common 
origin, and could be described as two stems growing from the same root. From the point 
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of view of academic orientation, this analysis is based on the theory of international 
relations and takes account of all three major contemporary schools of thought: realism, 
liberalism and constructivism. The author considers that in order to understand the 
background to Koizumi's foreign policy, it is useful to adopt an eclectic approach to 
these three strands of thought. Recent eclectic analyses by Peter Katzenstein 
(2004:1-33) and Thomas Berger (2000: 406-28) provide a good perspective. 
 Japan's recent move to become a more realistic, responsible and self-assertive 
player in regional and global security affairs could be described as a shift from idealistic 
pacifism towards realism. Idealistic pacifism could be incorporated within the broad 
range of liberalism. The pursuit of liberal values (democracy and freedom) in the 
domestic policy, efforts to achieve economic development via the free flow of goods 
and services, and reliance on world politics to maintain a state of global peace (Doyle 
1997: 210, 302-6) all reflect typical post-war Japanese liberal thinking, with the caveat 
that extreme passivity in post-war Japanese idealistic pacifism (vis-à-vis its own 
security and global peace) should also be noted.  
Realism can be understood in the traditional sense that the world is composed of 
power-motivated states, that relations between states are conditioned by the competition 
for power, and that peace and security are preserved through a balance of power. Hans 
Morgenthau's definition of realism as 'the concept of interest defined in terms of power' 
(Morgenthau and Thompson 1948: 5) is still instructive in this regard. Japan's 
realization that it should become more proactive, assertive and responsible signifies its 
shift towards realism.  
This paper does not intend to focus on the degree of the change occurring in 
Japan's policies. Although that is an important subject for debate, the author considers 
that an analysis restricted to the liberal–realist dichotomy does not fully explain Japan's 
recent drift towards nationalism. In the contemporary theory of international relations, 
constructivism would seem to bring us closest to the truth. Constructivism here is 
understood, largely based on Alexander Wendt's (1994: 385) theory, as highlighting 
'identity' as a key determinant of a state's behaviour. A country's definition of its national 
interests depends on how its identity is constructed. Constructivism also underscores the 
intersubjectivity of identity: 'actors learn identities and interests as a result of how 
significant others treat them' (Wendt 1999: 171).60 This paper puts its emphasis on the 
historical formation of identity in Japan. Intersubjective development in conjunction 
with such actors as China, Korea or Russia is not accentuated in this paper. Though 
highly significant, the author considers that given the constraints of space, Japan's 
identity analysis in its historic and domestic context should take precedence over 
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intersubjective analysis of outside actors. Thus, historical analysis dating back to the 
post-Second World War period, together with contemporary political analysis composed 
of psychological, cultural, political, economic and other factors, constitute this paper's 
principal analytical tools. 
The Impact of Defeat in the Second World War 
The impact of Japan's defeat in the Second World War on the national psyche was 
immeasurable. Japan as a nation had been defeated and occupied for the first time in its 
entire history. In national memory, there were only three occasions when Japan fought 
wars against outside forces. In the 12th century, Japan was attacked by the Mongolian 
Empire, whose fleets were destroyed by a hurricane, called kamikaze. In the 16th 
century, Hideyoshi Toyotomi invaded Korea, where his army was defeated. While this 
was technically a defeat, the episode is usually remembered as an unsuccessful 
operation by an omnipotent ruler. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan achieved, 
for the most part,61 continuous victories. 
 Thus for the majority of the Japanese people, the shock incurred by defeat in the 
Second World War was so great that they became engulfed in a huge spiritual vacuum. 
John Dower discusses vividly this state of 'spiritual vacuum' in his book Embracing 
Defeat (Dower 1999: 87-121). Defeat in war also meant the end of the values that had 
led to war. But the majority of the population had little opportunity to analyse and 
reflect upon the significance of the events which had set Japan on the path to war and 
defeat. 
 Externally, Japan was occupied by the United States.62 The initial Allied policy 
was to demilitarize and democratize Japan. Idealism governed initial US policy––to turn 
Japan into a peaceful, democratic, middle-scale economic power (Murata R. 2002: 19). 
American directives informed the new Constitution which was promulgated in 
November 1946. In particular, Article 9, which stated that: 'the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation as means of settling international 
disputes' was thought to be the work of General Douglas MacArthur63. 
 US occupation also brought to light many of the atrocities committed by Japan 
during the war, particularly after the Manchurian incident in 1931. Japan's war 
responsibility was heavily engraved from early in US occupation and through the 
International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE) (May 1946 to November 1948). 
The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty obligated Japan to 'indemnify those who suffered 
undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan (Article 16)'. For the majority of 
Japanese, those revelations were new, and some of them were shocking. A dawning 
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realization of Japan's culpability for its actions during the Second World spread in the 
spiritual vacuum of post-war Japan. Many post-war intellectuals and the mass media 
followed this line.  
Thus Japan's pacifism under Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan's negation of 
all pre-war activities began to dominate immediate post-war thinking in Japan. This way 
of thinking had its merits, but also its limitations, which began to emerge in the next 
stage of Japan's history: the Cold War.  
Cold War Years: the Rift between Realists and Passive Idealists 
The initial period of the occupation which was characterized by idealistic pacifism did 
not last long. The Cold War began in Europe, almost before the Second World War had 
ended, and descended on East Asia in 1947: Korea's formal split in 1948, the civil war 
in China, the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the relocation of the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1949, were followed by the Korean War and Chinese 
intervention in 1950. 
In the Cold War environment, the initial post-war US policy towards Japan was 
transformed. From early 1948, Japan became a regional bulwark of the democratic 
camp. A policy of 'partial peace' establishing diplomatic relations with democratic 
countries took shape; close security ties with the United States became essential; Japan 
was urged to rebuild minimum security forces; and an economic policy to enhance 
reconstruction and economic recovery was introduced.64 
Japan's reaction was complex. The government, under the conservative 
leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, basically welcomed and implemented 
these policies. Yoshida's objective was to rebuild the economy, while ensuring Japan's 
security through its ties with the US. It was a realistic and responsible policy for the 
time. A peace treaty, together with a security treaty with the United States, was thereby 
concluded in September 1951. Symbolic security forces were established, which later 
became the Self-Defence Forces (SDF).65 
 Inside Japan, idealistic pacifism deriving from the immediate post-war period 
was in full swing, supported by leftist political forces, the socialist and communist 
parties, labour unions, influential intellectuals and public opinion, as well as the media. 
On the other hand, the conservative parties and a minority of intellectuals espoused the 
government's realism. Thus under the Cold War iron umbrella of US–Soviet rivalry, the 
first deep contradiction in Japan's foreign security policy emerged as a rift between 
realists and passive pacifists. The conservative government led by the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) established itself in 1955, with the creation of the so-called 
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'coalition of conservatives'.66But the opposition led by the Socialist Party and backed by 
media-led public opinion was no less influential, particularly in parliamentary debates. 
The rift between the two camps continued for almost four decades. 
 This does not mean, however, that important proactive and self-assertive 
initiatives were not undertaken during this time, but they were always accompanied by 
the political struggle between realists and pacifist idealists. In 1960 the Japan–US 
Security Treaty was revised to place the two countries on a more equal footing. This 
revision met with mass protest, which feared Japan would become entangled in US-led 
wars.  
 In 1969, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Nixon agreed on the basic 
principles for the reversion of Okinawa. The key issue was whether nuclear weapons, in 
an emergency, would be allowed to re-enter Okinawa. Public opinion was totally against 
re-entry. Given this reality, Sato announced publicly that nuclear weapons would never 
be allowed, although a secret agreement with the US allegedly promised otherwise. 
Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972. 
Cold War Years: Japan's Identity Issue 
The second issue emerging from Japan's deep spiritual vacuum from its defeat in the 
Second World War concerned the nation's responsibility for pre-war activities. This is an 
issue deeply related to Japan's identity: what was Japan before and after the war? What 
brought Japan to the war? What was right and what was wrong in Japan's pre-war 
deeds? How should this issue be related to post-war Japan's diplomacy?  
 As stated earlier, the initial years of occupation brought about a new recognition 
of the negative aspects of Japan's pre-war activities, which was strongly shared by 
post-war intellectuals and the media. Masao Maruyama championed those anti-militarist 
views. His thinking identified a unique and structural cause in pre-war Japanese state 
and society that had precipitated Japan to ultra or extreme nationalism, as manifested in 
the tract Chokokkashugino Ronrito Shinri (The Logic and Psychology of 
Ultra-Nationalism) written in 1946 (Maruyama 1964: 11-28). This became an enduring 
banner for post-war Japanese intellectuals. Saburo Ienaga, who waged a lone court case 
from 1965 against Japanese textbooks that failed to adequately address Japan's 
responsibility and atrocities during the war, also became a symbol of consciousness of 
many intellectuals during the Cold War period (Togo 2005: 142).  
At the same time, there emerged another type of post-war consciousness, rarely 
supported by the media majority. This constituted an effort to understand and re-state 
Japan's position from the perspective of the erstwhile top Japanese leadership (and a 
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large proportion of the population) at the time of the war. This historical narrative was 
prominently on display at the time of the IMFTE trials, for example, by Shigenori Togo, 
foreign minister of Japan in the Tojo and Suzuki Cabinets, who did everything he could 
to prevent the war from happening (and failed) and everything he could to end the war 
(and succeeded).67 
While confused, the people of Japan gradually developed an understanding that 
Japan owed an apology for its atrocities and wrong-doings during the war, particularly 
towards its Asian neighbours. At the same time, simply to negate all its pre-war past 
because of this regrettable aspect, left feelings of unease among those Japanese who 
thought that their soldiers had conducted themselves with honour, in the belief that they 
were fighting for the right cause for Japan and Asia. Positions began to diverge among 
Japanese intellectuals, government agencies, political forces and public opinion 
generally. 
However, this divergence regarding Japan's past and its identity did not really 
come to the forefront of foreign policy during this Cold War period. In other words, 
protected under the Cold War iron umbrella, Japan itself never succeeded in resolving 
this inner contradiction to come up with a reasonably clear national consensus about 
what was wrong and what was right regarding its past and to elucidate and re-establish 
its identity. Thomas Berger writes an interesting analysis that 'the relative looseness of 
the US-led coalition, the paucity of democracies in the region, and the deep divisions 
among the Communist nations in Asia' contributed to this issue failing to come to the 
forefront of Japan–Asia relations (Berger 2003: 60). 
At any rate, the Japanese government went through war crime tribunals, paid 
reparations and related funds for economic co-operation, and settled claims with foreign 
governments, in the belief that through this process, it was fulfilling all the victors' 
requirements. Through the 1960s and 1970s, when Japan resumed relations with Korea 
and China, the issue of war responsibility was heatedly discussed, but was resolved with 
the key expression of Japan's expression of 'deep remorse' (Togo 2005: 129, 159). The 
decade of the 1980s marked the start of China's policy of 'reform and opening' and 
Korea's rapid economic growth (leading to the Seoul Olympics in 1988). During this 
period economic ties between Japan and these two countries strengthened remarkably. 
But historical issues reappeared in the form of controversial textbooks (1982), official 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (1985), and contentious statements by a number of 
Japanese politicians. On the surface, these issues were resolved through the revision of 
textbooks to excise and/or modify offending sections, the discontinuation of official 
Yasukuni visits, and the resignation of the outspoken politicians from their official 
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positions. These case-by-case solutions, however, did not resolve the fundamentals of 
the identity issue for Japan: 'What was wrong and what was right in pre-war Japan?'  
Post-Cold War: From Idealistic Pacifism towards Realism 
The end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on Japanese foreign and security 
policy. The iron umbrella, which had protected Japan for 40 years, disappeared. Japan 
became more directly exposed to the harsh reality of international politics. 
 The Gulf War of 1990-91 was the first 'post-Cold War' shock for Japan. Japan 
mobilized a total of $13 billion in economic assistance, but was unable to contribute 
personnel. America perceived that Japan was willing to share the financial burden of the 
war, without sharing the human risks of putting its young men and women in harm's 
way. Japan's efforts went naturally unappreciated by the international community. 
Michael Green writes about 'shockingly little gratitude for Japan's $13 billion to support 
the Gulf War' and that the 'war was a colossal diplomatic failure for Japan' (Green 
2001a: 24). The derision that met Japan ensured that the first Gulf War would be 
remembered as 'Japan's defeat in 1991'68. 
 The second shock occurred in East Asia. The 1993-94 North Korean nuclear 
crisis brought East Asia to the brink of war. The crisis was settled through a framework 
agreed by the US and North Korea, but it made US and Japanese defence officials 
realize that, should a crisis break out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, lacking the 
necessary legal basis, would be unprepared to co-operate with US troops. Yoichi 
Funabashi gives a detailed account of how the officials on both sides shared a common 
concern about Japan's inability to respond to a crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula 
(Funabashi 1997: 310-21). 
The third shock in 1995-96 took place in the Taiwan Strait, when China 
exercised missile-launching across the Strait in the months preceding Taiwan's 
election69. Although tensions cooled after America sent two carriers to the Strait, a sense 
of crisis inevitably shook Japan. 
 Internal changes in Japan's power structure were equally dramatic. From 1992 to 
the summer of 1993, several reformist politicians left the LDP to form new parties.70 In 
August 1993 the LDP lost at the polls for the first time since 1955, and a coalition of 
eight parties headed by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa took power. One year later, 
in June 1994, the LDP returned to power in a most unthinkable coalition with its Cold 
War arch-enemy, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), led by Tomiichi Murayama, who 
became prime minister. Murayama acknowledged the SDF as constitutional, and the 
Japan–US Security Treaty as admissible. The JSP, known for so many decades as the 
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protector of Article 9, had to acknowledge post-Cold War reality. This recognition of 
reality crushed the Socialists' raison d'être.  
 In January 1996 the LDP dissolved its coalition with the JSP and Ryutaro 
Hashimoto became prime minister. In September 1996, the newly formed Democratic 
Party became the main opposition. The Democratic Party is a coalition of politicians 
with wide-ranging views on security but which is, on the whole, ready to recognize 
Japan's more active and responsible participation in regional and global security 
matters. 
 Thus through the 1990s the external shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold 
War era and corresponding internal political changes resulted in a more realistic, 
proactive, responsible and self-assertive Japanese foreign security policy. Two examples 
highlight this change. First, 'Japan's defeat in 1991' made the leadership think seriously 
about remedying the situation.71 In September 1991 a new bill was presented to the 
Diet; the International Peace Co-operation Law was approved in June 1992. The new 
law became the legal basis for the SDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping 
and humanitarian relief operations. 
 The enactment of the International Peace Co-operation Law created the basis for 
Japan to participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), which 
began its work in March 1992. From September 1992, Japan participated in UNTAC.72 
Japan's engagement in the East Timor crisis was slow to begin, as the law allowed the 
SDF to be dispatched only after a ceasefire had been signed.73 From the enactment of 
the new law in 1992 to the summer of 2003, Japan sent 17 missions: eight UN 
peacekeeping operations, four for humanitarian relief and five for election monitoring.74 
 Second, Japan took a series of proactive measures to counter tensions in 
Northeast Asia. After the 1993-94 Korean nuclear crisis, intense efforts at co-ordination 
began between Japanese and US defence experts. Thomas Berger writes that 'after the 
near débâcle in Korea, the two governments were finally galvanized into action', which 
led to series of agreements in the latter part of the 1990s (Berger 2004: 146). The US 
Department of Defense published its report East Asian Strategic Review (EASR) in 
February 1995, which proclaimed the US intent to maintain approximately 100,000 
troops in Asia. In November 1995, the Murayama Cabinet adopted a National Defence 
Program Outline (NDPO)75  which reconfirmed the importance of post-Cold War 
Japan–US security relations and extended SDF involvement to areas such as 
participation in international peacekeeping and large-scale disaster relief (Green 2001a: 
75-79). 
 The efforts of the two administrations culminated in 1996. In April, upon 
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President William J. Clinton's visit to Tokyo, The Japan–US Joint Declaration on 
Security: Alliance for the 21st Century76 was adopted. The document reaffirmed the 
Japan–US security relationship as the cornerstone for maintaining a stable and 
prosperous Asia-Pacific region, and announced the review of the 1978 Guidelines for 
Japan–US Defense Cooperation. Whereas the 1978 Guidelines had primarily addressed, 
under Article 5 of the Security Treaty, co-operation between the two governments in the 
event of Japan being attacked, the new Guidelines were a response to the 1993-94 North 
Korean nuclear crisis, when a US–North Korea clash without a direct attack on Japan 
could be envisaged, although geographical definitions were carefully avoided.  
 The review of the Guidelines took nearly one year. Yoichi Funabashi describes 
how leading Japanese officials like Hitoshi Tanaka (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs––MOFA) and Takeaki Moriya (Japan Defence Agency––JDA) proactively led 
the negotiations to establish 'an equal partner relations not in words but in deeds' 
(Funabashi 1997: 492). New Guidelines for defence co-operation were adopted in 
September 1997. It took nearly another year for Japan to prepare the necessary 
legislation to implement them, and after full parliamentary debate in the spring of 1999, 
The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security in Situations in Areas 
Surrounding Japan was adopted in May 1999. 
Post –Cold War: From Enhanced Apology to Rising Nationalist Sentiment 
The end of the Cold War also deeply affected Japan's position on its history. Out of the 
unresolved issue from 1945 on 'what was wrong and what was right', a series of 
concrete measures to express an apology were taken in the wake of the Cold War. It is 
worth considering why, during the first half of the 1990s, the Japanese government 
became more forthcoming in expressing such an apology, and in the second half of the 
1990s, in seeking reconciliation with related countries. First, the lifting of the Cold War 
iron umbrella might have forced these unresolved issues more to the forefront of 
international relations and Japan had to react to this reality. Or perhaps the watershed of 
50 years since the end of the war brought a sense of a time limit, whereby things needed 
to be resolved in a more definite manner. But then, why more towards reconciliation?  
 The end of the Cold War brought into the Japanese government those politicians 
whose thinking was more inclined towards a straightforward apology. Prime Minister 
Hosokawa (1993-94), who represented the first non-LDP reformist government and 
Murayama (1994-96), a socialist Prime Minister, both had political backgrounds that 
favoured a straightforward apology. Hosokawa and Murayama, Miyazawa (1991-93), 
and Kono as his chief cabinet secretary, were leading thinkers in the LDP seeking 
 497 
reconciliation with Asia, and Hashimoto (1996-98) and Obuchi (1998-2000) belonged 
to the Tanaka faction, whose basic policy was to give priority to Japan–China relations. 
 Thus the Asian Women's Fund was established in the period from the Miyazawa 
Cabinet to the Murayama Cabinet specifically to pay atonement money together with a 
written apology to 'comfort women'. 77  Prime ministers such as Miyazawa 78 , 
Hosokawa79 and Murayama80 were particularly forthright in expressing their apology 
in this period. And the major historic statement of apology was made by Prime Minister 
Murayama on 15 August 1995, expressing his 'deep remorse and heartfelt apology'. Due 
to the polemical situation which occurred in relation to the Diet resolution adopted in 
August 1995, the importance of that statement is sometimes overlooked. Thomas Berger 
gives a lively description how the Diet Resolution was debated and adopted in a 
confused situation (Berger 2003: 80). But despite this confusion, the Murayama 
Statement, as agreed by a Cabinet decision, became the basis of government policies of 
apology since 1995 to date (Togo 2005: 170-1). The key paragraph of the statement 
reads as follows: 
 
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken 
national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese 
people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused 
tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to 
those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I 
regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here 
once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me 
also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and 
abroad, of that history. 
 
The Murayama Statement became the basis for reconciliation between Japan and Great 
Britain in January 1998, South Korea in October 1998, and the Netherlands in February 
2000 (Togo 2005: 171-5, 282-5). Thomas Berger also gives a vivid description as to 
how the Japan–Korea reconciliation was achieved in 1998 (Berger 2003: 80). 
 Furthermore, Japan's 'engagement' policy towards China in the face of its 'reform 
and opening' was manifested by the launching of massive ODA from 1979 (Nakanishi 
2001: 176). Moreover, Japan expressed a strong appeal to the international community 
not to isolate China after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 (Murata, K. 2001: 221, 
228), which enhanced their relations. As a culmination of this friendly relationship, the 
imperial visit took place in 1992. It is also noted that the Ienaga trial was concluded in 
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1997 at the Supreme Court, which has brought justice to many of Ienaga's view on 
history (Togo 2005: 142). 
 This mood of general optimism changed sometime in the mid-1990s. 
Particularly in relation to China, the climate of genuine reconciliation rapidly began to 
wane. Japan's expectation that the Chinese leadership would begin looking to the future 
rather than harking back to the past proved to be illusory. In 1995, at the time 
Murayama was making his historic statement expressing 'deep remorse and heartfelt 
apology', a campaign began all over China displaying pictures of the Nanjing Massacre 
in primary schools. Even pro-Chinese MOFA officials were desperate (Funabashi 2003: 
59). The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96, nuclear tests in 1995-96 (Green 2001b: 80-2), 
the Senkaku Islands issue (Green 2001b: 82-8), and perceived arrogance by Jiang 
Zemin in 'preaching to Japan on past sins' in 1998, all combined in the latter part of the 
1990s to heighten tensions between the two countries. 
 Coinciding with this rising tension with China, those scholars and intellectuals 
who considered that Japan's affirmation of its honour and identity must play a central 
role in its internal and external policy became more vocal than ever. There are at least 
three beliefs common to thinkers in this group: (i) that much greater approval should be 
given to pre-Second World War Japan; (ii) that the post-war US occupation and the 
IMTFE destroyed Japan's honour and self-esteem and that these needed to be 
re-established urgently; (iii) that those atrocities that had been committed by Japan 
before the war had already been compensated in full by war tribunals and treaty 
obligations. 
 In December 1996, these scholars and intellectuals established a forum for a 
'new history textbook'. In 1998, Yoshinori Kobayashi, a leading writer of the 'new 
history textbook' forum and a popular cartoonist specializing in history, published his 
Sensoron [Theory of War], which comprised a full justification of Japan's cause in the 
Second World War. In 1999, Kanji Nishio, a leading historian belonging to the 'new 
history textbook' forum published Kokumin-no Rekishi [Nation's History] with the same 
flow of thinking. It may not be a coincidence that in 1999, Shintaro Ishihara, a popular 
politician whose political thinking is much in line with these scholars, was elected as 
governor of Tokyo. 
 Why did this nationalistic trend became more visible in Japan's intellectual 
world? Professor Rikki Kersten in a public lecture held in 2003 stated that the successes 
of Saburo Ienaga in court became a powerful dialectical force that engendered its 
antithesis within nationalist thinking.81 It may well be so; that dialectic precisely 
represented Japan's search for identity. At any rate, the upsurge in nationalist thinking 
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did not directly affect Japan's foreign policy until the end of the 1990s. However, at the 
turn of the new millennium the government leadership was assumed by a new prime 
minister, Junichiro Koizumi, and the issue of national identity began to assume more 
serious implications for Japanese foreign policy in East Asia. 
Domestic and Foreign Policies under Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro Koizumi was elected prime minister in April 2001. Three factors underlie the 
internal dynamics which brought him to power. First, dissatisfaction with the economy 
had been growing since the 1990s, in large part due to the government's inability to 
address the aftermath of the bubble economy. Huge non-performing loans continued to 
negatively impact on the growth of the economy, while social problems, including high 
unemployment, proliferated. At the same time, the Japanese socio-economic structure, 
once hailed as the engine of growth, came under fire for its role in preserving an 
uncompetitive, inefficient and over-protected society. Koizumi was brought to power 
amidst expectations that he would lead the country out of these economic difficulties.82 
 
 Second, Koizumi was an LDP politician of long standing but was never at the 
helm of an LDP faction, which formed the traditional power base within the party. He 
was a striking but lone figure within the Abe–Mitsuzuka–Mori faction. Koizumi was, in 
large part, brought to office by his popularity among local LDP party members, who 
overwhelmingly voted for him at the time of the LDP presidential elections in April 
2001. These local party members were attuned to the popular mood of the country, 
indeed, one may conclude that Koizumi's power base rests on the 'popular' vote. Hence 
Koizumi is said to be a populist, with a keen understanding of the mood of public 
opinion. It may be added that the importance of 'the voice of the people' emerged 
against the background of the weakening iron triangle of politicians, bureaucrats and 
businessmen who presided over post-war Japanese economic development83. 
 Third, Koizumi, while a populist, is not a man who blindly follows 'the voice of 
the people'. He seems to have a selective political agenda, controversial in some cases, 
from which he does not retreat. His insistence on the need for reforming the postal 
services, his conviction that nothing should prevent Japan from 'acting responsibly' on 
defence and security matters, his determination to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pay 
homage to the war dead: these show that he is not blindly bowing to fluctuating opinion 
polls. He may be convinced that his views correspond to what his era requires of him, 
ultimately to what the Japanese people expect. Externally, the greatest challenges 
Koizumi had to face were 9/11, the war in Iraq and the North Korean threat. Koizumi's 
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preoccupation with these security/foreign policy challenges at times overshadowed his 
primary task of socio-economic reform. 
Without doubt, 9/11 in 2001 was the single major incident which shook the world after 
the end of the Cold War. The impact of 9/11 was so far-reaching that many international 
relations analysts maintain that the post-Cold War era has been replaced by a new era of 
the war against terrorism. All countries have had to take a position and Japan is no 
exception. President Bush waged war against Saddam Hussein in March–April 2003, as 
an extension of the war on global terrorism. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and 
links with Al Qaeda were originally identified as the primary motives to dismantle 
Saddam's regime. Japan, alongside other major countries, had to take a stance. 
 For Japan, an additional threat it had to face at the threshold of the 21st century 
emanated from North Korea. The DPRK became one of the most militaristic, totalitarian 
and oppressive regimes in the world during the Cold War. When it ended, the country 
emerged as the sole loser in East Asia. In order to consolidate power, North Korea has 
pursued a zig-zag between hard-line policies, including the worst kind of terrorist 
activities, and conciliatory behaviour, particularly addressed to South Korea. After the 
end of the Cold War, Japan responded to North Korean overtures. Aiming to establish 
diplomatic relations, Japan shipped humanitarian food aid, which brought three periods 
of relative quiet.84 But each period was followed by rising tension.85 
 Against this background, Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in September 2002 
ended with a series of seemingly remarkable successes. By then, the abduction issue had 
become foremost for the Japanese public. In the late 1970s at least a dozen Japanese 
citizens had been abducted by North Korea.86 Kim Jong Il acknowledged the fact, 
apologized, and promised that it would never happen again––a gesture nobody 
anticipated. Regarding the unidentified vessels encroaching upon Japanese territorial 
waters,87 Kim Jong Il stated that he had had no previous knowledge of the issue but had 
recently begun investigations, promising that such incursions would cease. Regarding 
nuclear weapons and missiles, North Korea in principle agreed in the Pyongyang Joint 
Declaration88 to comply with all related international agreements. The ground for 
re-opening negotiations to establish diplomatic relations appeared to be there, however 
it soon collapsed. The fact that eight out of the thirteen abductees were dead, a fact 
acknowledged by North Korea, shocked many Japanese. Japanese public opinion 
exploded in indignation against North Korea. The nuclear crisis which erupted in 
October 2002 was the final blow in cementing the Japanese perception of threat from 
North Korea. 
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Security Policy and US Relations: Greater Self-assertion Based on Realism 
As the greatest challenges Koizumi had to face in external relations were the war 
against global terrorism and North Korea, his foreign policy was heavily oriented 
towards defence and security matters. Koizumi's reaction was, in general, realistic, 
proactive, responsible and self-assertive. Five reasons account for his position. 
 First and foremost, we need to go back to the historical context. After four 
decades of strife between realists and pacifist idealists, Japanese increasingly found it 
more natural and comfortable to become a normal partner within the international 
community, sharing responsibility and participating in matters affecting global and 
regional peace and security. Koizumi, based on his intuitive understanding of popular 
opinion, took a series of proactive decisions. Some decisions, particularly relating to the 
war in Iraq, were controversial. Public opinion has been split, but thus far, Koizumi's 
decisions have not seriously undermined his basic popularity. In accordance with an 
Asahi Shinbun (AS) poll, Koizumi's rating which peaked at 78 percent in April 2001 (AS, 
30 April 2001), declined to its lowest level of 38 percent in June 2002 (AS, 22 March 
2003), because of internal political reasons. It rose slightly to 44 percent in February 
2003 (AS, 25 February 2003), and dropped back to 42 percent only after Koizumi's open 
support of President Bush in March 2003 (AS, 22 March 2003).89 
 Second, ironically, it was the asymmetry that dominated the Cold War security 
environment that triggered Japan's proactive decision-making. Article 9 of the 
Constitution grants Japan the right to exercise minimal self-defence, but not the right of 
collective self-defence as granted by the UN Charter. Article 5 of the Security Treaty, on 
the other hand, obligates the US to defend Japan if it is attacked by outside forces. The 
Article is written in such a way as to exempt Japan in an equivalent situation.90 
Abductions and North Korea's nuclear capabilities compelled the Japanese to take note 
of the security threat surrounding the country. The realization that Japanese security was 
ultimately dependent upon the United States, based on the above-mentioned asymmetry, 
underpinned Koizumi's decision to opt for responsible and self-assertive measures. 
Japan's position converged with President Bush's position in favour of further proactive 
engagement from Japan. 
 Third, Japan's economic crisis during the 1990s may have made the country 
more sensitive to its political role. Frustration emerging from economic failure 
translated into a desire to fulfil a greater political role. Declining economic power also 
deprived Japan of its once mighty cheque-book diplomacy. Contributions in the political 
arena may have become an alternative way for Japan to stay active in the arena of 
international peace and security.  
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 Fourth, as previously discussed, from the spiritual vacuum in the summer of 
1945 emerged two fundamental issues in post-war Japan: the nation's security role and 
its identity. Japan's greater role in its own defence and security, and its search for a more 
realistic, responsible and self-assertive role are certainly in line with the growing 
nationalism in search of clearer identity and greater self-esteem. Michael Armacost 
identifies this linkage between nationalism and Japan's readiness to play a greater 
security role (Armacost 2003: 102). 
 Fifth and finally, Japan's younger generation, which does not have any 
recollection of post-war hardship, let alone of the war itself, is increasingly supportive 
of Japan playing a greater role in matters related to global issues of peace and security. 
It is natural that Japan's greater self-assertion be supported by some of the older 
generation, whose sense of national pride has long been hurt by the post-war 
ascendancy of idealistic pacifism. But among the younger generation as well, Japan 
behaving normally without particular inhibition from the past is gaining new support. 
Post 9/11  
In contrast to the slow reaction of the past, Koizumi announced on 19 September 
Japan's decision to react to the terrorist attack on 9/11. Japan took the attack as 'Japan's 
own security issue'91––a clear and unambiguous message of support for joint action by 
the international community. Three weeks later, the government presented the 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill to the Diet. The essence of the bill was to send the 
SDF to provide rear-action support in the war against international terrorism. By the end 
of October, the bill had been approved in the Diet.92Eric Heginbotham and Richard 
Samuels give a very positive evaluation concerning Koizumi's initial reaction 
(Heginbotham and Samuels 2002: 101-2). 
 The changes of the 1990s had prepared the Japanese people for this 
development.93 By the end of 2001, based on the Basic Plan adopted in November, five 
ships, eight aircraft and 1,380 troops (Saga Shinbun Kyodo, 17 November 2001) were in 
action, supplying fuel to American and British vessels in the Indian Ocean and the 
Arabian Sea engaged in combat activities against international terrorism in Afghanistan. 
Aircraft were engaged in transport between American bases in Japan and the Guam 
Islands (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 7 November 2002). 
 Politicians, intellectuals, and public opinion in general were supportive of 
Koizumi's decision. Among the major newspapers, Mainichi Shimbun did not support 
Japan's involvement, and such an influential politician as Nonaka voiced a message of 
caution (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002: 102-3). But they were not in the majority. 
Among the 'nationalist' camp, Yoshinori Kobayashi was conspicuous in justifying the 
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terrorists' cause against the US, but he was in a minority (Kobayashi 2001: 9-32). 
War in Iraq in 2003 
When President Bush decided to disarm Saddam Hussein in the summer of 2002, public 
opinion in Japan, as in many countries in Europe and around the world, was against a 
pre-emptive attack. From the outset, Koizumi seems to have been determined that Japan 
would ultimately support the US. However, he believed that disarming Saddam would 
be more effective were he declared an enemy of the community of nations, and not only 
of the United States. Thus from the summer of 2002 to the winter of 2003, Japan 
advised the United States, discreetly, to go through the United Nations. At the Japan–US 
strategic talks in August 2002, the deputy minister for foreign affairs Takeuchi said to 
deputy secretary Armitage that 'The US should create a structure of Iraq versus the 
international community, and not Iraq versus the United States. The UN Security 
Council will serve that purpose.' Armitage said proudly to the Japanese leadership in his 
visit to Tokyo at the end of the year that the US had fulfilled that Japanese request (AS, 
10 December 2002).  
 The United States did go through the United Nations, but from February to 
March 2003, failed to command the support of the Security Council. At this moment, 
when a deep rift appeared in the long-standing transatlantic alliance, Japan emerged as a 
clear supporter of President Bush's position. On 18 March 2003, only hours after 
President Bush sent an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, Koizumi declared his open 
support for President Bush's decision. Public opinion was split, as were the editorials of 
the major newspapers: Yomiuri and Sankei in support, Asahi and Mainichi against.94 
However, Koizumi's ratings did not fall appreciably. 
 After the fighting officially ended in Iraq, the Koizumi government presented a 
bill on 'Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq' to the 
Diet, which was approved in July. Koizumi took a whole half year to prepare for the 
actual sending of Japanese troops. Finally, in January and February 2004, Japanese 
troops from the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces (SDF) were stationed in 
Iraq, to be engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction activities (AS, 27 January 
2004).95 In June 2004, Japan decided to join the multinational forces based on UN 
Resolution 1546, while preserving its right of command (AS, 19 June 2004). At the 
October 2003 Madrid Conference, Japan committed $5 billion for the period 2004-07 to 
assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. It was the second largest contribution after the US's 
$20 billion (AS, 25 October 2003). 
 Koizumi's decision to support President Bush and send the SDF, and the timing 
of this, have been widely debated in Japan. Some criticized that Japan was just blindly 
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following US interests and instructions. Nonetheless, given the Japanese security 
concerns described above, it was Japan's own security that demanded good relations 
with the United States, and as a final resort, the Japanese people were ready to accept 
Koizumi's support of President Bush. Questions remain however, as to whether Japan 
had pursued all alternative measures before Koizumi took the ultimate decision. 
Commentators have asked whether Japan could have pushed harder for a maximum role 
for the United Nations; whether Japan had fully explored dialogue with the Middle East 
and Europe; and ultimately whether Japan's dialogue was sufficiently honest in pointing 
out problems vis-à-vis the United States (Togo 2005: 310). The situation in Iraq after its 
liberation was so problematic that it was unfortunate for Japan that this war became the 
test case to assess its determination to become a responsible and proactive partner in the 
community of nations. But given the internal logic, as described at the beginning of this 
section, ultimately the only wise choice for Koizumi was to send the SDF to Iraq. 
 US reaction in academic analysis generally favours Japan's decision. Michael 
Armacost underlines the importance not 'to alienate the United States over Iraq at a time 
when [Japan] needed US support in dealing with a re-emerging threat in North Korea'. 
His analysis also indicates that Japan, with its political support and limited 
reconstruction and humanitarian participation, but nonetheless fulfilling the requirement 
of 'boots on the ground', evinced a positive reaction from the US and increased its 
chances for future involvement in a lucrative Iraqi oil deal (Armacost 2003: 91-3). Mike 
Mochizuki makes an interesting observation that 'new nationalism' does not necessarily 
explain Koizumi's backing of Bush's policy because nationalism could have been 
directed towards an independent position vis-à-vis the United States. Instead, Mochizuki 
points to the North Korean threat as a key factor, and also that Koizumi might gain 
much foreign policy leverage at relatively low political cost (Mochizuki 2004: 113-17). 
Enactment of Laws in Response to an Armed Attack 
The threat from North Korea, in particular, resolved an issue which had dragged on 
from the 1970s: the enactment of laws to respond to armed attack. In 1977 the 
government began considering reform of the legal structure to allow for the country's 
defence if attacked by outside forces. But because of public reluctance to contemplate 
any war situation, and because the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union rendered such a situation rather hypothetical, the issue was frozen for 
more than 20 years (AS, 7 June 2003).  
 Following 9/11 and the heightening of the Japanese concern for security, 
Koizumi formulated three laws to addressing this issue, and presented them to the Diet 
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in April 2002. The laws were approved by overwhelming majorities in the House of 
Representatives in May and in the House of Councillors in June.96 In April 2004 the 
government submitted to the Diet a second round of legislation―seven laws and three 
treaties. They were again approved by overwhelming majorities in the House of 
Representatives in May and in the House of Councillors in June.97 
Growing SDF Capabilities 
The annual budget approved in spring 2004 included two items not easily dissociated 
from the perception of a growing threat from North Korea. One was missile defence: the 
amount of 142.3 billion yen was allocated for the deployment of surface-to-air missiles, 
one Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 (PAC3) missile around Tokyo, and one Standard 
Missile-3 (SM3) on an Aegis destroyer. The Defence Agency plans to deploy four 
PAC3s and four SM3s over the next four years.  
 The second item in the budget was the request for 116.4 billion yen for a new 
type of escort ship, in reality a helicopter-carrier. This new type of escort ship is 16DDH, 
13,500 tons, and 195 metres in length. The ship is designed to carry four large 
helicopters but has at least twice that capacity. The MSDF is intending to equip two 
ships of this type, scheduled to be deployed in 2008 and 2009. The SDF explains that 
the purchase of this ship is necessary as 'long-term cooperative activities in the Indian 
Ocean, larger scale rescue operations, UN based PKO activities, transport of Japanese 
nationals at a time of emergency and other activities require large space and sufficient 
equipment' (AS, 30 August 2003). 
Permanent Law to Deploy the SDF within Multinational Forces 
Experience with the 2001 anti-terrorism law and the 2003 Iraqi assistance law made the 
leadership think that a 'permanent law' enabling Japan to participate in multinational 
coalitions would be necessary. On 1 August 2003, a special task-force was established at 
the Cabinet Secretariat (AS, 3 August 2003). Numerous issues are awaiting political and 
legal deliberation, including the role of the United Nations, the use of weapons and the 
nature of multinational forces. 
 As a prelude to these deliberations, in December 2002 a private advisory 
committee to the Cabinet General Secretary 'International Peace Co-operation 
Committee', under the chairmanship of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, former under-secretary 
general of the United Nations, formulated a report and presented it to the prime minister. 
It claimed that 'ten years of Japanese peacekeeping operations after the Cambodian 
involvement lagged far behind compared to other advanced countries'. The report 
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advocated a new law to allow the SDF to participate in all multinational forces based on 
UN resolutions98 (AS, 19 December 2002). 
Japan–US relations 
Under the foreign policy of Koizumi's government, relations with the United States 
reached their post-war apex. Koizumi's realistic, proactive, responsible and 
self-assertive approach to deal with the threats of global terrorism and North Korea 
coincided with the US wish that Japan play a more proactive and responsible role in 
regional and global security matters. Naturally the Japan–US alliance was consolidated. 
Japanese public opinion generally supported Koizumi's policy. In facing external 
realpolitik after the Cold War, and following the internal logic from idealistic pacifism 
to realism, public opinion felt Koizumi's policy was proceeding in the right direction. 
 One question needs to be raised: Is Japan supporting US policy on terrorism for 
the sake of Japan–US relations or for the sake of its own defence-security interests? My 
answer is clear: Japan's recent move toward a more proactive and self-assertive security 
policy derives fundamentally from its desire to fulfil its own national interests and 
responsibilities. This view suggests nothing provocative about the nature of Japan–US 
relations. Consolidation of Japan–US relations accords with Japan's geopolitical as well 
as global interests. This view is based on historical analysis of 60 years of post-war 
Japanese history, and my observation as to how Japan has moved from the spiritual 
vacuum in 1945 toward greater proactivity. 
Foreign Policy in East Asia: the Shadow of Nationalism 
Since Koizumi's East Asian foreign policy is such a wide, deep and complex issue, I 
restrict myself to covering North East Asia only and dwell on major events as they have 
unfolded up to the summer of 2004.  
 To set the context, it should be noted that economic and cultural relations with 
major East Asian countries, China, South Korea and Russia, are developing with a 
certain dynamism. One may argue that East Asia is relatively stable, in part because of 
the balance of power which favours the United States and Japan. Furthermore that 
China, while a rising power, does not come close to matching the combined resources of 
these two countries.99 Cultural relations with South Korea have been particularly rosy 
due to an unexpected flood of emotions on the part of Japanese housewives to a Korean 
movie-star. The response was a genuine expression of friendly feeling toward Korea, 
void of any historical memory. 
 However, political relations with all countries are suffering. With Russia real 
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difficulty is continuing with regard to the territorial issue. With South Korea, good 
progress in 2004 has almost been obliterated since March 2005 after a historic statement 
by President Roh Moo-Hyum, although this incident is outside the scope of this paper. 
North Korean relations are in stalemate because of the abduction issue, in addition to 
the nuclear one. Relations with China are deteriorating for many reasons, the historical 
legacy being one of the major factors. The anti-Japanese movement in China, which 
revealed itself in the spring of 2005 in a move against Japanese firms and merchandise, 
is beginning to affect the economic environment.  
 Amidst all these issues which harden Japan's political relations, one common 
factor stands out: Japan's urge to redeem its 'lost identity'. This issue, which assumes a 
different shape in each bilateral relation, is the single common thread that emerges in all 
of all Japan's major foreign policy decisions in East Asia: toward Russia, Korea and 
China. Furthermore, regaining lost identity and self-esteem has been the central issue 
debated, particularly among 'nationalists', from the latter part of the 1990s. As of now, 
this 'nationalist movement' and foreign policy implementation in East Asia are not 
directly linked and must be considered separately. And yet, the commonality here 
cannot be ignored. 
 From the realpolitik point of view, given the power relations in East Asia around 
the ascendancy of China, it clearly is not in Japan's interest to clash with all surrounding 
countries. It is hard to fully comprehend this situation, if analysed only by the 
traditional realist-liberal approaches to international relations. This is why I referred to 
the constructivist approach. Alexander Wendt's emphasis on norms and identity seems 
to lend adequate theoretical scope and give some hope for the future. 
 The way political relations are developing (or not developing) between Japan 
and North East Asian countries is worrisome, not only from the point of view of Japan's 
national interest, but also from the point of view of surrounding East Asian countries. 
The current status of political relations is not in the interest of any bilateral relations in 
the region. From Japan's perspective, there is an absolute need to grasp how and where 
this attachment to 'lost identity' may lead. From the viewpoint of outside countries, there 
is an equal imperative to understand Japan's behaviour and influence in order to see how 
it might be accommodated within the framework of their own policies and interests. 
Thomas Berger rightly observed that 'while by itself the historical issue is unlikely to 
lead to military conflict, it can have a serious corrosive impact on the region and is 
likely to hinder efforts to forge a stronger regional alliance' (Berger 2003: 84).100  
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Japan–Russia Relations 
The first occasion when the issue of lost identity appeared after Koizumi assumed office 
was his Russian policy. It took the form of Japan's fixation on 'lost honour'. Japan and 
Russia had been seriously engaged since the end of the 1980s in talks to settle a 
territorial dispute over four islands northeast of Hokkaido.101 Gorbachev visited Japan 
in 1991 when his foreign policy agenda was practically accomplished and his political 
tenure was weak. The maximum concession he brought was a written statement that the 
four islands would remain the object for negotiation.102 
 After the demise of the Soviet Union, President Yeltsin apparently launched in 
the spring of 1992 an unprecedented, confidential concessionary proposal, which was 
not accepted by Japan (Rozman 2003: 6). This led to stagnation in negotiations until 
November 1997, when Yeltsin proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty by the year 
2000. This was only achieved after successful diplomatic approaches to Hashimoto to 
develop relations between the two countries on all fronts, including the establishment of 
personal relations between the top leaders. Japan then made its first concessionary 
proposal in April 1998, which seemed to have attracted President Yeltsin's attention, but 
Russia rejected this proposal.103  
 The first year under President Putin was probably the most promising period for 
negotiations: in March 2001 Russia acknowledged its obligation under the 1956 Joint 
Declaration,104 the possibility of discussing the real fate of the two larger islands almost 
emerged. But after Koizumi came to power in April, Japan's Russian policy 
disintegrated. The first reason for this disintegration was an internal political struggle 
based on personality and power. The key players were: Suzuki Muneo, a 
parliamentarian who strongly supported the prime minister Mori's Russian policy, but 
whose explosive character alienated many Foreign Ministry officials; Makiko Tanaka, 
foreign minister under Koizumi from April 2001 to January 2002, who was extremely 
popular but distrusted by Foreign Ministry officials; and top bureaucrats and Russian 
specialists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The struggle resulted in Makiko Tanaka's 
resignation from the post of foreign minister and Muneo Suzuki's arrest for corruption. 
Whatever the intention of those involved, peace treaty negotiations collapsed after 
Koizumi took office in the spring of 2001, and any remaining hope vanished in the 
spring of 2002. 
 Thus far, there has been little analysis in English about the state of negotiations 
in the first year under Putin, and the significance of its collapse thereafter. Gilbert 
Rozman's article stands out (Rozman 2002: 337-52) and a short article of mine may be 
added (Togo 2004: 47-49). But in essence, the collapse of negotiations under Koizumi 
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had deeper reasons than just personality and power struggle. Prime Minister Mori, 
supported by Muneo Suzuki, wanted to enter into real discussions over the two larger 
islands 'without preconditions'. But political forces who sought to undermine Suzuki 
asserted that negotiating 'without preconditions' may lead to a solution other than 
'resolving the four islands issue as a group'. This hard-line approach––that only this 
position can protect Japan's request to return the four islands and ultimately redeem 
Japan's honour––gained support among Japanese politicians, opinion leaders and media.  
 Four years have passed since Irkutsk. The year 2005 was recognized as the 
150th anniversary of the conclusion of the Shimoda Treaty which initially demarcated 
the Russo-Japanese border. By Irkutsk, both sides were close to reaching a common 
understanding that out of the four islands under negotiations, Habomai and Shikotan's 
status had been legally resolved in 1956; however, claims were divided regarding the 
sovereignty of Kunashiri and Etorofu, necessitating serious negotiations 'without 
conditions'. If a possibility should present itself to resume the negotiations, Japan will 
have to weigh this situation seriously. Maintaining the demand for 'four islands as a 
group', will most likely simply stall the negotiations and lead to a stalemate. Accepting 
some compromise solution may not fully redeem Japan's honour, but Japan has to 
consider the other side's viewpoint and weigh up what, in the final analysis, it might 
conceivably be prepared to relinquish in order to resolve this long-standing issue. 
Judging its national interests based on a realpolitik balance of power in East Asia is also 
necessary.  
 At the time of the writing of this paper, there is no evidence that Japan is 
seriously considering a mutually acceptable solution. Nationalism and the association of 
national identity with territory seem to be blocking compromise. But should the 
situation arise where Japan is prepared to move away from seeking a full restoration of 
its lost honour, an equivalent compromise might be expected from the Russian side, so 
that both countries might maximize their attainable national interest. 
Japan–North Korea Relations 
After Koizumi's Pyongyang visit in September 2002, an opportunity presented itself for 
intensive negotiations. The five survivors made what was planned as a temporary return 
visit to Japan from 15 October and were given a warm welcome under the spotlight of 
full media attention. But on 24 October, under pressure from family members of the 
abductees, the Japanese government decided not to return the five survivors to North 
Korea and to request the return of eight family members of the five abductees who 
remained in North Korea (AS, 25 October 2002). The decision was received positively 
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in Japan, rapidly drawing strong support from public opinion. The five abductees 
eventually agreed to follow the government. Then and there, the people's search for 
'justice' prevailed, and substantial talks between Japan and North Korea ended.  
 When the US and North Korea deadlocked over the nuclear issue, and when 
six-party talks began in August 2003, Japan adopted the most stringent position among 
the five, together with the United States. China presided over the talks and Japan lost its 
slim opportunity to play a leading role in the negotiations. The fury of anti-North 
Korean feeling continued unabated in Japan. Even a description by a Japanese scholar 
that 'Koizumi's visit to North Korea might have brought a historic opportunity for Japan 
to play a leadership role in the Korean Peninsula, but Japan's fixation on the abduction 
issue greatly limited that possibility' (Soeya 2004: 214) sounded fresh and somewhat 
audacious against near-uniformity in emotional criticism of the North. 
 Against this backdrop, Japan's policy towards North Korea developed in several 
directions. First, Japan prepared concrete means to pressure North Korea through 
economic sanctions. A law to suspend currency transfers to North Korea was approved 
by the Diet on 9 February 2004 (AS, 10 February 2004). Another law which empowered 
the government to forbid the entry of North Korean vessels engaged in various 
transactions between the two countries was approved by the Diet on 14 June 2004 (AS, 
15 June 2004). 
 Second, Japan participated enthusiastically in the six-party talks held in 
February and June 2004. The content of the negotiations has been kept confidential, but 
informed sources are suggesting that Japan is trying its best to find an avenue to bring 
about a realistic solution, despite its hard-line façade.105  
 Third, on 22 May 2004 Koizumi revisited Pyongyang, led five out of eight 
abductees family members back to Japan, and agreed to find a location (later Indonesia 
was chosen) for the remaining three to be reunited with Mrs. Soga, who was the fifth 
abductee.106 North Korea agreed to further investigate the fate of ten outstanding 
abductees,107 and listened to Koizumi reiterate that all nuclear weapons should be 
dismantled. Japan agreed to humanitarian assistance via international organizations: 
250,000 tons of food aid and $10 million of medical aid (AS, 23 May 2004). Koizumi 
overcame a further emotional upsurge of public feeling in Japan, including an explosive 
outcry by the five who had returned to Japan regarding a delay in the reunion with their 
children. This trip might have brought the relationship back to the point of September 
2002.  
 Japan needs to find a way to achieve both objectives: resolving the abduction 
issue and achieving the denuclearization of North Korea. Mike Mochizuki also 
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concludes that Koizumi's partial liberation from a fixation on the abduction issue may 
open up an opportunity for Japan to play a more effective role in the six-party talks 
(Mochizuki 2004: 118-20). However, treating the abduction issue as a high priority is 
unavoidable. It signifies something more important than the legitimate anger of the 
families. A great number of the Japanese people are satisfied to see that, after so many 
years of neglect, the state is finally fulfilling its responsibility in its search for 'justice'. 
At the same time though, this agenda should be placed within the framework of Japan's 
overall objectives towards North Korea. It should be implemented in parallel with 
Japan's maximum contribution to the six-party talks, which tackle the denuclearization 
issue. After all, this issue is vital for Japan's own security. Also, six-party talks might 
become a basis for regional multilateralism in the future. In this context, dialogue, 
pressure, inducement and sanctions must be finely balanced in the most appropriate 
manner. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Japan's long-term policy objective is to 
achieve a normalization of relations with North Korea. Understanding and 
encouragement by the international community of Japan's multiple objectives would 
naturally assist Japan in this endeavour.  
China and Taiwan 
In order to place Sino-Japanese relations in a proper perspective, it may be useful to 
analyse the economic relations that existed prior to Koizumi's term of office. After the 
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972, it is generally thought that Sino-Japanese 
economic relations developed smoothly. The sharp rise in trade figures exemplifies this 
trend (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1: Total Trade (Imports and Exports) between Japan and China,($ bn)  
1972  1981  1991  2003 
 1.1    10.4    22.8  132.4 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). 
(http://www.jetro.go.jp/jpn/stats/trade/excel/gaikyo2003.xls) 
For the year 2003, Japan's trade with China amounted to $132.4 billion; its trade with 
the US totalled $174.1 billion; with the EU $124.8 billion; and with ASEAN it totalled 
$119.3 billion.108 The figures clearly show the immense growth in Sino-Japanese 
economic relations. The fact that China's exports to Japan exceeded US exports to Japan 
already in 2002 also reflects this emerging dynamic bilateral trade.109 
 China's recent economic growth is comparable to the Japanese period of high 
growth in the 1960s. Investment flourishes from developed countries, making China 'the 
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factory of the world'. Total trade nearly doubled in the five years 1998-2002 with 
America, Japan, the EU and ASEAN (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2: China's Trade, 1998-2002 ($ bn) 
Year  USA  Japan  EU  ASEAN4110 
1998     52.3  49.9  47.5  11.8 
2002     92.1  88.4  80.9  29.7 
Source: JETRO111 
 China took initiatives in 2000 to conclude a free trade agreement with ASEAN 
by the year 2010. All in all, recent Chinese politico-economic behaviour shows more 
engagement towards regional and global issues. These positive developments are 
primarily the result of efforts made by the Chinese themselves, although it must be 
acknowledged that Japan continued to encourage China in this direction. Koizumi is 
certainly aware of the importance of economic ties.112 
In contrast to these positive economic developments, political relations 
between Japan and China have registered considerable difficulties. There are numerous 
contributory factors to this problem, but I would like to concentrate on three dimensions 
which seem to be the most relevant, namely geopolitics, history and Taiwan. 
1. Geopolitics in Current Sino-Japanese Relations 
Turning first to the geopolitical context: China is on the ascendancy and for its 
economic development, it needs energy from all over the world. The most obvious way 
to ensure this is through its coastal areas. China's moves in its surrounding seas are 
obviously connected to this. Japan, on the other hand, which is becoming much more 
sensitive about the need to protect its people, territory and other rights in recent years, 
cannot to ignore China's maritime activities. An inevitable collision has therefore 
occurred. Two examples may be given: the East China Sea and Okinitorishima. 
 In the seabed of the East China Sea lie rich resources, including an abundant 
supply of gas. These resources lie on both sides of the demarcation line of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) as understood by Japan (equal distance from the borders). 
China's position on the Dalian Development Zone (DDZ) differs (the continental shelf 
belongs to the coastal country), but since China has control over gas resources which 
Japan could not claim, it began preparations for their excavation many years ago.  
 Japan's anxiety became heightened that Chinese maritime research vessels were 
extending their activities into the Japanese EEZ. The two countries concluded an 
information sharing system in August 2000 (Togo 2005: 154). But Japan learned in 
August 2004 that China unilaterally had begun to excavate the gas-field. The area itself 
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cannot be contested by Japan, but Japan expressed its concern because the Chinese 
excavation might deplete Japan's gas, which may originate in the same gas-field. 
Successive requests by Japan for China to submit information about the state of the 
excavation have failed to elicit any response (AS, 24 October 2004). The excavation 
continues and irritation mounts on the Japanese side. 
 Turning to the second example, Okinotorishima is a tiny 'island' located 
southeast of Okinawa, over which Japan has long claimed sovereignty, and on the basis 
of which Japan has defined its EEZ. In April 2004, China advanced its claim that, in 
accordance with the Law of the Sea, Okinotorishima should be considered as 'rocks', 
which do not entitle a country the right of an EEZ. Japan objected. No convergence of 
views was achieved and Chinese maritime research ships are scaling-up their activities 
around Okonotorishima (AS, 24 April 2004).  
 From Japan's perspective, a series of other issues, including the build-up of 
Chinese naval strength and renewed interest in the Senkaku Islands, are fuelling the 
growing concern. There seem to be some justifications for the increasing rivalry. If a 
great power rises and another power in its vicinity is eager to reinstate its position in the 
region, certain tensions will naturally arise. This is a time-honoured conclusion of 
realism. In such a situation, each country is entitled to develop necessary and 
appropriate measures to respond to the other's power-plays, but both sides are expected 
to establish dialogue and exchanges to minimize possible conflict and the damage that 
might ensue, and to maximize possible rapprochement and its benefits. Illusory 
optimism does not help, but the reality of power-politics dictates that such governance 
of relations through dialogue and exchanges is in the interest of both parties. 
2. The Historical Factor in Current Sino-Japanese Relations 
Prime Minister Koizumi's succession of visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001, 
February 2002, January 2003 and January 2004 have doomed mutual visits by the heads 
of state to each other's capital for three years. In Japan a host of explanations have been 
advanced to explain Koizumi's continued visits: his political commitment before his 
election as prime minister;113 his need to secure votes from the Izokukai (families of the 
war dead); his determination not to 'bow to China', etc.  
 However, probably the most relevant factor behind the visits is that Koizumi 
genuinely believes in the importance of visiting this shrine: through praying for those 
who sacrificed their life for their country and mourning the war dead, he is convinced 
that he is redeeming Japan's 'lost identity'. It is hard to detect anything militaristic or 
aggressive towards Asian neighbours. Koizumi is expressing with strong wording his 
remorse for the atrocities committed and is renewing his pledge for peace. For his 
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statement made at the time of the first visit on 13 August 2001, he was even harshly 
criticized by a nationalist opinion leader that his language has become even stronger 
than that used by Prime Minister Murayama: 'Koizumi even used hakarishirenai songai 
(immeasurable damage) instead of tadaino songai (tremendous damage)' (Maeno 2004: 
80). Although not appreciated at all by critical neighbours, he has so far consistently 
avoided 15 August as the visit date.  
 But despite his best intention to mourn the war dead and his efforts to reach out 
to the other side, he has not gained any sympathy in China. One salient reason can be 
highlighted in this regard. First, Japan has never successfully explained how mourning 
its war dead at a shrine which also commemorates Class A war criminals does not 
contradict its acknowledged post-war remorse for its actions and its sincere desire for 
peace. Whatever the reason, the absence of summit talks with China in these critically 
important years of the latter's growth as a major regional and global player is a greatly 
missed opportunity and may harm Japan's national interests. The realpolitik necessity 
for governing the relationship and the constructivist urge for establishing identity are 
colliding with a seemingly impossible contradiction. Japan needs to find a way to 
redress this situation, both for the sake of its own national interests and in the interests 
of surrounding Asian countries. At the same time, the resolution also lies in reciprocal 
efforts and understanding by the surrounding international community.  
3. The Taiwan Issue  
Finally, let us turn to the third dimension of the Sino-Japanese context, viz. Taiwan. 
After Japan established relations with China in 1972, Japan severed diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan, though Taiwan remained one of Japan's most important economic partners. 
Up until 2000, Japanese exports to Taiwan exceeded its exports to China.114 The 
emergence of a strong Taiwanese identity under President Lee Teng-hui in 1996 opened 
up a new debate in Japan on its policy towards China . In the latter half of the 1990s, 
Japanese politicians and intellectuals continued to emphasize that Taiwan's identity is 
different from that of China's (Namiki 2004: 118-19), that Taiwan is a democratic 
country with which Japan shares common values (Kin 2004: 120-1), that Taiwan 
occupies a strategic position to protect sea-lanes that connect Japan and South-East Asia 
(Okazaki 2004: 117-18) and that Lee Teng-hui's praise of the positive aspects of 
Japanese colonial rule should be more appreciated (Nakajima 2004: 116-17). 
Anti-Chinese feeling often became mixed with pro-Taiwanese emotion. 
 The Taiwan issue, which depends on how it is handled on both sides of the Strait, 
is an extremely difficult one. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with China 
in 1972, Japan has committed itself to respecting the 'one-China' policy,115 requesting 
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only that the matter be resolved peacefully. The basic structure of the Japan–US 
Security Treaty from 1960 is also unambiguous. Taiwan is a part of the long-standing 
geographical definition of the Far East of Article 6 of the Security Treaty (Togo 2005: 
83), where the United States has its security interest. Should the US decide to act, Japan 
must make up its mind through the prior consultation system. But more than three 
decades have passed since then and conditions on both sides of the Strait have changed, 
as has Japan's resolve to become a responsible partner of the international community. 
How this would affect Japan's position in cross-Strait relations is an extremely 
important and delicate matter.  
 Japan observers abroad have naturally given a lot of attention to the increasing 
difficulties between Japan and China. Thomas Berger (2004: 153-6), Michael Armacost 
(2003: 95-6), and Mike Mochizuki (2004: 121-5) all give detailed accounts about this 
difficulty, with a variety of degrees of optimism towards the future. As Mike Mochizuki 
points out, 'the key challenge for both Japanese and Chinese officials will be the 
management of populist nationalism in their respective countries' (Mochizuki 2004: 
124). But the root cause of the difficulty is probably more serious than any of these 
writings show. 
Ways Ahead 
Looking from the perspective of Japan's security and defence policy, the continuation of 
Koizumi's proactive and self-assertive policy will most likely lead to the question of 
revising the Constitution's Article 9. In January 2000 a five-year parliamentary research 
commission was established in the House of Representatives. On 1 November 2002, the 
commission published an interim report showing the divergence of views concerning 
the revision of Article 9 (AS, 2 November 2003). Traditional 'revisionists' of Article 9 
like Yasuhiro Nakasone and a new generation of security-oriented deputies such as 
Shigeru Ishiba (LDP) and Seiji Maehara (Democratic Party) stated that revision was 
necessary to specify that Japan could exert not only the individual, but the collective 
right to self-defence. The Komei Party, the Communist Party, and the Japan Socialist 
Party oppose revision of Article 9. The commission is scheduled to finalize its report in 
2005.  
 Prime Minster Koizumi, after he assumed power in April 2001, made it clear 
that constitutional revision, while not his immediate goal, was a viable long-term 
objective (AS, 31 August 2003). On 25 August 2003, Koizumi told reporters that he 
endorsed the Liberal Democratic Party formulating a proposal for revision by 2005 (AS, 
26 August 2003). The idea originated among influential party members within the LDP: 
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November 2005 will be the 50th anniversary of the Party. Taking these facts into 
account, one cannot rule out the possibility that constitutional revision will be placed on 
the political agenda in the years after 2005.  
 But the revision of Article 9 inevitably leads to the state of Japan's relations with 
its Asian neighbours. Japan's decision to transform itself into a more responsible, 
proactive and self-assertive country should be understood and welcomed by other 
countries, particularly neighbouring countries. But the current state of political relations 
between Japan and its neighbours is far from satisfactory. One key difficulty is that the 
rationale behind Japan's desire to re-establish its identity and overcome its past is poorly 
understood by its neighbours.  
 There seem to be two major policy directions which should underpin Japan's 
efforts in this regard. First, Japan's efforts to re-establish its identity should be 
conducted parallel with its efforts to understand other countries' pain over the same 
issue and to apologize for this. 'Japan should have two types of courage: to acknowledge 
and to apologize for the deeds which were wrong; [and]―to stand firm against wrong 
accusations and to defend her honour' (Togo 2005: 426). Second, Japan's search for its 
identity must always be framed in the overall perspective of the geopolitical power 
balance in East Asia. Fixation on a single factor, be it identity or otherwise, does not 
serve Japan's national interest. 
 At the same time, efforts are required from the other side as well. Japan's 
neighbouring countries should show greater understanding of the nature of current 
Japanese policy, both towards a more responsible and proactive security policy and 
towards a search for its identity. Japan's neighbours should try to enlarge areas of 
co-operation for the sake of their own national interests and for the region more 
generally. Regional dialogue, as proposed by Thomas Berger (2003: 84), in which both 
sides genuinely try to understand the other, may offer the best hope for the future.  




                                                   
60 See also Mingst (2003: 76): 'identities change by engaging in co-operative behaviour 
and by learning' and Smith (2001: 224-49).  
61 Japan's Siberian intervention after the Russian revolution failed; the army was 
defeated by the Russians at Lake Khasan in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939. 
62 The occupation of Japan was undertaken by the Allied Forces, which consisted 
primarily of American forces, with a symbolic involvement of Commonwealth forces. 
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63 Recent scholarly works indicate that the fundamental idea of idealistic pacifism was 
first proposed by then prime minister Kijyuuro Shidehara in his meeting with General 
MacArthur on 24 January 1946 (Iokibe 2001: 45). For the Japanese people, who had no 
knowledge of this meeting, Article 9 was taken to be an American notion. 
64 From February to March 1949, an American economist, Joseph Dodge, visited Japan 
and recommended a new policy to stabilize and stimulate the Japanese economy (Iokibe 
2001: 61). 
65 Security forces (hoantai) were established in October 1952, which developed into the 
Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in July 1954 (Ikei 1997, chronology). 
66 It was also called 'the system of the year 55'. 
67 Shigenori Togo is the author’s grandfather. He left a memoir in Japanese Jidaino 
Ichimen, translated into English and published by Simon & Schuster in 1955 entitled 
The Cause of Japan. His activities are covered in my book as well (Togo 2005: 25-7, 
44-5). 
68 This expression is quoted from the title of a book written by Ryuichi Teshima, chief 
of the NHK office in Washington, on how Japan’s reaction to the first Gulf War was 
confused, leading to non-appreciation of its efforts by the international community. See 
referred texts.  
69 In March 1996, Lee Teng-Hui, a native Taiwanese who became the Kuomintang 
leader, was elected president. 
70 The Japan New Party led by Masahiro Hosokawa, the Sakigake (Harbinger) Party led 
by Masayoshi Takemura, and the Japan Renewal Party led by Ichiro Ozawa were the 
major ones. 
71 Already at the time of 'Japan’s defeat in 1991', the three ruling parties, the LDP, the 
Komeito Party and the Japan Democratic Socialist Party, had agreed to enact a new law 
which would enable the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief 
operations (Fukushima 1999: 69). 
72 Japan dispatched eight ceasefire observers, 600 construction troops, 75 civilian 
police officers, and 41 election observers to UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia) (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/kyoryoku.html viewed on 4 
December 2002). 
73 From March 2002, 680 SDF members to be engaged on facilities construction and 10 
commanding officers were sent under UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor). Their work carried through to UNMISET (UN Mission of Support in East 
Timor). 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/jinteki.pdf viewed on 5 August 2003). 
74 http://www.mofa.go.jp./mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/jinteki.pdf viewed on 5 August 2003. 
75 The first key defence policy document was the Basic Policy for National Defence 
adopted in 1957. The second document was the National Defence Program Outline 
(NDPO) adopted in 1976. That document was revised in 1995. 
76 http://www.mofa.go.jp./mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/jinteki.pdf viewed on 8 August 2003. 
77 By 2002, 385 women in Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines and 78 women in the 
Netherlands received atonement. 
78 Miyazawa stated toward Korea in October 1990: 'deep remorse and apology', and in 
January 1992: 'heartfelt remorse and apology' (Togo 2005: 169-70).  
79 Hosokawa stated toward Korea in November 1993: 'deep remorse and heartfelt 
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apology' (Togo 2005: 170), and toward China in March 1994: 'deep remorse and 
apology'. 
80 Murayama stated toward China in May 1995: 'deep remorse' (AS, 4 May 1995).  
81 Rikki Kersten, 'Ienaga Saburo and War Responsibility', public lecture organized by 
Japan-Dutch Dialogue, in Leiden on 10 May 2003. 
82 After becoming prime minister, Koizumi made a clear policy declaration in the 
spring of 2001 that the resolution of non-performing loans and the seven points of 
structural reform were major pillars of his economic policy. 
83 As described above, the long-time governance of the LDP under the 'system of the 
year 55' ended in 1993 with a non-LDP government. After the LDP returned to power, 
the traditional system of factions based on power-sharing was weakened. In the 1990s 
the bureaucracy was shattered by a series of major scandals, involving major ministries 
such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the 
Ministry of Welfare, the Defence Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
bursting of the bubble economy naturally shook business, above all financial institutions 
and middle to small-scale enterprises.  
84 In 1991-92 there were eight rounds of negotiations to establish diplomatic relations; 
in 1995-97 the establishment of KEDO, Japan grants rice aid and the homecoming of 
former Japanese spouses; 1999-2000 three rounds of negotiations to establish 
diplomatic relations and continuing rice assistance. 
85 In 1993-94 occurred a nuclear crisis; 1998 the Taepodong missile-testing over 
Japanese islands; in 1999 a Maritime Safety Agency gunboat shot at unidentified 
vessels inside Japanese territorial waters; in 2001 another shooting of an unidentified 
vessel resulted in its explosion and sinking (AS, 24 December 2001). 
86 In March 1988, the Japanese government recognized in the Diet that ‘there were 
enough doubts to suspect that three couples had been abducted by North Korea’ (AS, 8 
December 2002). Koizumi went to Pyongyang with a list of 11 abductees. 
87 See note 26. 
88 17 September 2002, signed by Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang. 
89 The Japanese prime minister’s popularity is typically very low; the danger level is 
usually seen as being around 10 percent. 
90 Article 5 of the Security Treaty reads as follows: 'Each Party recognizes that an 
armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet 
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.' The 
expression 'constitutional provisions' refers to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.  
91 http://www.emb-japan.nl/information2/statement/news4.htm viewed on 9 November 
2001. 
92 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/1029danwa.html viewed on 14 April 
2003. 
93 The 1999 Surrounding Situation Law provided a solid legal basis for the enactment 
of this new law against terrorism. The structures of the two laws are similar. The basic 
purpose of SDF activities differ: the Surrounding Situation Law prescribes SDF 
co-operation with US troops within the scope of the Japan–US security treaty, whereas 
the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law prescribes Japan's co-operation against 
international terrorism, as defined by UN resolutions.  
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94 Sankei Shinbun makes an interesting analysis comparing these divergent tendencies 
(Sankei Shinbun, 18 April 2004). 
95 The total number of soldiers deployed amounted to 1050. 
http://www2.asahi.com/special/iraqrecovery/images/040117b.gif viewed on 5 July 
2004. 
96 The three approved laws were related to (1) response to armed attack; (2) revision of 
a part of the SDF law; (3) revision of the law establishing the security committee. On 15 
May the three laws were approved in the House of Representatives with approximately 
90 percent of votes in favour (AS, 16 May 2003). On 6 June they were approved in the 
House of Councillors with 202 deputies in support of the new laws among 235 present, 
with one abstention. The Communist Party and the Socialist Party were opposed (AS, 7 
June 2003). 
97 The seven laws were related to: (1) the protection of Japanese nationals at a time of 
armed attack; (2) help and support for US forces; (3) control of maritime transport of 
foreign military equipment; (4) usage of specified public facilities; (5) handling of 
prisoners of war; (6) grave offences against international humanitarian law; and (7) 
revision of a part of the SDF laws. The three treaties were: (1) 1949 Geneva Convention 
Protocol I; (2) 1949 Geneva Convention Protocol II; and (3) Revision of ACSA 
(httpo://www.jda.go.jp/j/yujihousei/index.htm). They were approved in the House of 
Representatives on 20 May (AS, 21 May 2004) and in the House of Councillors on 14 
June 2004 (AS, 15 June 2004). 
98 The report also advised Japan to soften principles within the International 
Peacekeeping Law to attune them to evolving standards of international co-operation. 
99 One crude measure of calculating this imbalance is GNP ratio of over 12 to 1, $14 
trillion to $1.14 trillion between the US and Japan vs China (calculated by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs home page: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ecodata/gdp.html, 
viewed on 17 April 2005). See also Berger (2000: 408-20) and Katzenstein and Sil 
(2004: 20-6).  
100 This statement is related to China but in my view applies to all countries in the 
region, North Korea inclusive, if abduction can be included with history. 
101 These four islands––the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashiri and 
Etorofu––formally became a part of Japan when the border between Japan and Russia 
was first demarcated in 1855. The Soviet Union occupied them from the end of August 
to early September 1945 after Japan had capitulated. 
102 Japan and the USSR resumed diplomatic relations in 1956. The Joint Declaration 
then adopted specified that two smaller islands (the Habomai group and Shikotan) 
would be transferred to Japan after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, but Japan also 
insisted on the return of the two larger islands (Kunashiri and Etorofu). Since then, 
negotiations have turned around the issue of two (smaller) versus four (including the 
two larger). 
103 In 1998 Japan proposed to demarcate the border between Etorofu and Uruppu, while 
making maximum concessions on all outstanding issues. No further details are disclosed 
by the negotiators, but Minoru Tamba, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, who 
assisted the negotiations between Hashimoto and Yeltsin, wrote in his memoir that 
Yeltsin was genuinely attracted to the proposal (Tamba 2004: 66).  
104 In 1960 when Japan revised the Security Treaty with the US, the USSR denied its 
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obligation to transfer the two smaller islands until all foreign troops had been withdrawn 
from Japan. 
105 This information is based on the author’s conversation with an informed Japanese 
source, who asked not to be identified (18 November 2004). 
106 Mr. Jenkins, the husband of Mrs. Soga, is an American deserter, and refused to go 
back to Japan for fear of American prosecution. On 9 July the Soga family was reunited 
in Indonesia, and on 18 July returned to Japan (AS, 2 July 2004). 
107 The total number of abductees as identified by the government is now 15. 
108 The figures in the table and in this sentence derive from the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) website. Statistics are based on Japanese figures. 
(http://www.jetro.go.jp/jpn/stats/trade/excel/gaikyo2003.xls viewed on 8 January 2005). 
109 In 2002, China's exports to Japan were $61.6 billion whereas US exports to Japan 
were $57.6 billion. Although outside the scope of this analysis, China, together with 
Hong Kong, became the number one trading partner for Japan exceeding the US in the 
year of 2004.  
110 These are Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
111 JETRO calculated this figure primarily based on IMF statistics. 
(http://www:jetro.go.jp/ec/j/econ/data/matrix1998xls~2002xls viewed on 6 July 2004.) 
112 Koizumi stated that he was not worried by Japan’s stalled political relationship with 
China because it was overshadowed by flourishing economic ties (Financial Times, 7 
June 2004). 
113 Koizumi had promised 43 times in his pre-election campaign that he was going to 
visit Yasukuni on 15 August when elected as prime minister (Maeno 2004: 79) 
114 http://www.jetro.go.jp/ec/j/trade/excel/rank.xls viewed on 6 July 2004. 
115 The Japanese government position was determined in Article 3 of the 1972 
Japan–China Joint communiqué, which reads: 'The Government of the People's 
Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the 
People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects 
this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains 
its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.' 
Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation states that 'The terms of the Cairo Declaration 
shall be carried out' and the Cairo Declaration states that '…Formosa (Taiwan)…shall 
be restored to the Republic of China'. 
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Hashimoto was the first prime minister who faced the political and economic 
weight of rise of China and the need to balance Japan’s relations with the United States, 
which constituted the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. Hashimoto’s fundamental 
choice was the United Sates, in case a real conflict might occur between The United 
States and China. But Hashimoto’s first foreign policy nightmare was “US-China 
hostility” which would compel Japan to take real hostile position against China. His 
second nightmare was “Japan passing” which might occur as the result of the 
improvement of relations between the two countries at the expense of Japan.  
Hashimoto was very careful to avoid these two extremes. He saw the danger of 
US-China hostility at the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. This led to the re-affirmation of 
the alliance in 96 and the agreement of a new defense guideline in 97, but Hashimoto 
paid real attention not to provoke China excessively. He visited Yasukuni in 96 but 
suspended it thereafter, lest he should provoke the Chinese on their historical memory. 
As seen in the Hopporyodo book, Hashimoto did his best in 97-98 to find a 
breakthrough with Yeltsin on the territorial issue in order to strengthen Japan’s external 
position against the United States and China. 
     Obuchi’s greatest achievement was Asia, notably Korea and China. Kim 
Dae-jung’s visit in 98 marked the most important occasion for reconciliation, when 
Obuchi expressed the clearest apology ever made to Korea. Jiang Zemin’s visit which 
followed was not that successful. However,  both Hashimoto and Obuchi took positive 
measures to solve(?) the Asian financial crisis and Obuchi succeeded in organising a 
tripartite breakfast under the auspices of the ASEAN Plus Three in 1997. 
     Mori’s single greatest achievement was perhaps Russia and the agreement which 




The end of the cold war opened a new strategic environment for Japan. But 
Japan was ill prepared for this change, and its inability to act responsibly in the Gulf 
War of 1991 inflicted a deep blow against its relations with the United States. In East 
Asia, at the time the Soviet Union was losing its influence, China was rising, guided by 
Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “peace and development” from the early 1980s.1 Based on 
its “engagement” policy, Japan revealed an unusually autonomous policy of “not 
isolating China” after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. But the “artificial honeymoon”2 
brought about by the Imperial visit in 1992 did not last long and Japan had to face 
China’s nuclear weapons tests (1995-1996) and the revival of history issues in 1995.3 
Japan’s North Korean overture in 1990-1992 proved to be abortive, and relations with 
South Korea did not improve much either, despite efforts to recognize and apologize for 
the comfort women, and 1995 became a difficult year symbolized by the destruction of 
the pre-war Japanese governor’s office. In relation to Russia, Japan missed an 
opportunity opened during the short period of euphoria in 1992 after the demise of the 
Soviet Union. Thus, heightened expectation in the wake of the cold war in 1991-1992 
was followed by general disappointment in the middle of the 1990s for all the missed 
opportunities. 
 
 Strategic environment in the second half of the 1990s 
 The strategic environment affecting Japan in the second half of the 1990s could 
be described in the following three perspectives: geopolitics, geo-economics and history. 
In geopolitics, the first and probably the most important factor was the rise of China in 
the Asia-Pacific region. After the difficulty China faced after the Tiananmen crackdown, 
Deng Xiaoping emphasized economic construction, as underlined in his “lectures in the 
southern inspection tour” at the beginning of 1992. In order to harmonize China’s 
external policy with this objective, he put forward a four-dimensional concept of the 
world: “one region (regional countries), one line (industrialized countries), one side 
(developing countries), and one point (the United States).” Each dimension had a 
specific mission within the overall objective of achieving economic construction. US 
policy was specifically expressed with a “20-word directive”, asserting a cautious, 
non-provocative but principled approach, which was made public only at the end of 
1995.4 How to manage the relationship with the US, the sole superpower, was a 
difficult and much debated issue, the answer of which was left unclear in China. Japan 
was an important “regional” and “industrialized” country, but as a close ally of the US, 
its position within the East Asian power balance could easily be seen as interfering with 
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China’s interests. In 1996, China’s success in economic construction and modernization 
since the beginning of the policy of “reform and opening” and “peace and development” 
could not be doubted, but maintenance of an international environment conducive to 
economic development was not considered an easy task. 
 For Japan, the US was not only the sole superpower, but a close ally. China was 
an important neighbor with long historic ties and developing economic relations, but 
with which political relations were complex. Facing a China rising in all spheres was 
totally a new experience for Japan. Considered by many to have a special negative 
feeling toward Japan, Jiang Zemin was not an easy interlocutor. How US-China 
relations would develop was unclear. In such a situation, Japan’s strategic thinking was 
left with little imagination: first, to strengthen trustworthy alliance relations with the 
US; second, to maintain and consolidate as friendly relations as possible with China; 
and third, to avoid two possible nightmares of “US-China hostility” and “US-China 
passing of Japan,” by way of helping to improve those relations in case of hostility, and 
impressing both with Japan’s presence in case of “passing.”  
  On the Korean Peninsula, Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy and changes 
occurring in the external relations of North Korea created another strategic challenge for 
Japan. Russia became an important factor, which had the potential to create a new 
power balance in Japan’s favor in East Asia as well. 
In geo-economics, the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, which affected Thailand, 
Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia, became the major factor to gauge Japan’s 
proximity with Asia. Japan itself was mired in its own financial crisis in overcoming 
non-performing loans and introducing structural reforms. Efforts could not be spared to 
launch a new round of the WTO,5 but as the largest economy in Asia, Japan was 
expected to show effective leadership to overcome the crisis. Japan’s credibility was at 
stake. And through this process emerged another challenge to create a regional 
cooperative economic structure in which Japan might play a leading role as well. 
  In history, Japan struggled to seek further reconciliation and establish its identity 
in Asia. China increasingly did not hide its concern about Japan’s past and that 
contemporary Japan was not cognisant enough about past atrocities. Such concerns 
were not stilled in South Korea either. Several important exchanges of top leaders were 
made in this period with mixed results. Furthermore, two fundamental issues for Japan 
to overcome linked to the history from WWII--the conclusion of a peace treaty with 
Russia and the normalization of relations with North Korea--were under continuous 
attention. In particular, normalization of relations with Russia became a weighty agenda 
toward the turning point of the century. Inasmuch as these issues were important from 
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the point of view of regaining identity for Japan, identity was also a crucial issue for 
Asian neighbors. As Muthiah Alagappa argues, the three major security issues in 
Asia--Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir--are “identity cum sovereignty conflicts.”6 In these 
circumstances, Japan’s struggle for identity became a complex issue. Thus, from the 
point of view of international relations theory, an analysis of this period could be made 
based on three approaches: realism, focussing on geopolitics, power relations, 
hegemony and balance of power; liberalism, accentuating the formation of an 
international structure to govern relations among states, including regional economic 
cooperation; and constructivism, emphasizing the importance of a search for identity in 
a state’s behavior.7 
Three prime ministers led Japan in this period: Hashimoto (1996.1-1998.7), 
Obuchi (1998.7-2000.4), and Mori (2000.4-2001.4). Internally, their primary task was to 
overcome the economic crisis derived from the non-performing loan and introduce a 
fundamental restructuring of the social and economic system. They tried without real 
success, although it was not clear whether they had real scope for leadership in the face 
of institutional and party obstacles. But in external policy, each period under the 
respective prime minister had its distinct characteristics. 
 
Hashimoto: strategic thinking in relation to the United States, China, and Russia 
    Born in 1937, son of a parliamentarian, Hashimoto Ryutaro was elected as a 
member of the Diet in 1963 at the age of 26. He served as minister of welfare, 
transportation, finance, and international trade and industry and became prime minister 
at the age of 59. First a member of the Sato faction and then becoming an influential 
member of the Tanaka-Takeshita faction, he was known to be a “lone wolf” and a 
seisakutsu (well versed on policy), strong in his policy articulation without resorting to 
human networking in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politics. Hashimoto played a 
major role as minister of finance during the Gulf War in preparing $14 billion in 
assistance. While in the opposition, he seriously studied the North Korean nuclear crisis 
of 1993-94 as the LDP chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council. In June 1994, 
under the extraordinary coalition of LDP and Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Hashimoto 
became the minister for international trade and industry under Prime Minister 
Murayama. In this capacity, he served as chief negotiator on automobile disputes with 
the Clinton administration and faced the Okinawa outcry over the rape of a primary 
school girl in early September 1995. In late September 1995 Hashimoto became the 
president of LDP also assuming the post of deputy prime minister. This position paved 
the way to becoming prime minister in January 1996 upon Murayama’s resignation.  
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Analyzing Hashimoto’s policy initiatives, one cannot but fail to notice that in the 
economic sphere his decisions created fundamental problems in managing the Japanese 
economy in the 1990s. First, the introduction of the restriction of asset trading in 1990 
as the minister of finance to overcome the bubble economy successfully exploded the 
bubble, but created impossible non-performing loans which brought down Japanese 
economy to a real downturn for more than a decade. Second, his decision as prime 
minister to increase consumption tax to 5% stifled the barely recovering Japanese 
economy back to its deflationary cycle. In each case he had to resign from the post of 
the minister of finance and the prime minister. One should observe though that 
Hashimoto’s ill decisions were also based on recommendation by Ministry of Finance 
(MOF)’s officials, thus not only the prime minister but also the whole bureaucracy was 
responsible for these policy failures. 
  Hashimoto’s foreign policy experience must have given him an understanding of 
the precarious ground on which international relations were moving after the end of the 
cold war and the necessity for Japan to strengthen its strategic position in the region. As 
in internal policy, all his external policy decisions were the results of combined efforts 
of the prime minister and supporting bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), MOF, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and 
Defense Agency (DA). 
 
Relations with China and the United States 
Hashimoto became the first prime minister who dealt with the dual challenge which 
Japan had to face in the post-cold war period: to maintain and to develop sound political 
and security relations with the US and to face squarely the enormity of issues connected 
with a rising China. The US decision to send two carriers to the Taiwan Straits in March 
1996 after China’s missile tests on the eve of Lee Teng-hui’s election seemed to justify 
Deng’s cautious “20-word” directive. For Japan and Hashimoto, this crisis was the first 
real exposure to the reality of East Asian security danger. The 1993-94 nuclear crisis 
was somehow left for the security experts to mull over, but the Taiwan crisis in 1996 
became an open concern for the prime minister and the nation. The central issue which 
Japan had to face was “what should Japan do if hostility breaks out between the US and 
China?” Omori Yoshio, Director of the Cabinet Intelligence Office 1993-1997, recalled 
that “the Taiwan crisis was the greatest security danger which Japan faced during my 
tenure. Japan was going to be involved in the great power geopolitics between the 
United States and China in 21st century Asia, and Japan had to take a position on this 
issue.”8 According to journalist Funabashi Yoichi, “the first nightmare for Japan, the 
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hostility between China and the United States, emerged.”9 For Hashimoto the answer 
was clear. Drawing on his own foreign policy experience, he knew well that Japan’s 
security was deeply dependent on the US. “If ultimately Japan was asked to choose, 
there was no doubt for Hashimoto to opt for the alliance with the United States.”10 But 
at the same time, China was not a country which Japan could discard. Thus, what 
Hashimoto did was to consolidate security ties with the US, to do his best to improve 
relations with China, and in facing the “US-China hostility” nightmare, to be careful so 
that Japan would not further provoke US-China hostility. Hashimoto explained his 
thinking to President Clinton in his April summit: he emphasized the necessity to 
consolidate Japan-US security ties and added that “If Japan and the US jointly approach 
China, China would not accept it. Japan and the US should coordinate our policies, but 
should endeavor [to implement] respective policies [separately].”11  
 For Hashimoto, the first task of consolidating the alliance proceeded smoothly. 
As a matter of fact, the format for consolidation of Japan-US security relations had 
already been prepared by the spring of 1996 by the two administrations. After the 
discovery in the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94 that Japan was almost 
incapable of effectively assisting US operations against North Korea, the two 
administrations had worked out an important document to reaffirm their security 
relations, which failed to be adopted at the Osaka APEC Summit in 1995 because of 
Clinton’s absence there. The Taiwan Straits crisis made the tone of that document even 
stronger,12 and in April 1996, when Clinton visited Japan, and “The Japan-US Joint 
Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century” was adopted.  
China launched a wave of criticism against the consolidation of Japan-US 
security ties. Its academics raised serious concerns that the security alliance was a 
mechanism of containment which could seriously damage China’s strategic position in 
the world.13 Voices of those concerned with the “egg shell” role of the US troop 
presence in Japan to foster Japan’s military power grew louder than of those who 
stressed the “bottle cap” of keeping the Japanese military genie in the bottle.14 China 
argued that the “Japan-US security treaty changed into a tool to contain China. Japan 
and the US were afraid of the future military power of China and were implementing an 
adversarial policy against China. The US should withdraw its forward deployment 
system from the Asia-Pacific region.” It sought to drive a clear wedge between Japan 
and the US: the danger of Japanese militarism was amply emphasized in talks with the 
Americans. Minister of Defense Chi Haotian in his visit to Washington in December 
1996 did not hide his view of Japan as “a country that cannot be trusted.” Meanwhile, 
Japan was told by the Chinese that just being obedient to the Americans lacks a 
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proactive quality necessary for a leadership role in Asia.15 
In addition to the security rift, Hashimoto faced a rocky agenda with China in 
1996 in relation to power and identity. Japan’s bewilderment about China’s nuclear 
weapons tests in May, August, and September 1995, which resulted in a partial 
suspension of ODA, still affected the psychology of the relationship. The Senkaku 
island issue emerged when several patriotic Japanese youth, in an anti-Chinese mood, 
went ashore and constructed a light house and a war memorial in July-August 1996.16 
Tensions also were escalated by Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine on July 29, 
1996, the day of his birthday. 
  1997 became a year for Hashimoto to test his strategic sense in East Asia: how to 
remedy relations with China, while consolidating relations with the US. First, on the 
security rift, the Japanese government went out of its way to explain to China that it was 
not its intention to gang up with the US to threaten China. The fourth round of the 
Japan-China security dialogue held in March 1997 became an unusually long and 
detailed session to explain the essence of Japan-US security relations to China.17 The 
new defense guideline, adopted in September 1997, formalized a new notion of the 
“surrounding situation” for the defense cooperation between Japan and the US, and the 
new notion was understood as being “situational” and “not geographical.” The two 
administrations have kept this position since then, and the political decision to be silent 
about the implications which the guideline might have vis-à-vis Taiwan helped to take 
some heat away from China’s reaction.18 This position was thoroughly explained by 
Hashimoto to Jiang Zemin in his September visit to Beijing and MOFA ascertained that 
“Japan succeeded in getting a fair amount of understanding from the Chinese side.”19 
Second, the thorny issue of nuclear weapons tests was resolved when China 
declared a moratorium after its last test in July 1996 and signed the CTBT in September. 
Japan lifted its ODA sanctions in March 1997. Third, concerning the Senkaku islands, 
Hashimoto reached an agreement with China in September 1997 to create a 
200-mile-wide “joint management zone” to allow fishing by both nations.20 Fourth, in 
the summer of 1997, Hashimoto had to decide whether to continue visiting Yasukuni or 
not. In October 1994, Hashimoto made a revealing statement about his thinking on 
history before a committee of the Diet Lower House: 
“I still continue to think about when Japan’s policy began to change to, what is 
generally called, aggression against the Chinese continent. It might have been some 
point during WWI. In relation to Korea, our seniors chose an action which cannot 
but be called colonialism. But when I restrict my thinking to WWII, where Japan 
fought a war against the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
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there remains some doubt whether we can call it aggression. At least, I have no 
intention to state that Japan waged a war of aggression against the Soviet Union, 
which began the attack on Manchuria.”21 
 
     Speaking cautiously, as is typical in parliamentary debate, Hashimoto, in essence, 
acknowledged that Japan needs a humble approach to Asia, where it has committed 
aggression and ruled as a colonial state. With this recognition, Hashimoto decided not to 
repeat his Yasukuni visit. Thus, Hashimoto on the whole successfully navigated through 
1997 to rebuild relations with China, while continuing to strengthen relations with the 
US, particularly through the defense guidelines. While Hashimoto was busy improving 
ties with China, US-China relations were also overcoming the 1996 crisis. From the 
latter part of 1996, and particularly when his second term began in 1997, Clinton took 
the initiative in improving US-China relations. This culminated first in Jiang Zemin’s 
October 1997 visit to Washington and the establishment of a “cooperative strategic 
partnership,”22 after Jiang stopped over in Honolulu and placed a wreath at the Pearl 
Harbor Memorial, “reminding all of the WWII alliance between China and the United 
States against Japan.” Clinton reciprocated this visit with a “nine-day grand tour” 
bypassing Japan and Korea in June-July 1998, an omission which was then bitterly 
criticized in Congress as a “strategic miscalculation.”23 Furthermore, in Shanghai 
Clinton announced the famous “three no’s” on Taiwan that the US does not support 
“independence for Taiwan, two Chinas or one Taiwan one China, and Taiwan’s 
membership in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”24 
Improvement of US-China relations accompanied by “Japan passing” was the 
second “nightmare” which Japan could face in this strategic triangle.25 Bad memories 
linger from Nixon’s announcement of his visit to China in 1971 without sufficient prior 
notification, the so-called Nixon-shokku. Ironically, Hashimoto had to face the first 
nightmare of “US-China hostility” at the outset of his activities and the second one of 
“US-China passing of Japan” at the end of his career as prime minister. Hashimoto later 
narrates his feeling: 
 “It was not pleasant to observe impassionately the visit to China while being 
bypassed by President Clinton. But I would have said: “please.” I made up my mind that 
we are not in a position to insist that President Clinton come to Japan. But mixed 
feelings remained. The US might have two faces: the Straits crisis and Clinton’s China 
visit. What would be Japan’s position?”26 
 
 Hashimoto’s unanswered question was probably all the more bitter, because Japan 
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had just undergone a complicated and strange adjustment in the implementation of the 
defense guidelines, fully taking into account China’s sensitivity. After the adoption of 
the guidelines in September 1997, Hashimoto, upon advice by MOFA, made the 
decision in the spring of 1998, that the cooperation in accordance with the new 
guidelines will be confined within the scope of cooperation based on the 1960 US-Japan 
security treaty. This limitation was clearly prescribed in the Surrounding Situation Law 
which was formulated in April 1998. It was a strange order of determination that this 
point, whether the scope of cooperation is wider than the narrowly defined Japan-US 
security cooperation or not, was left somewhat ambiguous in the guidelines and that 
Japan’s internal law to support implementation unambiguously specified it. But 
whatever the reason for this anomaly, when Hashimoto and MOFA sharpened the 
interpretation of the guidelines to be cooperation strictly under the 1960 security treaty, 
a logical dilemma occurred: the cooperation under the 1960 security treaty cannot be 
conducted outside the area which may affect the security of “Far East”, whereas the 
geographical interpretation of the term “Far East” in accordance with Article VI of the 
1960 treaty was abundantly defined in the parliamentary debate in 1960 to include 
Taiwan. Once one enters into a definition related to the 1960 treaty, it would become 
rather difficult to stick to the definition that the cooperation may be exclusively 
“situational” and not “geographical.” Thus, pushed by the force of logic, a MOFA 
official touched upon such a “geographical” interpretation at the Diet in May 1998. 
Hashimoto not only insisted on sticking to the “situational” interpretation, but 
eventually removed that official from his post. Thus, Hashimoto did his best not to 
provoke China. Japan’s sense of balance that it is unwise to provoke China on such an 
issue as the legal explanation of the new guidelines prevailed in this period. 
 
The Asian financial crisis 
In addition to his geopolitical thinking and based on his long-time experience as 
minister of MOF and MITI, Hashimoto had confidence in understanding the logic of 
international economics, finance, and trade. When a financial crisis of unprecedented 
magnitude befell Asia starting with Thailand in July 1997, Hashimoto’s government was 
ready to take a leadership role to overcome it. Japan’s initiative to establish an Asian 
Monetary Fund was launched in August 1997.  
  What was Japan’s motivation? It was a combination of three factors: First, the 
crisis occurred in Asia, to which Japan belongs, and where Japan is the greatest 
economic power. In Asia, Japan has tried to create longstanding relations based on 
economics, trade, and investment, if not political relations. Should Japan be unable to 
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take an effective role to overcome the crisis, how can it claim an honorable leadership 
role in the region? Second, practical and tactical considerations such as the low profile 
of US activities, some dissatisfaction with the IMF scope of assistance, and ASEAN’s 
support for Japan’s leadership role made policy makers think that a new AMF would 
genuinely contribute to better resolve the crisis. Third, personality factors played a role. 
Sakakibara Eisuke, vice minister for international affairs in MOF, powerfully led the 
negotiations. Given Hashimoto’s confidence on such crucial matters of international 
finance, it is more than natural to assume that Sakakibara’s initiative was fully 
supported by Hashimoto’s thinking.27 
By the end of September, the initiative had essentially failed. It was partly due to 
the generality of the proposal; apart from proposing a fund of $100 billion of which 
Japan was prepared to finance half, such important issues as conditionality and relations 
with the IMF were left vague. But primarily it was due to a lack of coordination with 
the US. A line-up of the US, the IMF, Europe, and, strikingly, China emerged to oppose 
this scheme, which was formally rejected in November.28 Not only from the point of 
view of Japan’s leadership in international finance and geo-economics in Asia, but also 
in terms of geopolitics and identity in Asia, it was a costly defeat. Japan again faced the 
second “nightmare” of being opposed both by the US and China. ASEAN’s expectations 
could not be met. 
In the fall when the crisis spread to Indonesia (in October) and South Korea (in 
November), Hashimoto’s government had no choice but to coordinate with the US and 
IMF. Its international assistance package harmonized with that of the IMF, $10 billion to 
South Korea, $5 billion to Indonesia, and $4 billion to Thailand. Primarily under the 
Hashimoto cabinet, Japan’s assistance totalled $44 billion, including funds for private 
investment, trade financing, help to the socially vulnerable, and support for economic 
structural reforms.29 In his ASEAN trip in January 1997, Hashimoto proposed a regular 
summit between Japan and ASEAN, which triggered ASEAN’s invitation of Japan, 
China, and South Korea.30 Amidst the financial crisis, it invited the three to the 
December 1997 Kuala Lumpur summit, commemorating 30 years. Hashimoto therefore 
became the first prime minister to attend the ASEAN + 3 summit meeting. 
   
Relations with Korea, India, and Myanmar 
 In relations with South Korea, Hashimoto’s major task became the 
implementation of Japanese assistance to the Korean financial crisis. Although Kim 
Dae-jung was elected to the presidency in December 1997 and inaugurated in February 
1998, Hashimoto did not face the full impact of his sunshine policy. With North Korea, 
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though, Hashimoto’s era was characterized by relatively warm relations: efforts to 
resume negotiations for normalization, the home return of former spouses, and 
continuous implementation of humanitarian assistance. It coincided with the general 
warming up of North Korea’s relations with the outside, such as KEDO and four-party 
talks, but at the same time, “as the backdrop of these developments, there were positive 
directions from Hashimoto.”31 
  When India tested a nuclear weapon in May 1998 Japan immediately froze all 
grant aid and subsequently new loans. “Hashimoto was genuinely concerned about the 
danger of proliferation and the fate of the NPT.”32 Purnendra Jain points out that 
Japan’s action was “swift and severe,” “out of proportion,” and “unnecessary,” and there 
was a lack of geopolitical calculation that India might act as a useful balancer to a rising 
China.33 Indeed, although there was a long-term security concern about the risk of 
proliferation in East Asia, nothing indicates that Hashimoto had any strategic 
calculation to include India in the geopolitics of East Asia against a rising China. 
In relation to Myanmar, however, Hashimoto was very conscious that just isolating 
Myanmar because of human rights issues would lead it to drift toward China, and this 
would not be conducive to the strategic interests of Japan and the US. Despite American 
criticism, he gave the green light to an emergency repairs project for airport safety.34  
 
Relations with Russia   
Hashimoto’s geopolitical thinking toward Asia was on the whole sound and 
balanced, but apart from the abortive AMF initiative, it was reactive and lacked 
dynamic initiative. The exception was “Russia, other than the United States, and in that 
context Okinawa, where Hashimoto really worked with personal enthusiasm and 
leadership.”35 Most conspicuously, Hashimoto’s leadership toward Russia was not only 
based on his aspiration to achieve a breakthrough in a bilateral context but also on his 
geopolitical calculation that improved Japan-Russia relations would strengthen Japan’s 
position in East Asia against a rising China. Hashimoto’s own words tell this: 
“We must make Russia an Asian player. We have to make Russia a friend for Japan. 
We do not want in the 21st century China and India to struggle for hegemony in 
Asia. In order to achieve this objective, we need to have Russia included in the 
region.”36 
 
 When Hashimoto was preoccupied with the Taiwan Strait crisis and the 
consolidation of the alliance with the US in the first half of 1996, Yeltsin was 
preoccupied with his election campaign to bring him a second term. But Hashimoto and 
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Yeltsin had their first encounter in April 1996 at the nuclear summit in Moscow, and it 
was a success. Hashimoto made a specific comment that he would not press on the 
difficult territorial issue and would wait for Yeltsin’s victory in the elections. Yeltsin 
responded with appreciation. In the area of security exchanges, two important initiatives 
were taken by the Japanese side in this period: to send the head of the Defence Agency 
in April, for the first time in history, and to dispatch a Maritime Self Defense escort 
vessel Kurama to Vladivostok in July, after an interval of 71 years. 
  But Hashimoto had to wait another year for his next encounter with Yeltsin, 
until Yeltsin came back to lead Russian internal and external policy in March 1997 after 
his re-election and health problems. Hashimoto recalls: “The turning point was 
President Clinton’s phone call just before his departure to Helsinki. He asked me 
whether I have any objection to including Russia in the G-8, because the US needs 
some triggering factor to let Russia accept NATO’s eastward expansion. I told him that I 
have no disagreement, provided that Russia would not join discussions on their own 
economy or Chernobyl, but simultaneously, I asked President Clinton to tell Yeltsin that 
Hashimoto was genuinely inclined to conduct in-depth talks [on a peace treaty]. Clinton 
reassured me that he would convey that message. I asked the same of Chancellor 
Kohl.”37 The bilateral meeting in Denver proceeded successfully; Hashimoto proposed 
to expand Japanese investment in Russia and to hold an informal “no necktie” meeting 
in the Russian Far East. 
“We got along well in Denver, but I felt that some concerns remained on the 
Russian side. I thought that highlighting Japan’s policy as “Eurasian foreign policy” 
may resolve Russian concerns and I sent a new message through my July speech at the 
Keizai doyukai.”38 Hashimoto emphasized in the speech that after the conclusion of 
“Eurasian policy from the Atlantic Ocean” by the formation of an expanded NATO, 
Japan was ready to embark on “Eurasian policy from the Pacific Ocean,” adding that the 
weakest link that needs to be strengthened among the four countries (Japan, Russia, 
China, and the US) is Japan-Russia, and calling for enhancement of the bilateral 
relationship based on the principles of trust, mutual interest, and a long-term perspective, 
to be applied to the territorial problem. The speech also reflected Hashimoto’s 
geopolitical instinct to improve relations with countries in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. The Russian side was deeply impressed by the dynamic worldview and the 
non-dogmatic approach to the territorial issue. A “no-necktie” meeting was planned for 
November 1997 in Krasnoyarsk. 
“President Yeltsin moved faster than I anticipated. He confirmed the target year of 
2000 and proposed to work together.” Hashimoto, on his part, prepared a detailed 
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program for economic cooperation, named the “Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan,” emphasizing 
cooperation for an open economy, a market economy, and energy.39 After Krasnoyarsk, 
a MOFA team led by Tamba Minoru, deputy foreign minister for political affairs and an 
expert on Russia with a strong personality and definite views on Russia, began tackling 
Japan-Russia relations in a most energetic manner for a half year. The purpose was to 
drastically improve Japan-Russia relations in all spheres and make this overall 
improvement connected to conclusion of a peace treaty by 2000.  
Hashimoto and Tamba first showed leadership by inviting Russia to the APEC 
summit in Vancouver, which was held immediately after the Krasnoyarsk meeting. 
“Japan introduced Russia to APEC. There was some feeling of a mismatch in APEC. 
But it had merit for Japan to remind others that Russia has an Asian face. APEC is an 
ideal place where Japan, China, the US, and Russia can meet in a natural manner.” Thus, 
Russia became a member of APEC from the Kuala Lumpur summit in 1998.40  
As concrete proof of economic cooperation, Foreign Minister Obuchi announced 
a financial assistance package of $1.5 billion to be jointly implemented with the World 
Bank in February 1998. This was the first, and it turned out, the last “un-tied” financial 
package which Japan declared toward Russia. 41  Another step which helped to 
strengthen mutual trust was the successful signing of an agreement on fishing around 
the four islands in February 1998. The compromise formula which allowed Japan the 
right to fish within the territorial waters around the islands without infringing the legal 
position of the two sides was the product of three year of negotiations between the two 
administrations. A shared spirit of mutual trust that characterized the Krasnoyarsk 
meeting became the basis of that agreement. 
Finally, Hashimoto launched the first concessionary proposal on the territorial 
issue in April 1998 at the second round of “no-necktie” meetings in Kawana. The 
content of the proposal was not formally disclosed but numerous reports emerged since 
then indicating that it was a combination of drawing a border line between Urup and 
Etorofu (assigning sovereignty over the four islands to Japan) and leaving the current 
status of the islands for some time to come (with all administrative rights to Russia).42 
The proposal seemed to have impressed Yeltsin, but no clear conclusion emerged in 
Kawana. 
“At the Birmingham summit in May, I did not expect much progress. We also had 
to deal urgently with the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan. After that, several 
factors contributed to the derailing of the negotiations. My resignation in July was one 
of the reasons.” Whatever Hashimoto’s own evaluation may be, the financial crisis in 
Russia, Hashimoto’s resignation due to the LDP’s defeat in the July elections, and 
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Yeltsin’s declining health, all contributed to the closure of a short-lived Japan-Russia 
“honeymoon.” A new page in the relationship had to be opened under Prime Minister 
Obuchi with Yeltsin ailing. 
 
         Obuchi: in search of reunification with Asia 
Obuchi, as Hashimoto, was born in 1937, as a son of a parliamentarian, and was 
first elected to the Diet in 1963. Known as hitogarano Obuchi (a man of personal 
warmth) who built his career through party work, in contrast to Hashimoto, established 
a solid personal network among LDP and opposition parliamentarians. He became the 
Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Takeshita cabinet from 1987 to 1989 when Japan moved 
from Showa to Heisei. Having gone through major party and factional work during the 
political reforms of the 1990s, he became the minister for foreign affairs in the second 
Hashimoto cabinet in July 1997 and succeeded Hashimoto as prime minister in July 
1998 at the age of 61. Because of his humble and non-flamboyant character, Obuchi 
was nicknamed first “cold pizza” or bokyahin (poor in vocabulary), but this low-key 
image was soon replaced by an impression that he was a man who had long prepared for 
the post of prime minister. 
 
Relations with China and the United States 
Probably it was in his Asia policy that Obuchi left his name in history, ranging 
from China to South Korea to regional cooperation. As Hashimoto, Obuchi faced a 
rising China, and his response was similar in reducing geopolitical tension and 
introducing a broad range of cooperation with a future orientation. On history, he made 
efforts to close the gap with China, but also sought a more self-assertive position to 
express Japanese views.  
Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in November 1998 became the first crucial occasion 
for Obuchi to deal with China. History, Taiwan, and Japan-US defense guidelines were 
the three difficult issues. Obuchi’s position was not confrontational but self-assertive, in 
contrast to his predecessors in the first half of the 1990s on history, and to Clinton on 
Taiwan. On history, Obuchi took a clear position that Japan was not going to include the 
word “apology (owabi)” in the written joint declaration. China, which did not ask in 
particular to include this point in the early preparatory stage, began to request strongly 
its inclusion after the Obuchi-Kim Dae-jung Declaration issued a month earlier. But 
Obuchi’s position was firm, and so was the position of MOFA in Tokyo. The consensus 
was that the postwar process of reconciliation with China, including the 1972 joint 
statement and the imperial visit in 1992, should have brought the relationship to a point 
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where it does not require another written owabi. Inclusion of owabi without an 
expression of reconciliation was considered unacceptable.43 A great majority of the 
LDP leadership supported this position. Ultimately, Tokyo agreed to include for the first 
time in a Japan-China official document the word “aggression” and Obuchi expressed 
verbally “heartfelt apology” at the summit meeting on November 26, but that was as far 
as Japan went.44 Obuchi’s position was reciprocated by Jiang Zemin’s full deployment 
of  the history card. But the preaching tone of his statements at the summit, the 
imperial dinner, Waseda University, and the press conference did not invite sympathy 
even among those who deemed friendship with China to be of utmost importance. 
Obuchi’s approach was justified and appreciated by most Japanese media and opinion 
leaders.45 
On Taiwan, Obuchi’s position was also cautious. The “three no’s” expressed by 
Clinton in his visit to China were neither confirmed in writing nor stated verbally. The 
Joint Declaration declared that Japan “continues to maintain its stand” from the 1972 
Joint Communiqué, “reiterated Japan’s understanding that there is one China,” and 
asserted that “Japan will continue to maintain its exchanges of a private and regional 
nature with Taiwan.”46 In the summit, Obuchi went to the extent of expressing that “the 
position of not supporting Taiwan’s independence will not be changed henceforward,” 
while emphasizing that he “hopes that the issue will be resolved peacefully through 
dialogue of the parties concerned.”47 At the same time, on the Japan-US defense 
guidelines, Obuchi confirmed the position that “the surrounding situation is not a 
geographical concept,” and also that “Japan-US security cooperation is not targeted 
against any specific country.”48 During the parliamentary scrutiny of the internal law to 
back up the Japan-US defense guidelines in the spring of 1999, Obuchi firmly 
maintained this position.49 
But Obuchi and MOFA officials also put a lot of effort into making Jiang’s visit an 
occasion for future-oriented cooperation. The new declaration was entitled “Building a 
Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development.” By accepting 
Deng’s key notion of “peace and development,” Japan meant to encourage China 
toward positive engagement not only in economic matters but also in peace and 
security. 50  Thus, the accompanying press statement comprised 33 projects for 
cooperation, including the construction of a high-speed railway between Beijing and 
Shanghai, the preservation of cultural heritage in the Silk Road area, human rights, 
non-proliferation, and exchanges on security and police activities. 
 While Obuchi was struggling through the establishment of his policy to China, 
an important change of tone was occurring in the US-China relationship. In the second 
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half of 1998 after the cooperative strategic partnership appeared to be established by 
Clinton’s visit to China, a series of difficulties occurred: congressional attacks against 
the “three no’s” (summer 1998), a crackdown on the China Democracy Party and on 
human rights issues (late 1998), a nuclear technology spy scandal (March 1999), and 
finally US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (May 1999).51 Tense debates 
on “peace and development” accelerated in China where those who warned of a 
“US-China cold war” got the upper hand.52   
Japanese concern was shifting from the broad spectrum of the second nightmare 
“US-China passing of Japan” to the first “US-China hostility.” But Obuchi was 
unusually pro-active in bridging the gap between the US and China in an area where 
Japan found itself with greater room to maneuver—economics--, namely, on the 
question of China’s participation in WTO. By early 1999, Clinton was favoring China’s 
entry. China was no less enthusiastic and sent Zhu Rongji in April to gain US approval. 
But the US Congress was not prepared, and after the Belgrade bombing in May, China’s 
internal hardliners began to voice caution, as did the US Congress, which sent a letter to 
Clinton asking him not to accept China’s accession to WTO.53 In talks with Clinton at 
the Kern Summit in June, Obuchi asserted that “friendly China-US relations are 
important for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region; I sincerely hope for the 
improvement; China’s early participation in WTO is important.”54 Toward China, 
Obuchi took concrete action in his July 8-10 visit to Beijing by giving consent to 
China’s membership. It was the first agreement reached with China among the G-7, and 
Obuchi advised Zhu Rongji to improve relations with the US.55 Iokibe Makoto argues 
that Obuchi’s encouragement of China’s membership to WTO in 1999 was the third 
symbolic gesture of Japanese policy of engagement toward China, after Ohira’s 
launching of ODA in 1979 and Uno-Kaifu’s non-isolation policy after June 4, 1989.56  
On history, Obuchi just acknowledged in his July visit that common recognition 
was confirmed during Jiang Zemin’s visit the year before, and interestingly, the Chinese 
side withheld any further demands of Japan.57 The negative impact of the absence of a 
written apology and the playing of the history card in November 1998 was kept to a 
minimum by China against the backdrop of the emerging rift between China and the US. 
With Japan’s encouragement, the US agreed in November on China’s entry into WTO. 
Geopolitics, identity, and economics were joining in a favorable circle in Obuchi’s 
China policy. 
 
Relations with Korea 
 Kim Dae-jung, elected as president in December 1997, declared immediately a 
 537 
new policy to radically improve North-South relations as well as cooperation with the 
US, China, Japan, and Russia for peace and stability on the peninsula.58 This thinking 
later was defined as the “sunshine policy,” and Obuchi was fully exposed to it. Kim 
visited Japan in October 1998, and encouraged by his policy of reconciliation, Obuchi 
and MOFA agreed to write “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” in the Joint 
Declaration, in return for Kim’s statement calling upon both countries “to overcome 
their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship.” 59  Obuchi 
overcame hardliners in the LDP by reiterating almost word-for-word in the Declaration 
Murayama’s statement of August 1995. Kim followed by taking the first step toward the 
liberalization of Japanese cultural imports into Korea. A new fishery agreement for 
cooperation under the 200 miles fishery zone system was also concluded in October 
with a mutually acceptable approach to waters around the disputed island 
Takeshima/Dokdo.60 Japan’s FDI reached an historic high in 1999. It should be noted, 
however, that although the Joint Declaration was a landmark achievement in Japan’s 
search for reconciliation, Obuchi and MOFA missed an important point: In the 
perpetrator-victim relationship between Japan and Korea, after crossing the Rubicon, 
Japan should have taken the lead in dealing with history, and sought greater 
understanding on what really happened in the past to make the reconciliation take an 
irreversible character. Despite Obuchi’s wish to re-enter Asia, this did not really happen. 
In contrast to relations with the South, Obuchi’s relations with the North were 
strained. The Taepodong missile shooting in August 1998 deeply shocked Japanese 
politicians. Japan suspended its aid to North Korea and KEDO financial support. 
Through tense consultations with the US, Japan eventually agreed to resume its support 
of KEDO, but in March 1999, an unidentified vessel, known to be from North Korea, 
intruded into Japanese territorial waters and was chased away by the Maritime Safety 
Agency’s gunfire. Ironically, North Korea’s increased threats resulted in strengthening 
security coordination between Japan, South Korea, and the United States and involved 
Japan more directly in security around the Korean peninsula. 
First, Japan and South Korea began closer defense and security coordination. The 
1998 Obuchi-Kim Dae Jung Joint Declaration “welcomed the security dialogue as well 
as the defense exchanges”. Naval exercises and training for search-and-rescue exercises 
began in August 1999. Second, the US took the initiative to improve Japan-US-Korean 
coordination, and former defense secretary William Perry was appointed as the senior 
coordinator for Korea in November 1998. After tense coordination among the three 
countries, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) was established in 
April 1999 and since then began to play an important role for coordination on North 
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Korean security policy. Third, Japan decided to participate in research of TMD with the 
US in October 1998 and also develop an indigenous Japanese surveillance satellite 
system in November 1998. Thus, although relations with the North did not improve 
largely due to North Korean erratic behaviour, Obuchi’s relations with the South 
improved from the point of view of security, history ,and economic relations, creating a 
second positive circle in his Asian policy. 
 
East Asian regional initiatives 
Obuchi’s emphasis on Asia was not limited to China and Korea. In October 1998, 
the so-called Miyazawa Initiative of $30 billion was announced in dealing with the 
Asian financial crisis. This decision brought Japan’s total contribution to the financial 
crisis to $80 billion.61 It was based on the political leadership of Obuchi and Miyazawa, 
former prime minister in 1991-93, and the MOF bureaucracy’s continued interest in 
exerting leadership in the crisis. This was proof of Japan’s proactiveness after Clinton’s 
“Japan passing” in June, when he also applauded China’s constructive approach to the 
Asian financial crisis and criticized Japan’s lack of economic reform in that 
context.62The MOF continued to seek a more effective structure of crisis management, 
and in May 2000, the Chiang Mai initiative of currency swapping was approved.  
In October 1998, Obuchi took another decision more delicate in nature. At the 
APEC Kuala Lumpur meeting, Japan faced US pressure for the liberalization of fish, 
fish products, and forestry products. But internally, Obuchi was under pressure from a 
powerful agricultural lobby, which categorically rejected concessions outside the 
framework of WTO. He did not find compelling reasons to introduce a compulsory 
liberalization process in APEC. His gradual approach was supported by his Asian 
colleagues from Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, whom Japan helped in their 
financial crisis and even from China.63 But as a result of Japan’s determination not to 
let APEC become another forum for trade liberalization and many Asian leaders siding 
with this “Asian consensus approach,” US interest in APEC waned. It was as if 
Mahatyr’s position a year earlier in Vancouver to “dilute APEC’s importance and 
strengthen the prospects for an Asians-only grouping in the future” came true,64 
although there is no evidence that “weakening APEC” was Obuchi’s intention. 
In striking contrast, in November 1999 Obuchi played a leading role in convening 
a Japan-China-South Korea tripartite breakfast meeting on the fringe of the ASEAN + 3 
meeting in Manila. Obuchi tried to hold such gathering in Hanoi in 1998, but China was 
reluctant to attend. This time China accepted: Improved bilateral relations in 1999 might 
have softened Zhu Rongji’s position. Obuchi said to the accompanying Japanese press 
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corps on the eve of the breakfast: “I feel much obliged to ASEAN which gave us this 
occasion, but I simply cannot miss this opportunity.”65 The first meeting concentrated 
on trade and economic matters, avoiding any political matters like North Korea. But 
whatever the central theme of the talks, for Obuchi, the tripartite breakfast was a 
significant step toward establishing closer relations with the two closest Asian neighbors. 
It was seen as a golden path for re-entering Asia through regionalism and even regaining 
national identity. 
Obuchi kept on taking a proactive policy in enhancing cooperation in Asia. In 
September 1998 during his trip to the United States, he proposed holding six-party talks 
instead of four-party talks on Korea’s future.66 In December 1998, he called for a 
conference for an “intellectual dialogue for the creation of Asia’s future” highlighting 
“human security” as a possible area for cooperation.67 The choice of Okinawa, a 
security hub and symbol of Japan’s history in WWII, as the location of the 2000 G-8 
summit was a decision made by Obuchi himself, a rare case of top-down leadership.68 
 
Relations with Russia 
Obuchi was as enthusiastic as his predecessor Hashimoto or his successor Mori in 
improving relations with Russia. When he assumed the post of prime minister, Obuchi 
confirmed the continuity of Japan’s policy toward Russia and expressed his willingness 
to activate the relationship based on the agreements thus far reached under his 
predecessor.69But it was evident that the Hashimoto-Yeltsin personal friendship, which 
was crucial in 1997-98, could not be sustained. The Russian financial crisis was 
gradually overcome in September, but Yeltsin’s health stayed at its nadir. Russia’s 
counter proposal, made during Obuchi’s trip to Moscow in November 1998, was 
received with disappointment in Japan. The proposal to conclude two treaties, the first 
treaty legally obliging Russia to conclude a second treaty to demarcate the border and to 
create a joint “special legal regime” on the four islands,70 was not supported by MOFA 
nor by opinion leaders: the dual treaties were perceived as procedural and avoiding any 
decision on sovereignty; and the “special legal regime” was considered legally too 
complicated and creating too many practical difficulties; Yeltsin’s positive reaction in 
Kawana in April and Russia’s cautious approach in November left an impression of 
unexplainable discrepancy. Returning from Moscow on November 14, Obuchi stated 
that “I did everything I could. A final conclusion has to be decided later, but I will 
continue to do my best.”71 In the course of 1999, however, Obuchi had no internal basis 
to do his best based on the Moscow proposal, and Russia did not show any interest in 
the Kawana proposal. The only Obuchi-Yeltsin meeting in 1999 occurred during the 
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Munich G-8 Summit in June and lasted only 10 minutes, with warm words of 
encouragement for the development of relations but without any tangible direction.72  
Obuchi’s renewed enthusiasm after Putin’s nomination as acting-president was 
reciprocated by an encouraging response, and his special envoy, Suzuki Muneo, met 
Putin in Moscow on April 4, 2000. Obuchi’s stroke, however, just two days before that 
meeting, left it to his successor to pursue this relationship. 
 
Mori: short-term prime minister with a passion toward Russia 
Mori, also born in 1937, was the son of a village chief of Negoro in Ishikawa 
prefecture and joined the Diet in 1969 after spending three years as a correspondent of 
Sankei shimbun. He became an influential member of the Fukuda-Abe faction, and 
assumed key LDP posts, including twice secretary general and minister for culture and 
education, MITI, and construction. Although his career was impressive as a leading 
parliamentarian, he had never been considered a serious candidate for the post of prime 
minister, and it was due to Obuchi’s unexpected brain-coma that he took that post in 
April 2000 at the age of 63. During his one-year tenure to be succeeded by Koizumi in 
April 2001, Mori’s ratings were low and he was constantly exposed to press criticism 
for a lack of legitimacy in the process of his selection as prime minister. 
 
Relations with Asia   
Under Mori relations with China and Korea were marked by relative calm, but 
several points require analysis. US-China relations in 2000 oscillated between tension 
and relaxation. Lee Teng-hui’s statement of “state to state relations” in July 1999 
created considerable tension between China and Taiwan, and it was reflected in 
US-China relations. The February 2000 Chinese White Paper was met with severe 
criticism, particularly by the US Congress and media. Chen Shui-bian’s victory in 
March elections kept cross-strait relations, and hence US-China relations, on tender 
hooks. At the same time, economic relations moved onto a more solid foundation. As 
Robert Suettinger observes, “establishing a constructive relationship with China became 
one of President Clinton’s legacy issues.”73 The agreement reached in November 1999 
on China’s accession to WTO led Congress to approve permanent normal trade relations 
(PNTR). 
At a time when US-China relations stayed in flux, the Chinese government 
essentially kept its “soft” approach toward Japan, continuing from 1999. A key 
statement was made in May 2000 by Jiang Zemin, emphasizing the importance of 
friendly relations with Japan to a Japanese culture-tourism delegation of 5,000 persons 
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headed by the minister of transportation. The statement was published in major Chinese 
media as “important discourse.”74 It was confirmed at the Jiang-Mori meeting at the 
United Nations Millennium Summit in September.75 In October Zhu Rongji made a 
visit, which emphasized friendly relations and economic cooperation, deemphasizing 
history. Mori and Japanese public opinion greeted China’s approach with passive 
enthusiasm and guarded optimism.  
In fact, tensions rose over Taiwan. In the winter of 2001 Lee Teng-hui, already 
retired from the government, sought entry into Japan for a medical check-up. In April, 
just before his retirement, Mori finally decided to grant it on the condition that the visit 
be confined to medical treatment and not include any political activities. Nevertheless, 
China reacted with indignation, cancelling Li Peng’s scheduled visit. China’s decision to 
“bash” Japan for this humanitarian decision aroused little sympathy in Japan, and 
Mori’s last decision as prime minister was ironically supported by the majority of 
Japanese public opinion. 
The year 2000 was a great year of opportunity on the Korean Peninsula with the 
North-South summit held in June. It was a reflection of Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy 
combined with Kim Jong-il’s calculated approach to regime preservation and 
normalization of relations with the outside world. Against this huge change in the 
political dynamics of the region, Japan was slow in responding. Particularly with the 
South, Japan was happy to enjoy the fruits of the 1998 Joint Declaration. In relation to 
the North, Mori’s government made efforts to warm up the relationship. Three rounds of 
negotiations for normalization of relations took place in April, August, and October, and 
Japan continued humanitarian assistance. But no concrete results emerged; progress had 
to await the next phase of negotiations under Koizumi. One incident tells us the way 
public opinion was becoming extremely sensitive on the issue of abductions. At the 
ASEM meeting in Seoul in October, Mori had a meeting with Prime Minister Blair and 
explained his efforts to resolve the abduction issue, and as an example of a past effort 
made by a LDP delegation to North Korea, described a “flexible idea” to arrange a 
reunion with abductees to be presented as missing persons, somewhere in a third 
country. When the content of Mori’s statement to Blair was disclosed to the media, it 
aroused public outrage. Mori was criticized for disclosing sensitive ideas for 
negotiations (although it was just an idea already conveyed to the North several years 
earlier and made public then) and deviating from the “principled position” to pursue the 
abductors.76 
Mori’s visit to India and Pakistan in August 2000 became an important turning 
point in bringing relations back to normalcy after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests 
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and Japan’s economic sanctions in 1998. In particular, given the rising geopolitical 
importance of India, it is worthwhile to note that Japan and India established a “global 
partnership in the 21st century” and agreed on enhanced cooperation in the area of 
Information Technology.77 
 
Relations with Russia  
It was, above all, in his Russian policy that Mori left his mark on Japan’s foreign 
policy. He happened to be in office in the threshold year for realizing Yeltsin’s promise 
“to make the utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by 2000.” But he had to negotiate 
with Putin, a new leader whose international stature was unknown, but considerably 
younger and with much greater support in Russia than Yeltsin had had. Mori did not 
have the special geopolitical flare which characterized Hashimoto, but he had sufficient 
understanding that enlarging the scope of Japan-Russia relations and taking a flexible 
and realistic approach on the territorial issue would serve Japan’s interest. MOFA’s 
views were streamlined by Kato Ryozo, deputy foreign minister for political affairs who 
succeeded Tamba. Kato was strongly supported by Russian experts from the European 
Affairs Department. Political support and advice also came from Suzuki Muneo, who 
was then rising fast on the LDP power-ladder and had gained influence over Japan’s 
policy toward Russia. Mori himself, (in addition to the fact that he was one of the four 
musketeers of Abe Shintaro, who had shown strong leadership to improve relations with 
the Soviet Union under Gorbachev) had personal ties from his father’s longstanding 
friendship with the Soviet Union. Mori’s father opened a sister-city relationship for 
several decades between his village Negoro and Shelekhov, close to Irkutsk, and in his 
will stipulated that part of his ashes were to be buried in the graveyard in Shelekhov, 
hoping that his son would regularly visit the Soviet Union to establish someday a solid 
friendship with this country. Mori had already honored his father’s will several times.  
Mori and Putin met five times in one year, starting in April 2000 with Mori’s visit 
to St. Petersburg. After this visit of familiarization with the broad political and economic 
issues facing the two countries, the second meeting took place in July in Okinawa, 
where Mori, as the host country’s representative, warmly greeted the debut of a newly 
elected Russian leader in the G-8 forum. But the real negotiations began in September 
with Putin’s official visit to Tokyo, when Putin acknowledged verbally the validity of 
the 1956 Joint Declaration. This was a contentious position which neither Gorbachev 
nor Yeltsin (although he indirectly approved it in 1993) dared to take. Mori and his team 
recognized that with this statement, peace treaty negotiations entered a new stage. While 
expressing due respect for the position taken by Russia’s new leader, Japanese 
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negotiators insisted that not only must the fate of the two smaller islands be resolved, as 
prescribed in the 1956 Joint Declaration, but also that the fate of two larger islands be 
addressed. The Japanese side showed preparedness to talk about the fate of the larger 
islands “without preconditions.” Intense talks continued at the fringe of the APEC 
meeting in Brunei in November, and were concluded by the Irkutsk meeting in March 
2001. Mori proposed parallel negotiations on the two smaller islands, prescribed in the 
1956 Joint Declaration, and the two larger islands, the sovereignty of which was 
undetermined. Putin did not accept Mori’s proposal, but he did not negate it, and 
negotiators of the two ministries became convinced that the approaches by the two sides 
were converging more than ever. 
At the same time, from the summer of 2000, severe criticism against Mori and his 
team were raised by opinion leaders, the mass media and even from within the Foreign 
Ministry, that they were not following the traditional approach to resolve this issue by 
“four islands in a bunch.” One reason of this criticism was due to various clashes of 
personalities among policy makers and opinion leaders related to Russia, but 
nationalistic feeling which did not allow room for any deviation from the established 
“principled approach” was also aroused.78   
 
Conclusion 
To what extent could Japan have demonstrated its strategic thinking in the second 
half of the 1990’s? In this period geopolitics fundamentally changed in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The US, the sole superpower in the post-cold war era, and rising China were 
contending for power in the region. Japan’s strategic agenda was to avoid the two 
nightmares of “US-China hostility” and “US-China passing of Japan.” The general 
guideline was to maximize solid alliance relations with the United States while 
minimizing tension with China. By and large, three prime ministers followed this line: 
Hashimoto, very conscious about the importance of the alliance but eager to avoid the 
two nightmares; and Obuchi with his long-term objective of stabilizing Japan’s position 
in Asia. Changes occurring on the Korean peninsula under Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Jong-il were also substantial. Despite many limitations, North-South rapprochement 
proceeded on an unprecedented scale. Japan succeeded in strengthening its relations 
with South Korea and the democratic triangle of the US-Japan-South Korea, but 
relations with the North stagnated despite efforts for a breakthrough. Strengthened 
relations with Russia seemed to be giving Japan geopolitical advantage in East Asia, 
and the two countries drew closer in their bilateral relationship than at any other point in 
post-WWII history. 
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In geo-economics, Japan did try to take a leadership role in the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis. Japan’s endeavor to create an Asian Monetary Fund did not materialize, 
but Japan poured in economic assistance of $80 billion and the Chiang Mai swap accord 
was realized in 2000 under Japan’s initiative. Amidst the financial crisis, Japan, China 
and Korea were invited to the ASEAN summit, resulting in the establishment of 
ASEAN + 3 from 1997, and the start of annual meetings of the three under there own 
auspices from 1999. Japan participated eagerly in this process and played the role of 
initiator of the meeting of the three. All these moves helped to advance Japan’s agenda 
to strengthen its ties with Asia.   
The third issue with which Japan struggled through this period was related to 
history and identity. No small efforts were made from the Japanese side to overcome the 
past, but with mixed results. President Kim Dae-jung’s visit in October 1998 was 
generally welcomed as an historic breakthrough because of the mutual willingness for 
reconciliation. President Jiang Zemin’s visit a month later did not achieve the same 
result but many Japanese thought that it was China’s unwillingness to accept 
reconciliation that prevented the same outcome as with South Korea. In this context, 
showing leadership for enhancing regional cooperation was welcomed in Japan as a step 
for regaining its Asian identity. A series of improvements in Japan-Russia relations 
brought some expectations that the long-waited resolution of the territorial problem, a 
wound in Japan’s national consciousness, might be near.  
The overall record for this period was rather positive from all perspectives, 
whether geopolitics, regional economics, or overcoming history. The alliance with the 
US certainly became stronger. Japan’s proactive and more responsible policy succeeded 
in overcoming the loss of confidence in the early 1990s. Chinese relations were clearly 
not easy, but they were under control and Japan even took some initiatives to improve 
US-China relations. South Korean relations looked markedly improved. Russian 
relations were at their peak. East Asian regionalism seemed to have found its place for 
the first time in post-WWII history. 
In reality, none of these achievements rested on a sufficiently solid basis to have 
secured Japan’s strategic position in East Asia. Responsible and pro-active security 
policies and efforts to bring US relations closer needed constant renewed attention; yet, 
in the first half of the following decade, only relations with the US were destined to 
develop along that direction. But in Japan’s policies in Asia, all successes achieved 
during the second half of the 1990s were replaced by self-assertive policies which failed 
to take into account sufficiently positions of others and resulted in mismanagement of 
relations. Retrospectively, such policy symptoms that we saw under Prime Minister 
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Mori as the lack of visible outcome to meet China’s “smile diplomacy” while taking  
decision to issue a visa to Lee Teng-hui (that humanitarian decision was genuinely 
supported by a large number of Japanese); rising emotions about North Korean 
abductions instead of strong interest in capitalizing on the “sunshine policy”; and calls 
for a “principled approach” on the territorial problem with Russia rather than earnest 
preparations for a new stage of negotiations based on Putin’s interest in improving 
relations, all prepared the ground for public opinion formation and policy decisions in 
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     ASEAN Regional Forum was established in 1994 primarily aimed to enhance 
confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese government took active 
leadership. Japan wanted to become a normal country whose political role was 
commensurate with its economic might without going back to pre-war military might, 
and thought that a forum in East Asia such as the ARF would be useful in explaining its 
intension. Toward the latter part of the 1990’s the forum played a limited but useful role 
to let China evolve into a more open multilateral security dialogue.  
     After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, ASEAN Plus Three was established as 
a co-operative body encompassing those countries in East Asia, taking a functional 
approach of co-operation particularly in the non-traditional areas of security such as 
piracy and terrorism. But it turned out that the real security issue to be considered was 
China. The two countries started co-operating within the framework of APT based on 
healthy competition, but as bilateral relations worsened in the 2000’s because of 
Yasukuni visits, there emerged an apparent rivalry between the two states, Japan taking 
the lead toward the formation of a more inclusive organization centred around the East 
Asian Summit, whereas China trying to keep the leadership of the APT. That rivalry 
seems to have calmed down after bilateral relations improved from 2006. 
     The North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002. President Bush’s unwillingness 
to negotiate directly with North Korea led to the establishment of the Six Party Talk in 
2003, and against strong public opinion fixated on the abduction issue, Japan took the 
toughest approach against North Korea. This position first harmonized well with the 
U.S. position, but after the U.S. changed to the strategy of negotiation from 2007, 
Japan’s position became isolated within the Six Party talk. 
     The author concludes that Japan’s inability to resolve historical memory issue 
with China or fixation on abduction weakens Japan’s position in East Asia. This 
weakened position is not conducive for the strengthening of the alliance, and Japan 
which is capable of taking a strong regional leadership may be more conducive toward 






WHAT IS JAPAN’S PERSPECTIVE on security multilateralism in Asia and  
its role in that process? I describe the three security-related multilateral organizations  
that have developed in Asia beginning in the 1990s: (1) the Association  
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), established  
in 1994 in the Asia-Pacific region, which has pursued moderate  
activities to date; (2) ASEAN Plus Three, which began in 1997, along with  
the East Asian Summit (created as its extension) and the emerging concept  
of the East Asian Community; and finally (3) the Six-Party Talks, which  
were first convened in 2003 in Northeast Asia. Then I discuss the future of  
Asian security multilateralism from Japanese and U.S. perspectives.  
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum 
 
The idea that led to the ARF was first discussed in June 1991 at the  
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) conference  
in Jakarta, where a proposal was made to hold a conference initiated  
by the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) to discuss stability  
and peace in the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Japan’s Initiative in the ARF  
Yukio Sato, director general of the Information and Analysis Department  
of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), participated in the  
ASEAN-ISIS meeting and agreed that the time was ripe for establishing an  
Asia-Pacific regional security dialogue. In July of that year, at the ASEAN  
PMC meeting in Manila, Taro Nakayama, Japanese minister for foreign affairs,  
offered a proposal based on Sato’s idea.that a mutual reassurance dialogue  
be initiated among friendly countries in the region. Nakayama’s proposal  
was not received with enthusiasm by ASEAN or the United States.  
Lack of sufficient prior consultation was one of the reasons, but Nakayama’s  
idea also differed from the ASEAN-ISIS agenda in that it did not include socialist  
countries and envisaged the ASEAN PMC itself as the appropriate  
forum within which to conduct security dialogues.1 Despite the cool reaction  
by ASEAN and the United States, Japan continued to advance its proposal  
to establish an ASEAN PMC.based security forum, as Prime Minister  
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Kiichi Miyazawa did in a speech he gave in Washington in July 1992.2  
Two factors characterized Japan’s positive approach to East Asian regionalism  
in this period. First, Japan made a considerable effort to conceptualize  
East Asian regionalism as just one part of its “multitiered [jyuusouteki]”  
security strategy. Kuniko Ashizawa argues that four distinct tiers  
of this strategy could be discerned in this period and cites Nakayama’s July  
1991 speech in Kuala Lumpur as well as Sato’s own writing. The first tier  
refers to existing bilateral security relationships, such as the Japan-U.S. alliance;  
the second tier refers to case-by-case, ad hoc arrangements to deal  
with specific issues, such as North Korea or Cambodia; the third tier refers  
to a regional multilateral framework for security dialogue; and the fourth  
tier refers to nonsecurity arrangements, particularly in the economic  
realm.3 By 1991.92, three tiers already existed, but the third tier had yet  
to be developed. The main purpose of this conceptualization was to clearly  
indicate the unwavering importance to Japan of its bilateral ties with the  
United States while it sought an acceptable forum for developing cooperative  
regional security agreements. The concept of a multitiered strategy  
in four phases was explained in detail in the Gaiko Seisho (Diplomatic bluebook)  
of 1992 and 1993,4 and since then it has continued to appear as a  
mainstay of MOFA thinking.5  
Second, as both Paul Midford and Ashizawa have pointed out, the Japanese  
leadership emphasized that Japan was promoting the idea of a  
regional forum because it wanted to create an appropriate environment in  
which to explain Japan’s policy of becoming a more proactive and responsible  
power on matters related to peace and security and at the same time  
reassure its neighbors that it had no intention of becoming a “military  
power.” Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, in addition to Sato and Nakayama,  
made clear statements to that effect.6  
By the middle of 1991, the post.Cold War geopolitical reality was already  
seriously affecting Japan. On the one hand, it was clear that the U.S.  
contraction from Asia could lead to an important reorientation of its alliance  
with Japan, and that Japan was bound to play a more responsible  
role. The first real alarm came in April 1990, when the United States issued  
a report on reducing its forces in East Asia by 14,000 to 15,000 personnel,  
including 5,000 to 6,000 from Japanese bases.7 But the most decisive  
incident was the 1990.91 Gulf War. The U.S.$14 billion of economic  
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assistance Japan provided to the United States and countries in the Gulf  
region was not appreciated by the international community, partly because  
it was perceived as “too little too late,” but, more important, because  
“checkbook diplomacy” without any engagement of personnel, to shed  
sweat if not blood, was considered selfish and irresponsible. Japan had to  
act in order to show the world that it was not an irresponsible and selfish  
power. It had reached the point at which its economic standing required  
responsible behavior. That was the reality facing Japan in the wake of the  
Cold War.  
But there was another reality. This was a product of the memory deeply  
entrenched in the minds of Japan’s Asian neighbors, particularly in China  
and Korea, which “reacted with the most suspicion” toward Japan.8 Developing  
a multilateral forum in which to explain that Japan intended to  
become a responsible but nonaggressive power was thus of real importance.  
For Japan it was a matter of regaining the trust and confidence of its  
Asian neighbors. Actions were naturally important, but how those actions  
were perceived and recognized was even more important.  
Thus, in the wake of the Cold War, the establishment of a regional security  
forum based on the principle of cooperative security met Japan’s  
need for both power and identity, that is, the realists’ requirement that  
it become a responsible and proactive power and the constructivists’ requirement  
that it establish an intersubjective identity by being accepted  
as a harmonious power in Asia.9 Actions followed in 1991. Japan adopted  
the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992, and this paved the  
way for the dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia in September.  
China, which had cautioned Japan until the last moment before the dispatch,  
also sent construction troops, and the two forces were engaged in  
similar reconstruction work. When two Japanese peacekeepers were killed  
in April and May 1993, the leaders of Malaysia and Singapore asked Japan  
not to withdraw its troops.10 Any possible U.S. reservations about a multilateral  
forum were removed in July 1993, when President Bill Clinton,  
during his trip to Korea, called for “the promotion of new multilateral  
regional dialogues on the full range of common security challenges.”11  
Later that month, the ASEAN PMC decided to start the ARF the following  
year. The ARF was launched with Japan’s full support in July 1994.  
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The Development of the ARF and China’s Role  
During the latter part of the 1990s, the ARF mechanism of confidencebuilding  
developed, albeit slowly. The subjects discussed ranged from traditional  
to nontraditional security matters, and the forum took a cooperative  
security approach based on a consensus-led “ASEAN way.”12 Through  
this process, China became much more active in enhancing cooperative  
security in the region. In 1996, just after the establishment of the ARF,  
Japan and the United States reconfirmed their alliance, igniting harsh criticism  
from China. But since then, China has become a much more active  
participant in the ARF dialogue. Akiko Fukushima argues that China wanted  
to strengthen its security position through enhancing common regional  
security,13 a view supported by Thomas Christensen.14 China hosted and  
co-chaired a confidence-building group in 1997, and in November 2004 it  
hosted and co-chaired the first ARF Security Policy Conference, at which  
“defence policy officials contributed further to building confidence and  
fostering mutual understanding.”15  
But in reality, did this engagement bring about a real change in China’s  
defense and security behavior? Using an ongoing problem as an example,  
Donald Weatherbee states, “The South China Sea problem is a prime example  
of the ARF’s relative irrelevance to real conflict management.” The  
ARF had to be content with welcoming negotiations on the Code of Conduct  
of Parties in the South China Sea, which was formulated as a declaration  
in 2002.16  
But one may also argue that having a declaration is better than having  
nothing to guide actions for the future. Moreover, if China is prepared  
for or even enthusiastic about the formulation of regional norms, is it not  
worthwhile for it to influence these norms rather than remaining outside  
the process? Masashi Iida argues that, if enhanced mutual confidence between  
China and ASEAN could be achieved, expansionist activities by  
China might be restrained.17 The ARF might be one of the catalysts for such  
movement. Christensen cautions against dismissing the regional cooperative  
developments as “mere rhetoric or showmanship.”18 Cheng-Chwee  
Kuik sees an underlying Chinese “aspiration to shape the ‘rules of the  
game’ for regional institutions for the ultimate ends of fulfilling the needs  
of a range of foreign policy concerns.”19  
As has been openly recognized, the effectiveness of the ARF in solving  
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concrete security issues is limited. Nevertheless, Japan has found merits in  
the ARF. At present, faced with the phenomenon of a rising China, Japan  
realizes that it is in its interest to become engaged with China in multilateral  
security regionalism and enhance cooperative security. Principles of  
realism suggest that countries with different values can coexist, but mutual  
understanding, cooperation, and, if possible, trust would facilitate  
that coexistence. An effort to agree on a vision of cooperation based on  
values that Japan cherishes would also be worthwhile. At the same time,  
there are important issues regarding its future security and defense policy  
that Japan will have to explain. In Japan, many envisage the amendment  
of Article 9 of the constitution in order to make Japan a responsible and  
proactive power, not a militaristic power that will threaten its neighbors.20  
This is an important issue, and one about which a multilateral forum like  
the ARF can enhance understanding. Japan’s long-term objective of reentering  
Asia would be better served by its active engagement in the ARF. The  
2004 Gaikou Seisho declared that “Japan will be contributing further so that  
the ARF will develop into an organization that contributes effectively for  
the security of the region.”21  
 
ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asian Summit, 
and the East Asian Community 
 
In the first half of the 1990s, the ARF was the leading multilateral organization  
dealing with security in the Asia-Pacific region, whereas the  
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), initiated in 1989, was the leading  
organization in economic cooperation. APEC gained political clout after  
the leaders’ meeting in 1993. But when APEC faced considerable diffi-  
culty in 1998 because of the rift between Japan and the United States over  
the liberalization of fish and forestry markets,22 another mechanism of  
regional cooperation emerged in East Asia. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT)  
was convened at the time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.98. Its mission  
was first conceived of as promoting dialogue in the area of economic  
cooperation, but was gradually expanded to cover a wider area, including  
political-security issues. The idea of holding an East Asian summit was presented  
at the APT summit in 2001. And the notion of an East Asian Community  
(EAC) began to be discussed widely after that.  
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The Chronological Development of the EAC  
The Period of Formation (1997.99). It was the Asian financial crisis of  
1997.98 that triggered Japan’s active interest in regional cooperation. The  
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) initiative in August.November 1997 failed,23  
but the assistance Japan provided amounted to U.S.$10 billion for South  
Korea, $5 billion for Indonesia, and $4 billion for Thailand.24 Thus ASEAN  
invited Japan, together with China and Korea, to its summit in December  
1997 in Kuala Lumpur, held to commemorate its 30th anniversary. The  
main topics of discussion were currency and financial matters.25  
In August 1998, Vietnam, the host country for the ASEAN summit,  
again extended invitations to Japan, China, and South Korea to attend the  
second APT summit in December. There Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi expressed  
his determination to work for early implementation of the $30 billion  
Miyazawa Initiative declared in October.26  
But it was at the third APT summit, held in November 1999, that the  
APT began to seriously attract the attention of the Japanese leadership. They  
adopted a “Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation,” in which they declared  
that political-security and transnational issues were objects of cooperation  
in addition to issues in the economic and social fields.27 Obuchi  
launched an initiative for human resource development in the APT,28 but  
his most striking initiative was to convene a Japan.China.South Korea tripartite  
breakfast meeting on the fringe of the APT meeting. This gathering  
concentrated on trade and economic matters, avoiding any political matters  
such as North Korea. But whatever the central theme of the talks, given  
the complexity of Japan’s relations with China and South Korea, a tripartite  
gathering under the auspices of ASEAN was like a fresh breeze. It provided  
Japan with a golden path by which to reenter Asia through regionalism.29  
In December 1999, Obuchi also undertook an important initiative  
with Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, under which a group of  
experts began studying the feasibility of a Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement  
(FTA).30 It was the first initiative to explore “spider-web bilateralism”  
as a way to structure a regional trade organization.31  
Mori’s Initiative and China’s Rise (2000.2001). In the area of financial  
cooperation, the May 2000 finance ministers’ meeting in Chiang Mai established  
a network of swap arrangements that came to be known as the  
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Chiang Mai Agreement.32 Spider-web bilateralism produced a tangible result,  
and the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) was instrumental in this  
success. Ministerial meetings on many issues began to be held regularly  
during these years.  
At the 2000 APT summit, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed cooperation  
based on three principles: establishment of partnerships, open  
regionalism, and comprehensive dialogue and cooperation on political  
and security matters. He also proposed an Asian conference on piracy and  
engaged Indonesia and Korea in the context of a security dialogue with  
other leaders. Meanwhile, China moved rapidly on concrete cooperation  
in trade. In its 2000 bilateral talks with ASEAN, it proposed to conclude a  
China-ASEAN FTA, and in 2001 a framework agreement was reached to  
conclude the FTA in principle by 2010.  
Koizumi’s Initiative (2002-3). To the surprise of many, in a speech Prime  
Minister Junichiro Koizumi gave in Singapore in January 2002, he named  
Australia and New Zealand as “core members” of the EAC. This move succeeded  
in creating an impression of inclusiveness, in contrast with China’s  
paying such close attention to the 13 countries of the APT.33  
In another speech, given in Australia in May of that year, Koizumi emphasized  
“functional cooperation” as the mainstay of East Asian cooperation.  
It was wise to use this concept to guide cooperation with Australia,  
which was not a member of the APT but which, he urged, “should become  
a core member.” This notion of functionality has become for Japan the  
core concept guiding EAC cooperation.34  
Since the latter part of 2002, however, the swing toward inclusiveness  
with regard to Australia and New Zealand has reversed itself, and the pendulum  
has shifted back to the original notion of cooperation within the  
APT. The moderate step taken in November 2002 at the sixth APT summit  
in Cambodia, at which Koizumi and the ASEAN leaders adopted a Joint Declaration  
on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA),35  
was overtaken in 2003 by three major steps to enhance cooperation in East  
Asia. First, in October the seventh APT summit was held in Bali, and India  
was also present. Japan and ASEAN at last signed a Framework for Comprehensive  
Economic Partnership,36 and they finally agreed to establish an  
EPA/FTA in principle by 2012.37  
Second, Japan, China, and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration on  
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the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation, the first agreement among just  
those three countries.38 It was a stunning document because it included  
“across-the-board and future-oriented cooperation in a variety of areas”  
and defined tripartite cooperation as “an essential part of East Asian cooperation.”  
Given the difficulties in bilateral Japan-China and Japan-  
Korea relations, to focus only on future-oriented relations without reference  
to history was amazing.  
Third, in December Japan hosted an ASEAN-Japan summit in Tokyo,  
the first meeting in ASEAN’s history held outside Southeast Asia. In a section  
of the resulting document headed “Deepening East Asian Cooperation  
for an East Asian Community,” the participants agreed to “uphold  
Asian traditions and values, while respecting universal rules and principles.” 
39 What was meant by “Asian values” was still vague, but for Japan.  
which had long been rejected as an acceptable partner for Asia because of  
its war in the Pacific.this manifestation of its greater acceptance in Asia  
was an important step toward the reestablishment of its Asian identity.  
The Polarized Search for an EAC (2004-5). As the time drew near for the  
eighth APT summit in Laos, which was to be held in November 2004, interest  
in holding an East Asian summit (EAS) heightened among member  
countries.40 But the government of Japan prepared “issue papers” in June  
2004 signaling caution in differentiating between the APT summit and an  
EAS.41 There was some confusion at the Laos ASEAN summit and the eighth  
APT summit in November, but ultimately ASEAN decided to hold an EAS  
the following year in Malaysia. At the APT summit, Koizumi was somewhat  
surprised by this turn of events, stating, “There is a need to discuss the concept  
of the conference”; but he accepted ASEAN’s conclusion.42  
Thus, in Japan the year 2005 began with an affirmative feeling toward  
an EAC. On January 21, in his General Policy Speech to the Diet, Koizumi  
declared for the first time, “The Government will play an active role in the  
creation of an East Asian community, an open community that shares economic  
prosperity while embracing diversity.”43 Haruki Wada has stated  
that “the declaration at the Diet of a new regionalism after its oblivion for  
sixty years was an extremely important event.”44  
But a demonstration by Chinese students in April 2005 revealed an  
increasing geopolitical rivalry and a deepening rift on issues of history,  
fueled by Koizumi’s yearly visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, where war dead  
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are enshrined. All this brought Sino-Japanese political relations to their  
lowest point since World War II, dooming Japan-China cooperation on an  
EAC. 
At this point, striking U.S. opposition to an exclusive EAC emerged.  
U.S. opposition to the East Asia Economic Caucus proposed in 1990 by  
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was well known.45 But after  
the 1997.98 Asian financial crisis, the United States offered no resistance  
to the embryonic APT. After President George W. Bush came to power  
in 2001, the United States even perceived Asian regionalism positively, as  
a means of launching a common fight against global terrorism.46  
However, this tolerant view was replaced by open criticism of an exclusive  
EAC at the end of 2004. Sudden politicization of the EAS and underlying  
U.S. concern over the rise of China may have been primary reasons  
for this change of attitude. The Bush administration did not make its  
position public,47 but the views of public opinion leaders were expressed  
unambiguously.48 A clear message came from Richard Armitage, perceived  
as the guardian of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In a May 2005 article in the Japanese  
magazine Wedge, Armitage emphasized the soundness and effectiveness  
of the alliance and raised objections to an exclusive EAS without  
a clearly defined content, purpose, and agenda, stating that “India, Australia  
and the United States should be given the right of participation.”49  
By then, there had been numerous reports that China was resolute  
about enhancing cooperation based on the framework of the APT. In  
Japan, the pendulum quickly swung back toward “inclusivity” as it had  
been manifested in early 2002. Given the deteriorating political relations  
with China and with such clear objections from the United States, geopolitical  
thinking shifted toward expanding the number of participants in  
the East Asian regional cooperation. In a press conference held at the end  
of February, Shotaro Yachi, vice minister for foreign affairs, stated that  
“Japan-U.S. relations are the cornerstone of our policy; anything which  
may not be compatible with [them] must really be scrutinized thoroughly.” 
50 On March 22, Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura stated in  
a public lecture that the EAC “has to be an open community; India and  
Australia are welcomed; the United States is welcomed as an observer; it is  
important that Russia participate in some form as well.”51  
On April 11, the foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries agreed that  
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all countries participating in the EAS should be ASEAN dialogue partners  
and would have to sign a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN.  
That decision set a course for resolving the question of membership. On  
July 27, the foreign ministers of the APT members agreed in Vientiane that,  
in addition to the thirteen APT countries, Australia, India, and New  
Zealand would participate in the first EAS in Malaysia in December. After  
this lively disagreement over membership in the EAS, the leadership struggle  
between Japan and China reportedly quieted down.52  
In fact, this quiet proved to be merely a lull before the storm. At the  
December meeting of the APT and in the EAS in Malaysia, all media reports  
indicated that China pressed the APT as a major vehicle for developing the  
EAC,53 whereas Japan tried to exert leadership to let the newly emerging  
EAS play a decisive role. The resulting declarations stated that the APT was  
to “continue to be the main vehicle in achieving that goal [of realizing an  
East Asian community]” and that the EAS “could play a significant role in  
community building in this region.” From the point of view of the Japanese  
delegation, it was a compromise to agree on the Chinese “main vehicle”  
formula for the APT while ensuring the Japanese a “significant role”  
in the EAS.54 Be that as it may, from the point of view of Japan’s reentry  
into and reconciliation with Asia, it was a grave setback to Japan for both  
China and Korea to be part of a regularized tripartite meeting (among  
Japan, China, and Korea) under the auspices of an APT summit.  
 
Proponents, Modifiers, and Opponents of the EAC  
Thus, by the end of 2005 the position of the Japanese government on  
the EAC had taken an acute shift toward “inclusiveness,” and Northeast  
Asian regional cooperation was becoming a distant goal. Against this background,  
it may be worthwhile to reexamine the range of Japanese thinking  
on the EAC among ministries, business and opinion leaders, and others  
in order to understand the breadth and complexity of this issue.  
Proponents of the EAC. The primary uncontested reason that some favor  
regional integration is economics. East Asia’s exports, domestic direct  
investment, and GDP rose sharply in the past 15 years.55 So did regional  
trade.56 The three leading Japanese ministries are all in favor of regional  
economic integration. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry’s  
Tsusho Hakusho [White paper on trade and industry] for 2005 for the first  
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time devoted a large section to the nature of the developing East Asian  
economy. Its main conclusion was that Japan needed deeper integration  
with East Asia in order to overcome its own demographic and structural  
problems. MOF is continuing to enhance the Chiang Mai agreement and  
is also supporting the establishment of a bond market for each country of  
the region while simultaneously promoting the establishment of its own  
Yen bond market.57 MOFA’s efforts to conclude EPAs and FTAs continue,  
with an emphasis on the five founding ASEAN countries.58 The 2004 Gaiko  
Seisho categorized the reasons Japan needs EPAs and FTAs as follows: economic  
reasons, which include enhancing free trade and supplementing  
the World Trade Organization; security reasons, which include improving  
the conditions of developing countries together with overseas development  
assistance; and political and strategic reasons, which include consolidating  
relations with the countries that Japan considers important.59  
Opinion leaders discuss why Japan and Asia need the East Asian economic  
community. For example, Toshio Watanabe and other scholars strongly  
support the gradual expansion of EPAs and FTAs, but add that further integration  
will be accomplished through common recognition, governance  
support, and political dialogue.60 Makoto Taniguchi writes, based on his  
long-time service in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and  
Development, that Japan should become a real partner of the East Asian  
economic community and take a leadership role so that Asia, Europe, and  
the United States can lead the development of the world economy.61  
Haruki Yoshida, based on his research on the EAC in 2003, proposes to  
establish an economic community of Ten Plus Five, including Hong Kong  
and Taiwan, with possible eventual inclusion of Mongolia and North  
Korea.62  
Some Japanese view Japan’s quest for East Asian regionalism as emanating  
from its desire to regain its Asian identity, which was shattered in  
1945. They feel that supporting East Asian regionalism has become a means  
of reconciling Japan with East Asia. And they see Prime Minister Obuchi’s  
move toward Asia, the 2003 Japan-ASEAN Tokyo Declaration that singled  
out “Asian values,” and MOFA’s clear recognition that the EAC’s final stage  
will involve the creation of a “sense of community” as moves toward repairing  
Japan’s historically soured relations with the region. Toshiaki Arai  
describes Japan’s identity as the issue underlying its search for an East  
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Asian economic sphere.63 Haruki Wada states on his home page that Japan  
needs reconciliation with its two major neighbors, China and Korea, for  
the sound development of regionalism.64  
These views beg the question: What is the Asian identity? From Japan’s  
point of view, apart from merely being accepted by other Asian countries  
as a true member and their friend, what are the specific values that distinguish  
Asia and create an Asian identity? In May 2004, the Council of the  
East Asian Community (CEAC) was established to study the East Asian  
Community, and prominent Japanese intellectuals from all areas gathered.  
They prepared a Seisaku-houkokusho (policy report) that was published in  
August 2005.65 The CEAC report makes two points that may shed light on  
the question of an Asian identity: It points out that a common identity in  
East Asia may already be developing based on a “similar life style of urban  
middle class workers” that was developed in Japan in the process of its  
postwar economic development and is now shared by many newly industrialized  
Asian economies, Southeast Asian countries, and China. The report  
also raises a second issue that lies at the border between the constructivist  
search for identity and the liberal search for democratic values.  
It proposes that, as guiding values to unite East Asia, Japan promote the  
values it has cherished in its own development since World War II: freedom,  
democracy, and human rights. Kenichi Ito, the chairman of CEAC,  
argues that Japan must develop an EAC motivated by these “strategic principles,”  
not just by its anti-China sentiments.66  
The essential issue is China. Relations between Japan and China are  
becoming strained, particularly under Prime Minister Koizumi. But if Japan  
realizes that it is in its own national interest to reduce this tension, it  
should also see that one way to do this is to follow a multilateral process  
and to engage China in common projects to enhance understanding.  
China’s activism within multilateral frameworks has been increasing. Its  
proactive position since 2000 has been remarkable when compared to its  
passive involvement (1990.95) and later active participation (1996.99) in  
ASEAN-led multilateral institutions in the past decade.67 Its reassuring  
“trade and smile” diplomacy allows China to play a deepening security  
role.68 Its regional policy rests on four main pillars: participation in  
regional organizations, deepening of bilateral relations, expansion of economic  
ties, and reduction of distrust in the security sphere.69 Is the EAC  
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not an appropriate forum within which Japan can positively engage with  
this kind of China?  
On June 24, 2004, Hitoshi Tanaka, deputy minister for foreign affairs  
in charge of political matters, explained why MOFA believes an EAC is necessary:  
(1) It would be in Japan’s long-term national interest. (2) It might  
create a system within which Japan could cooperate with China. (3) It  
would help to absorb unhealthy nationalism. The second point mentioned  
by Tanaka is that regional multilateralism may help Japan establish better  
relations with China. Makoto Iokibe argues that both Japan and China  
should make an effort to redress their grievances, and that, even if Japan’s  
relations with the United States are sound, Japan must not criticize China,  
because Japan’s doing so might someday be awkward if there is U.S.-China  
rapprochement.70  
Modifiers of the EAC. Rising tensions with China and clear objections  
from the United States to the formation of an exclusive EAC have shaken  
Japan’s thinking, and at least two modifying lines of thought have begun  
to take shape. The first favored opening up the scope of cooperation to outside  
countries across the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. The participation  
of Australia, India, and New Zealand in the EAS was seen as the first  
step. Japan favored the inclusion of Russia and the United States. From all  
indications, in the first half of 2005 the Japanese government set a course  
in this direction. Japan’s fundamental geopolitical interest in engaging  
and cooperating with China was replaced with a short-term geopolitical  
interest in competing with China. The question of participation in the EAS  
by Russia (after it was present at the 2005 EAS as a guest of the hosting  
Malaysian government) and by the United States (after its emphasis shifted  
more clearly to APEC) lost political impetus, but the Japanese emphasis on  
inclusiveness remained influential.  
The second line of thought favored limiting cooperation to the economic  
arena, where the reasons for cooperation are the strongest. The totalitarian  
character of the Chinese government and the anti-Japanese attitude  
of the Chinese people cautioned Japan against going too far in the  
establishment of a “community.” Noboru Hatakeyama, former president  
of Japan External Trade Organization, advocates this approach.71  
Opponents of the EAC. Although those who advocated modifying the  
EAC could be understood as trying to adjust the vision of East Asian cooperation  
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to the reality, skepticism about China led some opinion leaders  
to negate entirely the idea of East Asian regional cooperation. Taro Yayama  
argued that the EAC was a Chinese stratagem to drag Japan into the sphere  
of Sino-centrism and that the solution for Japan lay in the creation of an  
“Asia-Pacific Community” with Australia, ASEAN, India, New Zealand, and  
the United States as participants, or else the creation of an “Alliance of  
Maritime States.”72 Mineo Nakajima drew a distinction between China’s  
continentality, Japan’s insularity, and Korea’s peninsularity, emphasizing  
a wide range of discrepancies in the recognition of modern history, and  
stated that during the “new cold war” between China and the United  
States, the EAC might be an illusion.73 A speech given on November 30,  
2006, by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, titled “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity:  
Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” might be considered an extension  
of this line of thinking.74  
 
Security Implications of the EAC  
If cooperation were “functional” and all relevant countries were included,  
cooperation based on the EAC might produce tangible results,  
which would benefit all participating countries. Avoiding duplication,  
however, is a legitimate concern. Demarcation between the cooperation  
under the ARF and the EAC may be a worthwhile consideration, just as,  
on economic matters, demarcation between APEC and the EAC might be  
helpful.  
But the real security issue is China, that is, how we should understand  
present-day China and consider the issue of multilateral cooperation in  
that context. Does it make sense to enhance cooperative security with  
China? If China is rising to manifest its Sino-centrist historical tradition,  
based on its rapidly developing power on the military, political, and economic  
fronts and using hatred of Japan to promote national unity, it may  
not be wise for Japan to flirt with regionalism in East Asia, at least without  
U.S. participation. Although dialogue is essential for constructive engagement,  
such dialogue is very different from joint efforts to create an EAC.  
But if China is a rapidly growing power that has not adjusted to the  
speed of its rise, misunderstands the outside world, and has ideas that  
Japan must listen to and understand.as Sakutaro Tanino, former Japanese  
ambassador to Beijing, argues75.efforts aimed at cooperative security and  
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enhancing an appropriate form of regionalism are crucial to Japan’s national  
interest. Naturally, even in the latter case the importance of guarding  
security in the traditional sense by means of strategic defense forces  
and the alliance firmly stands. In addition, Japan should not yield to undue  
pressure in the foreign policy sphere. But Japan’s overall behavior  
would change depending on how one views China.  
If the second scenario presents the most accurate picture of China,  
there were good reasons for Japan to have been active in the work related  
to the APT and EAC. But in that situation, from the point of view of Japan’s  
security and alliances, there remains a serious question. The question has  
four parts: Is Japan’s policy consistent if it tells the United States (1) that  
there is no need to worry about Japan’s participation in an EAC in which  
the United States might not take part; (2) that Japan’s purpose in participating  
in an EAC is to ensure that China will be harmonized with the region;  
(3) that there is a dire need for Japan to create a viable regional multilateral  
structure, not only for economic reasons but also to satisfy its  
long-time desire to be accepted as a partner in Asia; (4) and that its alliance  
with the United States since World War II should be a good basis for the  
United States to trust Japan not to harm U.S. interests? Looking back at  
Japan’s Asian policy since the turn of the new century, another question  
undermines Japan’s position regarding part (3) of the previous question: if  
“reentering Asia” is so important to Japan, how could it have behaved in  
such a way as to antagonize China, bringing the political relationship between  
the countries to its lowest point since World War II?  
The EAC cannot be understood properly without an appreciation of  
the fact that Japan is trying to regain the Asian identity it lost after its defeat  
in August 1945. But in Japan that defeat also resulted in a contradiction  
between complete negativism toward the country’s prewar activities  
and a legitimate desire to protect its honor.76 Japan’s inability to resolve  
this contradiction is creating a crisis of national identity. The two approaches  
on which it has staked it search for identity.“reentering Asia”  
and “reestablishing national values”.are on a collision course.  
Although this identity crisis has a strong domestic character, its international  
repercussions are strongly affecting Japan’s foreign policy. At a  
time when national identity seems to be gaining the upper hand over Asian  
identity, no one in Japan can responsibly and persuasively explain how the  
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EAC is important for Japan’s economic prosperity and geopolitical stability  
and also for the reestablishment of its honor in Asia. Among the eleven  
“lessons for successful regionalism” in Northeast Asia given by Gilbert Rozman,  
the most sensible is that Japan is back-pedaling by not pursuing “an  
accord between China and Japan over security” with maximum intensity  
and giving up its opportunity to “foster a regional identity.”77  
Owing to this confusion, Japan is moving to a position of seeking an  
EAC with an enlarged membership to counter China and to include the  
United States. But is this position really serving Japan’s best security interests?  
From an immediate geopolitical perspective, when relations with  
China are so strained and when the United States is so openly against the  
EAC, taking the “expansionist modifier” position is the only option. The  
classical theory of balance of power applies. But in the long run, if Japan  
were able to participate in a robust EAC, in which it could harmonize  
China with the outside world and gain greater understanding and trust in  
the region, would not such an EAC best serve Japan’s security interests?  
Power is still a key consideration. But conciliating as well as balancing may  
become the key. Besides, the search for an Asian identity may be at least as  
important as that for a national identity. After one year of unexpectedly  
harmonious Asian policy under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda,  
known to be more Asia-friendly, was elected prime minister in September  
2007. From the U.S. point of view, would not an EAC that improved relations  
between Japan and China also contribute to U.S. security interests?  
From the point of view of its national interest, the United States may  
legitimately require an inclusive East Asian cooperation in which it plays  
an integral part. But even in such a case, a key question still remains: would  
the United States prefer to have a Japan capable of managing its relations  
with China or bear with a weakened and dependent Japan? Today, Japan-  
China political relations are so strained that the relevance of such a question  
seems remote.78  
 
The Six-Party Talks 
 
At the end of the 1990s, while Japan’s interest in regionalism was manifested  
mostly within a cooperative framework comprising both Northeast  
and Southeast Asia, an important scheme was also taking shape to address  
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cooperation around the Korean peninsula. In response to the first North  
Korean nuclear crisis of 1993.94, the Korean Peninsula Economic Development  
Organization (KEDO) had been established in 1995,79 and Four-  
Party Talks had begun in 1996. But KEDO was in principle a technical body  
whose purpose was to construct a light water reactor, and the Four-Party  
Talks did not have a concrete task to accomplish within a set time frame.  
The Six-Party Talks (6PT) were entirely different. From a geopolitical  
perspective, the task of the 6PT was to stop North Korean nuclearization;  
their mission was to eliminate a threat to regional security in the most traditional  
sense. Or, as Francis Fukuyama indicated, the 6PT (or possibly 5PT)  
could develop into an entity that could profoundly influence the future  
peace and stability of Northeast Asia.80 From the point of view of Japanese  
identity, because what was at stake was so fundamentally related to the  
core issue of traditional security, the presence of the United States was a  
prerequisite. Whether Japan would seek its identity through reentering  
Asia or through reestablishing its national pride, it was important that the  
players in the game include its key trans-Pacific partner, the United States,  
and its two continental neighbors, China and Korea; there was no room  
for membership agony.  
 
Japan.North Korea Relations before the 6PT  
During the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, relations between  
Japan and North Korea swung between two poles: relatively warm relations  
and cold relations with an absence of communication (see Table 7.1).  
These pendulum swings exactly reflect North Korea’s relations with the entire  
outside world.  
The significance of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in  
September 2002 must be analyzed in the context of these relations. By the  
time of his visit, numerous problems separated Japan from North Korea, and  
public opinion was sensitive in demanding justice for Japanese victims of  
North Korean abductions.81 But Koizumi’s visit resolved all of these issues,  
most of them as prescribed in the Pyongyang Declaration of September 17,  
2002, which included an acknowledgement of and apology for the abductions. 
82 On Northeast Asian security, the declaration included a statement  
of the countries’ shared recognition “that it is important to have a framework  
in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidencebuilding,  
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as the relationships among these countries are normalized.”83  
For a very short period of time, it seemed as if this diplomatic success  
gave Koizumi a small but unprecedented opportunity to take a leadership  
position in the negotiations regarding North Korea. Makoto Iokibe stated  
that “abduction is abominable, but in order not to repeat such tragedy,  
normalization of relations must be accomplished without making mistakes.” 
84 Shinichi Kitaoka praised Koizumi’s visit as “a success to be remembered  
in post-WWII foreign policy.”85 But it goes without saying that,  
when the nuclear issue exploded in October, the perspective on normalization  
changed substantially. North Korea’s holding nuclear weapons  
was a clear violation of the Pyongyang Declaration and a grave threat to  
Japan’s security. Japan’s taking a rigorous position against North Korean  
nuclearization was natural and unavoidable. But had Koizumi maintained  
his diplomatic stance and channel to the North, Japan’s ability to communicate  
with North Korea might have had a different kind of impact on the 6PT process. 
  
Table 7.1 Japan.North Korea Relations, 1991.2003  
Years Japan.North Korea relations North Korean external relations 
1991.92 P Kanemaru’s visit; 8 rounds of talks North-South joint UN declaration 
1993.94 N Nuclear crisis Nuclear crisis 
1995.97 P Housewives’ return, food aid KEDO established; Four-Party Talks 
1998.99 N Missile crisis, vessels’ 
encroachment 
Provocations at South Korea’s eastern coast  
1999.2000 P Three rounds of talks, rice aid North-South summit; Russia; China  
2001 N Vessel shot down and sunk (―), Europe establishes relations (+) 
2002 P Koizumi’s visit (September) (+), axis of evil speech (January) (―) 
2003.5 N Abduction, nuclear crisis Nuclear crisis 
Note: P, (+) positive; N, (―) negative.  
 
However, events developed in a different direction. The Japanese public  
was shocked and angered that 8 out of 13 abductees had been pronounced  
dead under mysterious circumstances. Media coverage of the return  
of the remaining 5 abductees to Japan on October 15 was rife with  
national emotion, and on October 24 the Koizumi government, despite  
the basic understanding of several weeks that the 5 abductees would return  
to North Korea, decided not to let them go back to the North.86  
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This decision had a profound impact. It was supported by public opinion,  
as influenced by the families and relatives of the abductees, now organized  
as the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North  
Korea (AFVKN) and supported by the National Association for the Rescue  
of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN).87 The families, after years  
of suffering in isolation, had begun to cooperate in the 1990s, forming the  
AFVKN in 1997 and gaining the “strength to fight against Kim Jong Il.”88  
Their anger was also directed against the Japanese government for its longtime  
negligence in protecting Japan’s citizens from abduction. Whereas  
the majority of the abductions had taken place in 1977.78, no precautionary  
measures had been taken then,89 and it was only in 1988 that the  
government officially acknowledged that “there were enough doubts to  
suspect that North Korea [had] abducted six Japanese citizens.”90  
Deciding whether to let the five abductees return to North Korea was  
difficult: their families genuinely feared that they might not be allowed to  
come back again, but North Korean negotiators reportedly maintained  
that not returning them would constitute a breach of trust that, given the  
nascent relationship between the two countries, would jeopardize the  
whole process. It was reported that Yasuo Fukuda, chief cabinet secretary,  
and Hitoshi Tanaka, director general of the Asian Bureau and the chief negotiator  
with the North, were of the latter view, whereas Shinzo Abe,  
deputy chief cabinet secretary, and Shotaro Yachi, the highest MOFA offi-  
cial in the prime minister’s office, took the former position.91  
When the view of Abe and Yachi prevailed, North Korea virtually withdrew  
from the entire process initiated on September 17. In Japan, the abductions  
became the national priority in dealing with North Korea. The  
idea of introducing economic sanctions, with the ultimate aim of forcing  
a regime change, gathered increasing support.92 Tanaka began to be portrayed  
in the media as a “national traitor” for having acted out of perceived  
self-interest, not paying enough attention to the alliance with the United  
States, and being too willing to compromise with North Korea.93 Koizumi  
maintained his trust in Tanaka, who had kept a communication channel  
open with North Korea, but in reality Japan’s ability to negotiate seemed  
to have been shattered.  
Koizumi’s decision to keep the abductees at home should be seen  
partly as reflecting the dynamics of Japanese internal politics. Public opinion  
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was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the families of the abductees, who  
maintained that the returned abductees must not be sent back to North  
Korea. At the same time, the widely shared support for that decision was  
a reflection of a new feeling of national identity: it seemed appropriate for  
the state to take measures to protect its citizens and thus protect Japan’s  
national honor and identity. 
  
Japan’s Security Position in the 6PT  
With the interested parties facing a deadlock over the North Korean  
nuclear issue, Japan did not stay idle. As was recently disclosed by former  
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jim Kelly, Japan proposed holding either  
five-party talks among North Korea, the United States, China, South Korea,  
and itself, or six-party talks, adding Russia, to Secretary of State Colin  
Powell during his Asian trip in February 2003. Powell agreed, but reformulated  
this as a U.S. idea and proposed it to China, which did not immediately  
agree.94 Eventually China agreed, and North Korea finally expressed  
its support for six-party talks through Russia on July 31, 2003.95  
Japan’s position in the six rounds of the 6PT can be summarized as follows:  
 
 As stated clearly in the keynote speech of each round, the resolution  
of the abduction issue together with the nuclear issue was a prerequisite  
to the normalization of bilateral relations.96  
 .North Korea should dismantle “all nuclear programs.” The dismantling  
should be comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible.97  
 .Japan was willing to assist North Korea, provided that adequate conditions  
were met. In the fourth round, Japan stated that “under adequate  
conditions, Japan was ready to join the energy support program”  
that had been proposed by South Korea in the second round.98  
 Cooperation with Washington and consolidation of the U.S. and Japanese  
positions were vital.99  
 
Japan’s emphasis on the abductions put it in the most difficult position  
of the five counties negotiating with North Korea. This at least saved  
the United States from isolation from the other four countries. Assisting  
North Korea as appropriate was consistent with Japanese policy. But Japan’s  
position of remaining tough on North Korea was put in jeopardy when the  
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United States turned toward a policy of seeking agreement with the North  
at the fifth round of the talks in February 2007. Japan decided not to join  
in providing financial support as agreed in that round. Its insistence on  
the abductions isolated Japan from the other four countries, and its role  
did not compare with that of China in hosting the meeting and becoming  
the major interlocutor in setting the direction of the negotiations, or that  
of South Korea in making concrete proposals to tempt North Korea to  
abandon its nuclear program, or that of the United States in acting decisively  
to achieve some kind of agreement with North Korea.  
How should this situation be considered in the context of Japanese-  
U.S. relations? Is Japan’s position harming the U.S. position in resolving  
the North Korean nuclear issue? It is difficult to tell at this point. 
Japan’s reactive approach is based on conditions that have faced Japan since Koizumi’s 
decision about the abductees on October 24, 2002, when Japan’s potential to  
play a more proactive role was greatly reduced. Yoshihide Soeya provides  
one of the rare straightforward analyses: “[Japanese.North Korean] negotiations  
broke down as the result of the Japanese government’s decision  
not to return the abductees, and foreign policy strategy to lead the transformation  
of East Asia through the normalization of Japan.North Korean  
relations collapsed.”100 If Japan had continued its basic policy, expressed  
in September 2002, and succeeded in influencing Kim Jong Il on the nuclear  
issue, Japan’s relations with the United States would have been even  
further strengthened.  
From the realists’ point of view, preserving Koizumi’s channel with  
Kim Jong Il could have been a priority, because there are enormous stakes  
involved in North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons. But from the point  
of view of regaining Japan’s national identity, protecting the five abductees  
at all costs became a prerequisite. The Japanese people thought it only fair  
that, after so many years of neglect, the government had at long last taken  
the actions necessary to protect its citizens. Assuming a geopolitical leadership  
role on the Korean peninsula was an extremely difficult and remote  
objective anyway; in contrast, the task of protecting the five abductees was  
a tangible objective, in which Koizumi could not fail. Internal politics were  
also at stake. The choice was clear: identity overwhelmed realism.  
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Japan’s security in East Asia is best ensured through multilateral forums  
when geopolitical power, economic efficiency, and its search for a national  
and Asian identity are harmonized and policy is well coordinated based on  
these three factors. At present, the conflict between power and identity is  
creating real difficulties that are weakening Japan’s security position.  
Japan’s policy with regard to the ARF is being conducted reasonably  
successfully. The ARF was conceived as an Asia-Pacific forum that would  
include both the United States and China, and Japan’s major aim was to  
use it as an environment in which to harmonize its defense security policy  
with the policies of its Asian neighbors. The fundamental structure and  
purpose of the forum eliminated conflicts between power and identity.  
With regard to the EAC, cooperation among East Asian countries has  
a potential for conflict with the United States: Japan’s search for an Asian  
identity could clash with its geopolitical interests in maintaining a solid  
alliance with the United States. When cooperation was attempted under  
the APT, motivated by economics with an emphasis on “functionality,”  
contradictions did not appear on the surface. But when that cooperation  
began to develop a political momentum, it invited U.S. objections. This  
coincided with the deterioration of Japan’s bilateral relations with China,  
and the delicate balance between power and identity under the APT began  
to disintegrate. With tension with China as a backdrop, Japan’s search for  
a national identity began to enjoy stronger support than its search for an  
Asian identity. Balancing power with Australia, India, and New Zealand  
vis-a-vis China was preferred to seeking a harmonization of power with  
China within an EAC. National identity and geopolitics took priority over  
Asian identity.  
The 6PT started without membership contradictions. Both the United  
States and China were there as founding members. The 6PT had the potential  
to serve as a cradle for effective security multilateralism in Northeast  
Asia. As Francis Fukuyama states in his chapter of this book, a new  
five-power organization (counting Korea) might be a viable option to enhance  
security cooperation in the region, particularly to overcome differences  
among member countries on democracy and human rights. Japan’s  
security interests could have been maximized by taking a leadership position  
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in the 6PT, and Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002 might  
have provided a rare opportunity to accomplish that. But Japan’s decision  
to take a tough stance on the abduction issue froze the channel with North  
Korea that had opened the way for Koizumi’s visit. In the 6PT, Japan began  
to take an even harder position toward North Korea than the United  
States. National identity overwhelmed geopolitical realism.  
From the U.S. perspective, what is Japan’s multilateral security outlook  
in East Asia? In both the EAC and the 6PT, Japan is strongly supporting the  
U.S. position. Japan’s proposal to include the United States among the 13  
APT countries, albeit as an observer, was the closest to the U.S. position.  
Japan’s tough position vis-a-vis North Korea in the 6PT was effective in not  
isolating the United States until the fifth round of the talks, when the U.S.  
delegation began to adopt a more flexible policy to reach agreement with  
the North.  
At the same time, in relation to both China and North Korea, Japan  
failed to maximize its foreign policy potential under Prime Minister Koizumi.  
Japan’s security position vis-a-vis China is weakened by its failure to  
conduct solid dialogue at the level of the top leaders and to manage diffi-  
culties between the two countries, ranging from history to geopolitics.  
Japan failed to use a small window of opportunity to maximize its influence  
over North Korean with regard to the nuclear issue. As a partner in  
the Japan-U.S. alliance, one might argue that present-day Japan is a weakened  
partner unable to maximize its foreign policy.security potential.  
Thus, an important question that the United States might consider  
from the point of view of its long-term national interests is What kind of  
Japan does it prefer as an alliance partner? A strong partner that is maximizing  
its security potential; capable of harmonizing its power, efficiency,  
and identity; and developing sound political relations with China through  
its bilateral and multilateral ties? Or a weakened partner whose security position  
is troubled because of its conflict between identity and power, a partner  
experiencing difficulties with China both bilaterally and multilaterally  
and becoming increasingly dependent on the United States in East Asia?  
The United States has the right to choose the type of partner it prefers.  
From Japan’s perspective, the harmonization of its power, efficiency,  
and identity can ultimately be achieved through its two fundamental  
postwar policy objectives: strengthening its alliance with the United States  
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and reentering Asia. If the international situation compels Japan to choose  
one of the two, the consensus is clear: alliance will be given precedence.  
But this kind of zero-sum picture is not desirable for Japan. It must achieve  
both objectives in order to maximize its diplomatic posture and satisfy its  
national interest.101  
The situation in which Japan found itself in 2005.successive deterioration  
of its political relations with other Asian countries, notably China  
.simply contradicted Japan’s fundamental desire to reenter Asia and its  
efforts in that regard. Regardless of the expectation that a “principled” approach  
toward China will maximize Japan’s long-term international posture,  
Japan’s inability to govern and manage present-day difficulties is  
weakening its international reputation. From a Japanese point of view, this  
is regrettable, and such a Japan may not really be the best alliance partner  
for the United States.  
Japan’s relations with China improved substantially under Prime Minister  
Abe. Under Prime Minister Fukuda Japan’s relations with Asia may be  
further improved. If Japan begins to behave as a stronger partner capable  
of conducting a more responsible and effective policy in governing and  
managing its relations with China and other Asian countries, it would be  
in the best interest of the United States to consider how best to deal with  
that kind of Japan, whether to encourage and acknowledge or to disapprove  
of and object to Japan’s fundamental desire to reenter Asia. The answer  
may not be simple, depending on the preference of the United States  
regarding its involvement in East Asia. Whatever that preference, I  
strongly believe that 60 years of consolidation of its alliance with Japan  
provides sufficient grounds for the United States to trust Japan in its efforts  
to reenter Asia.  
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This article first goes back to 1945 and describes the spiritual vacuum which 
emerged because of the unprecedented total defeat and internal contradiction which 
emerged since then between those who totally denounced modern Japanese history and 
those who maintained, in various degrees, that some aspects of Japan’s modern history 
contained facts of which the Japanese should rightfully feel to be proud. The author 
argues that although the divergence between the two extreme schools was wide, there 
were continuous efforts to find synthesis between the two extreme views.  
The author then examines five specific issues on historical memory: comfort 
women, the Nanjing Massacre, forced labour, POWs, and Unit 731. All these issues still 
provoke anger from the victims in other countries. Although the author strongly believes 
that there is a general feeling of remorse and apology among the Japanese for pre-war 
atrocities, this feeling has not found common ground with their other need to feel pride 
in the accomplishments that Japan has achieved since the Meiji Restoration. This 
disconnection makes it impossible for the Japanese to produce a synthesis. The author 
argues, however, that in almost all issues there are hopeful signs toward a synthesis, 
although the degree of such hopeful signs varies in each issue.   
With regard to the five issues which address more general aspects of war and its 
memory--textbooks, apology, responsibility for the war, Yasukuni and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)-- the textbook and apology issues seem to 
have certain progress toward synthesis. What the author proposed on war responsibility 
and the Yasukuni issue has not gained political support inside Japan. Opinions are 
starkly divided on the IMTFE issue. The author concludes that there is a need to make 









Even over 60 years since the end of the Second World War, memories of it still linger 
heavily in Japan. It affects important parts of Japanese domestic policy as well as 
relations with important neighbors such as China and South Korea. Views inside 
Japan are polarized on all issues related to the memory of war. Why is this polarization 
happening? What concrete issues still need to be addressed? Is Japan overcoming 
this internal split or is it drifting toward further polarization? Is the rupture with 
China and Korea being mended, or is the rift getting worse? These are the issues that 
I would like to examine in this chapter. 
 
WHY IS HISTORICAL MEMORY HAUNTING JAPAN? 
 
In order to understand the polarization that is happening now in Japan, we need to 
go back to the nature of World War II and its total defeat in 1945. Japan had fought 
fiercely against the United States and the Allies until its capitulation. Kamikaze pilots 
sacrificed their lives. Japan began the war with the slogan ‘‘Beat the Americans and the 
British who are the devil and the beast’’ and ended it with ‘‘One hundred million are 
ready to die.’’ Yet, when the occupation began, there was no resistance against it. The 
U.S. occupation forces were generally warmly received. If one considers the bitterness 
with which the war was fought, Japan’s adaptation to the new era was astonishingly 
smooth and swift. How could it happen? 
For the first time in its history, Japan was defeated and occupied by foreign troops. 
This defeat aroused a huge shock and created a spiritual vacuum among the Japanese 
people. It was not just a simple military defeat. Japan lost all the territories it 
had accumulated from the Meiji Restoration until 1945. It also meant the loss of 
deep-seated values in which the Japanese people believed. 
Many people felt that there was something wrong in the way all of Japan was 
mobilized and fully absorbed to fight that total war. The totalitarian mechanism had 
created a top-down system of oppression and engendered an inhuman, inefficient, 
irresponsible, and sometimes cruel system. After the defeat, many people were 
relieved by the disappearance of that totalitarian oppression. They saw new breathing 
space to begin a new life. In academic circles and through the media, intellectuals and 
opinion leaders immediately began a process of soul-searching, questioning why 
Japan lost the war, and their views greatly influenced public opinion.1 A reappraisal 
of democratic thinking, which had achieved the establishment of the Meiji 
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Constitution and the Taisho democracy, underpinned this new trend. The questioning 
eventually developed from ‘‘Where did we go wrong to lose the war?’’ to ‘‘What 
did we do wrong vis-a`-vis those whom we fought, in particular, the people of Asia?’’ 
The occupation lasted from 1945 to 1952. The occupation forces, largely led by 
the United States, arrived with the intention of creating an entirely new Japan, an 
example of peaceful democracy, which would never harm U.S. interests in the Asia 
Pacific region. Demilitarization, democratization, and decentralization became the 
major policy directions. 
The occupation had several distinct characteristics. First, Japan’s basic 
governmental structures were preserved and U.S. occupation policy was carried out 
through the existing Japanese government. Imperial tradition was preserved to maintain 
order and continuity from the past. The new Constitution established new values of 
peace and democracy, but retained the emperor as the symbol of the nation. 
Second, the Cold War affected not only the international situation but also the 
political situation inside Japan. U.S. leaders expected Japan, as a pacified democracy 
in the Far East, to play a vanguard role in the fight for democracy and against 
communism in Asia. A new economic policy, initiated from around 1948, emphasized 
a quick and powerful recovery, and it slowed down dissolution of the zaibatsu, 
which had created the economic might of prewar Japan. Finally, the Yoshida Doctrine 
placed economic reconstruction as the first and foremost national priority and 
laid the foundations for Japan’s alliance with the United States, both of which 
matched well with the new direction under the Cold War. 
Third, prewar leaders purged from public functions were gradually allowed to 
return to power and they began to join the reconstruction of the country. The most 
symbolic example was Mamoru Shigemitsu. Shigemitsu was sentenced to seven years 
of imprisonment as a Class-A war criminal, but he became Japan’s first foreign minister, 
after Japan regained its independence, and he attended the UN Plenary Session 
in 1956. 
In these ways, Japan adapted to its defeat, the occupation, and the rise of the Cold 
War. A remarkable degree of continuity was preserved from the prewar period in 
terms of the postwar political structure, governmental personnel, and economic 
structures. But this continuity blurred the distinction between the prewar and the 
postwar periods, eventually leading to a shift from questioning ‘‘Where did we go 
wrong to lose the war?’’ to ‘‘Was everything Japan did before the war wrong?’’ The 
seeds for future polarization on historical memory were thus well implanted from 
the early postwar years. 
 587 
But while the seeds for a sharp split in the future were already planted then, 
the occupation period brought two distinctive conclusions on prewar Japan that 
Japan accepted as a nation. Although opinion leaders, intellectuals, and politicians 
have subsequently seriously questioned these two conclusions, they have never been 
repudiated by subsequent administrations and they will remain the principle of the 
government policy for the foreseeable future. 
The first conclusion is that Japan accepts the 1948 judgments of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). Altogether 25 Class-A war criminals 
were found guilty, mostly for crimes against peace for having waged and conspired 
in the war of aggression, and for conventional war crimes, namely responsibility for 
allowing or failing to prevent atrocities. Those found guilty of conventional military 
crimes were primarily charged for Class-B and Class-C war criminals by seven Allied 
powers, and 984 soldiers received the death sentence.2 The Japanese government 
accepted these judgments under Article 11 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. 
Second, after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan concluded 
international treaties and agreements to resolve the consequences of war with many 
other countries, including key countries such as China and South Korea. Through 
these international agreements, Japan reestablished diplomatic relations, paid 
reparations, atoned for atrocities committed against prisoners of war, and formally 
settled all other issues related to World War II. The United States and the Republic of 
China (and later the People’s Republic of China) exempted Japan from reparations. Two 
issues remained unresolved, however: first, Japan and Russia were unable to settle 
their territorial dispute and could not conclude a peace treaty; and, second, Japan 
and North Korea still have not established diplomatic relations. But all other issues 
related to World War II have been legally settled in accordance with the treaties 
concluded between Japan and the respective countries. 
No one in the Japanese government or among serious opinion leaders are trying to 
legally renounce the IMTFE judgment or any part of the legal framework that 
allowed Japan to participate in international society. But because the spiritual 
vacuum created by the defeat was so deep, the transition from the prewar to the postwar 
period was so drastic, and the seeds for division implanted from this period were 
so fundamental, inevitably contradictions and polarization emerged. 
Since Japan faced an unprecedented total defeat, many asked, ‘‘Where did we go 
wrong to lose the war?’’ But from there, to generalize broadly, there emerged a sharp 
split between those who believed that Japan’s modernizing past was an unmitigated 
march toward militarism, colonialism, and aggression and those who argued that 
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not everything Japan did should be judged negatively, and that some actions were 
justifiable. On the question of Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors, the former 
believed that Japan’s actions were unjustifiable acts of aggression and colonialism 
against its Asian neighbors, while extremists in the latter group argued that Japanese 
actions were dictated by its circumstances, and hence, completely justifiable under 
the circumstances. In this chapter, I define the first group as ‘‘apologizers’’ and the 
second group as ‘‘nationalists.’’ 
Throughout the Cold War and especially during Japan’s economic expansion 
from 
the 1960s to the 1980s, some government officials and conservative Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) politicians supported the nationalists’ position but there 
was a strong current in public opinion and in the opposition parties supporting the 
apologizers’ cause. Internationally, China and Korea were in the process of 
reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations with Japan, and neither country was 
inclined to raise contentious historical issues against Japan. The Japanese people 
were very busy improving their standard of living and basically thought that the 
history issue should not be a high priority on the political agenda. Some nationalist 
intellectuals and opinion leaders emerged who tried to justify prewar Japanese 
activities, but their influence was not far-reaching. Successive powerful LDP prime 
ministers such as Nobusuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Sato, Kakuei Tanaka, 
Takeo Fukuda, Masayoshi Ohira, and Yasuhiro Nakasone, despite their individual 
differences, all successfully managed the balance between the apologizers and the 
nationalists.3 
When the Cold War ended, coinciding with the temporary eclipse of the 
onceomnipotent LDP reign, the ideas of the apologizers briefly shaped government 
policy. Landmark events such as the 1992 Emperor’s visit to China in 1992, Yohei 
Kono’s 1993 statement on comfort women, and Tomiichi Murayama’s 1995 statement 
apologizing for Japanese aggression and colonization were hallmarks of this 
period. Many Japanese naively expected that clear apologies would result in 
reconciliation with China and Korea. LDP leaders during that period, such as Kiichi 
Miyazawa, Kono, Koichi Kato, and Toshiki Kaifu all apologized for past Japanese 
conduct as they sought reconciliation with Japan’s important neighbors. The shift 
of power to the socialists, represented by Prime Minister Murayama, inherently an 
apologizer, strengthened this trend and culminated in the landmark 1995Murayama 
Statement. When the LDP regained power in 1996, both Hashimoto and Obuchi 
understood the sensitivity of the history issue in dealing with China and Korea, while 
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paying due attention to a rising tide of nationalism in Japan.4 
When Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister in 2001, he began to make 
annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine for the next six years. His visits to Yasukuni 
antagonized China and Korea deeply, while invigorating nationalist opinion leaders 
and politicians in Japan. Japan suddenly plunged into a recession after its bubble 
economy burst, which shook Japanese confidence. Political pressure for a more 
assertive Japan accompanied this economic decline, as did a successful strengthening of 
ties with the United States. Lurking behind this assertiveness were fears of rising 
Chinese economic, political, and military power and anger toward China due to its 
incessant preaching to ‘‘learn from history.’’ All these factors contributed toward 
louder nationalist historical discourse. 
In what direction is Japan headed? With Prime Minister Shinzo Abe out of office 
less than one year, it is very hard to predict the future direction. Abe assumed his post 
with a history of supporting and of support from nationalist politicians and opinion 
leaders. But his actual policy was more restrained than one might expect. On the 
Yasukuni visit issue, he adopted a ‘‘No Confirmation No Denial’’ policy. Even what 
has been interpreted as his denial of Japanese military’s involvement in recruiting 
comfort women could be understood to be the result of series of unfortunate 
misstatements.5 Yasuo Fukuda, who replaced Abe, has a long record of being less 
nationalist and more apologist in his foreign policy orientation toward Asia,6 but 
the extent to which his thinking will influence the future course of Japanese foreign 
policy is still unclear. 
Obscured by the overall trend toward nationalist views are strenuous and constant 
efforts since the end of World War II to better anchor Japan in the international 
structure, while appeasing conflicting domestic political forces. In accordance with 
Hegelian dialectics, my arguments use the apologizers’ views as the thesis and 
nationalists’ views as the antithesis, with the emergence of a patriotic/international view 
as a synthesis. I then provide evidence for the case that the government, politicians, and 
opinion leaders should grasp and consolidate this synthesis. 
The debate on historical memory involves wide-ranging issues, and the nature of 
each issue is complex. It is therefore necessary to identify some of the important 
issues, describe the main contentious points, and examine whether or not a general 
consensus has emerged. I argue that there are five micro issues, all related to concrete 
and specific wartime issues: they are the comfort women issue, the Nanjing massacre, 
forced labor, POWs, and Unit 731. I also argue that there are five macro issues that 
address overall aspects of the war and its memory in general, which are closely 
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interconnected with each other but can still be analyzed separately. These are textbooks, 
apology, war responsibility, the Yasukuni Shrine, and the IMTFE (International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East). I will analyze these ten issues, one by one, in the 
order that I have mentioned above. 
 




In Japan, there are groups of opinion leaders, scholars, politicians, lawyers, and 
gender activists who maintain that the comfort women system was basically a system 
of mass rape, and that the prewar Japanese military must be held responsible for this 
organized rape. Among others, Yoshiaki Yoshimi is the leading scholar of this school. 
Some denounced the Japanese government at the human rights commission in 
Geneva in 1992.7 A Socialist member of the Diet has been working to enact a law 
to pin down the Japanese government’s legal responsibility.8 Many Japanese gender 
activists under the Violence Against Women in War Network Japan (VAWW-NET 
Japan) organized the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military 
Sexual Slavery from December 8–12, 2000, in Tokyo. Those activists have also 
played an important role in assisting former comfort women in Asia to file lawsuits 
in Japanese courts.9 
But there are people who have very different views on comfort women. They 
maintain that comfort women stations were military brothels. Brothels were then a 
socially accepted practice in East Asia and other parts of the world. Stations were built 
to avoid rape, venereal disease, and leaks of confidential information. Primarily it was 
civilian traders who owned and operated comfort stations. No documents exist proving 
that officials recruited women from Korea, then a part of Japan, through coerced 
recruitment (kyosei renko). In some instances, Korean women were taken to the comfort 
station by deception, but military police generally acted to prevent such acts, 
although admittedly not in all cases could they prevent them. In the occupied areas, 
in contrast to Korea, there were cases of rape and some women were forced to stay 
with the military. But these were considered criminal acts, and many perpetrators 
were court-marshaled by the military authority or punished in postwar tribunals. 
The Dutch case was an exceptional instance of proven local military involvement. 
Ikuhiko Hata is probably the most diligent scholar who represents this school.10 
Tsuneyasu Daishido, a former Japanese colonial officer in Korea now aged 90, writes 
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that in all cases that he knew of there was no physical coercion in comfort women 
recruiting in Korea.11 Conservative opinion leaders regularly expound their views 
in print, and a notable example is in the August 2007 special edition of Will, which 
has a special feature on the comfort women issue.12 The Liberal Democratic Party’s 
Committee of Parliamentarians to Think about Japan’s Future and Historical Education 
is also reconsidering the comfort women issue.13 
From 1989 toward the early 1990s this became a hotly debated issue between 
Japan and South Korea. The two governments had intense talks on this issue when 
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Seoul in January 1992. Following Miyazawa’s 
visit to South Korea, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono made a statement 
on August 4, 1993, establishing the Japanese government’s position. Kono clearly 
apologized but the Kono Statement was also an attempt to synthesize the gap 
between apologizers and nationalists. Kono acknowledged that ‘‘the then Japanese 
military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management 
of the comfort stations and transfer of comfort women’’. He further admitted that 
in many cases comfort women were recruited by private contractors against their 
own will, through coaxing and coercion. Kono then expressed ‘‘sincere apologies 
and remorse to all those who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical 
and psychological wounds.’’14 
Following the Kono Statement, the Asian Women’s Fund was established in July 
1995 under Prime Minister Murayama. Each comfort woman was to receive a letter 
of apology signed by the prime minister in power, accompanied by compensation of 
two million yen. Compensation from the fund was extended to women from Korea, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Netherlands, and it concluded its work 
in March 2007. Prime Minster Abe in his trip to Washington on April 26–27, 2007 
expressed his ‘‘deep-hearted sympathies for the extreme hardships and expressed his 
apologies to have put them in that sort of circumstances.’’15 
On April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court rejected two cases demanding an apology 
and compensation from Chinese comfort women based on a judgment that postwar 
international agreements already renounced both state and private claims. With this 
precedent, Japanese courts will likely reject any future comfort women cases. 
Prime Minister Abe’s alleged March 1 statement that coercion did not exist in relation 
to comfort women and a June 16Washington Post full-page advertisement signed 
by Japanese politicians and opinion leaders that gave the same impression, angered 
many U.S. Congressmen. On July 30, the U.S. House of Representatives passed by 
a unanimous voice vote a resolution presented by 167 cosponsors asking Japan to 
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offer an unequivocal official apology on the comfort women issue. 
The Japanese government and politicians so far seem to have acted with restraint. 
To say the least, Abe’sMarch 1 statement was inadvertent and the June 16Washington 
Post advertisement produced the opposite of its desired result. But I argue that not fully 
appreciating the weight of the Kono Statement in the complex conditions of Japanese 
politics and asking for further ‘‘unequivocality’’ is a demand that goes too far. 
Instead, what concerns me more than the House Resolution is that all the good 
work done by the Asian Women’s Fund is now completely terminated.17 I hinted in 
an essay that I contributed in Asahi Shinbun that the April 27 Supreme Court decision 
may give the Japanese government a unique opportunity, now that it is not in a position 
to be legally compelled to act by internal courts, to reconsider this issue on a moral 
basis and not to discontinue the Asian Women’s Fund’s activities.18 This is my 
proposal to seek a further synthesis. Apart from several positive responses from center 
to left intellectuals, politically my voice does not seem to have any impact. Even under 
the new cabinet led by Yasuo Fukuda, the comfort women issue may just be handled 
quietly with a confirmatory statement of the Kono Statement, as necessary. 
 
Nanjing Massacre 
The Nanjing massacre was first brought to the Japanese public’s attention at the 
IMTFE. The Tribunal revealed that more than 200,000 soldiers, civilians, women, 
and children were massacred from December 1937 to March 1938. The Chinese 
government later began stating that the number of victims was 300,000 and this is 
the figure currently displayed at the Nanjing Massacre Museum in Nanjing. Many 
Japanese scholars, who belong to the apologizers’ camp, confirm that atrocities were 
committed and the overwhelming majority of textbooks in junior-high and high 
school reflect this, although some disagreement exists about the precise figures.19 
Countering Chinese claims and the arguments of the apologizers, some Japanese 
historians and opinion leaders, particularly from the mid-1980s, began arguing that 
there was basically no Nanjing Massacre. Some execution of guerillas (soldiers wearing 
civilian clothes) took place, but nothing proves that this was done outside the 
framework of international law. There is no record, credibly shown to be from that 
period, that any mass murder took place. Masaaki Tanaka, Kanji Katsuoka, and 
Shoichi Watanabe are known to have this position.20 The Committee of 
Parliamentarians to Think about Japan’s Future and Historical Education concluded in 
June 2007 that ‘‘Massacre in Nanjing was denied even by the League of Nations, 
because in 1938 China asked the League of Nations to take concrete actions against 
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Japan for 20,000 massacres and several thousand rapes in Nanjing, but that the request 
was not accepted.’’21 
The number of victims in Nanjing is still very much a controversial issue. But 
after the sharp rise of public interest in the textbook controversy in 1982 regarding the 
Nanjing massacre, the Japanese army veterans association, Kaikosha, decided to 
conduct their own research in 1984. Completed in 1985 and published in theMarch 
edition of their monthly magazine, Kaiko, the results of their research were quite 
unexpected,22 confirming that ‘‘unlawful actions (fuhokoi)’’ were committed and 
giving an estimate of 13,000, adding 3,000 as a minimum estimate. In announcing 
this conclusion in their monthly magazine they made the following statement: 
We apologize deeply to the people of China. We say again. Naturally 13,000, and even our 
minimum figure of 3,000, is an astonishingly huge number. We began our work of checking the 
military history, knowing that we were not completely clean. But with this huge number, we 
simply have no words. Whatever the severity of war or special circumstances of war psychology, 
we just lose words faced with this mass illegal killing. As those who are related to the prewar 
military, we simply apologize deeply to the people of China. It was truly a regrettable act of 
barbarity.23 
For both the apologizers and the deniers of the Nanjing massacre, to get to the 
real picture is an important task and the polarized debate continues. But I believe that 
the Kaikosha statement represents best what many people who are seriously interested 
in history feel about what happened in Nanjing precisely 70 years ago. Scholars may 
continue arguing which numbers are closest to reality. But in terms of the Japanese 
facing their own history and reconciling with Asia, the position expressed by Kaikosha 
that, even if the number of victims is less than the one the Chinese believed to be 
so, the unlawful killing itself is truly regrettable and merits apology is very important. 
Whether such a view can command a consensus as a synthetic approach including 
nationalists’ opinion leaders is unknown at this point. 
 
Forced Labor 
Korean and Chinese workers were moved to Japan and were ordered to work in 
Japanese companies. The transfer of Korean workers to Japanese companies was 
done in three stages, from September 1939 as voluntary recruitment (boshu), from 
February 1942 as administrative placement (assen), and from September 1944 on 
government order (choyo). The estimated number of those who came to Japan varies, 
but several studies show the number to be 147,000 in the first stage, 300,000 in the 
second stage, and 220,000 in the third stage.24 In all stages, the numbers of Koreans 
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who were mobilized under this program were less than those Koreans who moved to 
Japan outside this mobilization program. As for the Chinese, based on a Cabinet 
decision in 1942, about 40,000 workers were sent to 35 companies in 135 sites such 
as mines and construction sites and 6,830 apparently died under severe conditions.25 
Those who are critical of this mobilization program argue that all Koreans who 
came to Japan under this scheme were put under forced labor. It was naturally so 
for those Chinese who were deported from Japanese occupied areas. From the 
1990s forced laborers both from Korea and China who had to endure hardship in 
Japanese companies brought cases against them in Japanese courts. Lawyers and 
social activists in Japan helped their court cases. Some companies voluntarily 
accepted their responsibility and paid compensation and reached agreements with 
the plaintiffs, but the majority did not consent to the plaintiffs’ claims, and the 
lawsuits continued into the 2000s. 
Regarding the Korean cases, scholars and opinion leaders emerged who argued 
that the mobilization program in its first and second stage could not be possibly 
considered forced labor. They further argued that the third stage mobilization was an 
inevitable program to implement the last stage of war. Korea was then a part of 
Japan, the Koreans were fighting with the Japanese against the Allies and the Japanese 
people as a whole by this time had already been subjected to work under their own 
government order.26 
On April 27, 2007, together with the two comfort women cases as mentioned 
above, the Supreme Court made a landmark decision concerning three Chinese 
forced labor cases. The Supreme Court rejected all Chinese plaintiffs’ claims based 
on the postwar Japanese international agreements that renounced both state and private 
claims.27 As with the comfort women cases, these verdicts serve as a precedent 
for all future cases. 
At the same time, while rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims, the court acknowledged 
that forced labor did occur and ‘‘the mental and physical pain incurred was extremely 
serious, whereas the company gained profits from the forced labor, so the company 
concerned and other entities involved in this matter must make efforts to help the 
victims.’’28 
The plaintiffs expressed deep disappointment and stated that the Japanese 
judiciary made an incorrect decision, failing to fulfill its responsibility. The Chinese 
Foreign Ministry issued a statement that the interpretation given by the Supreme 
Court was illegal and invalid because the Chinese government did not relinquish 
individuals’ compensation rights and it urged the Japanese government to take 
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appropriate measures. 
The forced labor issue now clearly stands at a crossroads. One way of looking at 
it is that Japan and its neighboring countries are now hopelessly deadlocked. But 
another way of looking at it is that, although companies where Korean and Chinese 
workers worked no longer need fear being prosecuted according to domestic law, the 
pain incurred by workers has been acknowledged by the Japanese Supreme Court. Now 
freed from the fear of legal prosecution, companies may be in a better position to 
acknowledge voluntarily the pain that they caused and compensate for it accordingly. 
But so far, no such action has taken place. As stated in relation to the comfort 
women, this is the position I argued in my essay in Asahi Shinbun. Like the comfort 
women issue, my proposal is not attracting political interest so far. Under the new 
cabinet led by Yasuo Fukuda, the forced labor issue may only be handled quietly, 
possibly with some words of general apology. 
 
POWs 
The San Francisco Peace Treaty prescribed that Japan should indemnify the 
sufferings caused to prisoners of war.29 In 1955 through the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Japan paid 4.5 million pounds to those Allied countries whose POWs 
suffered in captivity in Japan’s prisons and camps. In 1956, the Japanese government 
paid an additional $10 million to the Netherlands. But the wounded feelings of 
those POWs were not healed and former Dutch POWs in 1994 and British POWs 
in 1995 filed lawsuits in Japanese courts.30 
None of these court cases were won by the POW plaintiffs, and as stated above, 
after the April 27, 2007 Supreme Court decision, any possibility of winning in the 
Japanese legal system has apparently disappeared. But while not acknowledging any 
legal obligation beyond those in the postwar treaties, in an attempt to heal the 
wounds of those who suffered, the Government of Japan established from 1995 to 
2004 the Peace and Friendship Exchange Program. Based on this Program, 784 former 
POWs from Britain, 425 from the Netherlands, and 56 from Australia were 
invited to Japan. During their stay in Japan, Japanese hosts, each in his own way tried 
to express their feeling of apology and show that postwar Japan has moved into a 
totally different direction than what they experienced as POWs.31 These steps may 
have made some contribution to healing the wounds of those who suffered. The 
British and Dutch programs continued after 2004. Particularly after the April 27 
Supreme Court decision, when all cases filed by POWs also lost grounds for victory, 




The history of Unit 731 is by now covered by abundant documentation both in 
Japanese and English. In 1933, a small military unit was established in Manchuria 
within the Kwantung Army to study biological warfare. In 1939, it developed into 
a powerful unit called ‘‘Unit 731’’ in Pingfang, and human biological warfare 
experiments started. By the time the war ended this unit had used about 3,000 Chinese 
prisoners, called ‘‘logs,’’ as object of these experiments. Facing Japan’s defeat, the unit 
destroyed everything possible in Pingfang, and those who worked there returned to 
Japan with only their memories. The U.S. military authority was to receive all 
information concerning their knowledge on biological warfare on the condition that they 
would not be prosecuted. Japanese survivors from the unit began speaking about it in 
the 1950s, and in 1982, a detailed account of the unit was published as The Devil’s 
Gluttony. It became a best-seller in Japan. 
Human rights advocates and those who consider this crime impermissible argue 
that it is simply shameful that although the basic facts are so well known, the Japanese 
government has never responded.32 After the deal was made not to prosecute 
the individuals in this operation, it may not be possible to indict them or disclose 
their names officially, but, at least, the Japanese government should recognize that 
the crime was committed and apologize for it. But some argue that, due to the nature 
of the deal which Japan had with the United States, it is impossible to disclose all of 
the information, and the best way the Japanese government can proceed is to keep 
silent and have this issue quietly disappear into history. No synthesis has been found 
on this issue yet. 
 
FIVE ISSUES WHICH ADDRESS OVERALL ASPECTS OF WAR 
AND ITS MEMORY 
 
Textbooks 
Private companies commissioning historians as authors produce Japanese 
junior-high-school textbooks, which then go through a screening system established by 
the government. Recent practice is to approve eight textbooks with variations in content 
and all junior high schools then have the right to choose one of them. The content of 
the textbooks and the way history is taught have been also the result of delicate 
balancing between the teachers union, which has advocated strong apologies, and the 
government, which has tried to limit excessive self-criticisms of Japan’s past. 
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In 1982 when the textbook controversy erupted under Prime Minister Zenko 
Suzuki in relation to China and South Korea, the Japanese government acknowledged 
that the feeling of neighboring countries should be one factor for the screening 
committee to consider, and this clause began to have certain influence on the content 
of adopted textbooks. 
But the great hero of the textbook controversy in acknowledging Japan’s war 
guilt was Saburo Ienaga, who sued the Japanese government, claiming that the 
screening system is illegal and nothing but censorship, and that key issues such as the 
Nanjing massacre, aggression toward China, and comfort women have to be described 
with much greater clarity. The lawsuit lasted for 32 years from 1965 until 1997, until 
finally at the Supreme Court Ienaga won many points on his claims, although he lost on 
the issue of censorship. After Ienaga’s victory, textbooks with more critical descriptions 
on controversial subjects, including the comfort women issue, began to be published. 
While Ienaga was gaining his limited but important victory, nationalist scholars 
and historians began raising their voices. In late 1996, they established an association 
to produce a new textbook, Tsukurukai. Kanji Nishio, Nobukatsu Fujioka, Chubei 
Takubo, Yoshinori Kobayashi, Susumu Nishibe, Hidetsugu Yagi, and other wellknown 
nationalist historians joined the project, and their textbook, approved by 
the government, was published in 2001 and 2005 by Fusosha. The Chinese 
government and the South Korean government each time strongly protested that this 
textbook whitewashed the history of Japanese aggressions and colonialism. Huge 
media attention was given to the Fusosha textbook, but, in reality, the adoption rate 
by junior high schools was extremely low. 
Inside Japan, the views held by the apologizers and the nationalists are poles 
apart. As analyzed in the first section of this chapter, nationalists’ views have been 
publicized more widely in recent years. Since it is not likely that Fusosha would stop 
publishing its textbook, Chinese and South Korean official criticism would continue. 
However, as Hiroshi Mitani’s chapter in this volume shows, a more synthetic 
approach has emerged between Japan and China and South Korea. Slow, belated, 
but important endeavors began between the Japanese government and the Chinese 
and South Korean governments attempting to understand each other better through 
candid exchanges of views on history. 
With South Korea, the two governments established a committee of scholars to 
study jointly the two countries’ history. The first round of this joint committee 
operated for two years, from 2002 to 2004. Views on history did not converge but, 
at least, the two sides came to understand the other country’s views better. The second 
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round of the committee, now with a subcommittee on textbook analysis, has 
started its work in April 2007.33 A similar joint history group was established with 
China after Prime Minister Abe’s 2006 visit to China. It began its work in December 
2006 and is expected to conclude its first round of work in 2008.34 
If the process of mutual understanding is slow and uncertain, there may be a 
possibility to narrow gradually the differences, first to understand that the other side 
has a fundamentally different view on history and, with time, gradually to find ways 
to reach a common perspective. 
 
Apology 
In the years following the end of World War II, many Japanese intellectuals and 
opinion leaders began seriously thinking about Japanese aggressions from the early 
1930s. They argued that Japan had ‘‘legal, political and moral responsibility from 
the point of view of international relations’’ for the aggressions.35 They also discussed 
the nature of the Korean annexation. Strong views were expressed that the IMTFE’s 
indictment of Japanese aggression was made by outsiders, but that Japan itself 
completely failed to pursue own legal responsibility.36 Katsuichiro Kamei, Isao 
Nakanishi, and Saburo Ienaga are, among others, scholars who acknowledge Japan’s 
guilt in waging wars of aggression from the early 1930s. There are scholars, for instance, 
Yoshimi Takeuchi, who argue that the war against the United States was a war among 
imperialists, but they are unanimous about the war with China as a war of aggression. 
37 The teachers’ union generally shares these views, and its negative opinion of 
Japan’s militaristic past are reflected in opposition to showing the national flag and 
singing the national anthem in schools. At the grassroots level, 1,109 soldiers 
detained in two prisons in China came back to Japan in the first half of the 1950s. 
They began confessing atrocities they had committed in China. They established 
an organization in 1957 and have continued to speak publicly about their past so 
that these atrocities will not be repeated.38 
But there were some who presented a different perspective. Most of the accused 
in the IMTFE argued that they had fought a war of self-defense against Euro-American 
imperialist powers, whose purpose included of the liberation of Asia. Fusao Hayashi 
supported this view in 1963, as did, strongly, the scholars who gathered at Tsukurukai 
in the 1990s. From their perspective, Japan conducted the war in accordance with 
the then-existing norms of international law and order. As for the crimes against 
conventional military law, officers and soldiers were punished in the three classes of 
war tribunals (A, B, and C). There were cases where judgments were wrongly given, 
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but Japan accepted them. As for the crime against peace that became the basis of the 
indictment at the IMTFE, although it was a retroactive crime based on victors’ 
justice, Japan also accepted it. There is therefore no need for further apologies. 
But the position taken by the Japanese government was different from the two 
competing schools mentioned above. The government did not pursue any additional 
legal responsibility after the judgments were rendered at the war criminals tribunals, 
but it went through a moral reevaluation of the war and its history from the Meiji 
Restoration. Japanese leaders have expressed numerous apologies to Chinese and 
South Korean leaders, and Prime Minister Murayama in 1995 gave the clearest 
statement of apology, as a cabinet decision, stating ‘‘deep remorse’’ and ‘‘heartfelt 
apology’’ for ‘‘the tremendous damage and suffering’’ that Japan caused by its 
aggression and colonialism. This statement formed the basis of the Japanese 
government’s reconciliation policy from that date. Prime Minster Koizumi in 2005 at 
the Bandung Asia-African heads of state conference confirmed this statement 
practically word for word with further emphasis on Japan’s impeccable record of peace 
in the last 60 years. Prime Minister Abe confirmed the Murayama statement also. 
In relation to China, the 1992 Imperial visit and the ‘‘deep sorrow’’ that the 
Emperor expressed marked an important page of reconciliation from the Japanese 
perspective. In relation to Korea, President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan in 1998, 
resulting in a landmark communique´ in which Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi 
expressed ‘‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’’ and Kim Dae-jung in turn recognized 
the need to ‘‘overcome their unfortunate history.’’ 
Nationalist politicians and opinion leaders severely attacked the Murayama 
Statement. But if the Japanese government and Japan as a whole are to pursue the 
basic line advanced by this statement, it will become the basis of Japan’s synthetic 
reconciliation policy. 
 
Responsibility for the War [Senso Sekinin] 
If the Murayama statement expressed ‘‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’’ for 
the ‘‘tremendous damage and suffering,’’ then who was responsible for that? This 
question has remained unanswered to this day. Can Japan really overcome its past 
without addressing this unanswered question? 
The questioning itself stands on a fragile basis. 
For the intellectuals of the apologizers’ school, for whom the Murayama 
statement may logically be a half-way achievement, they nonetheless welcome the 
possibility of pushing his apology position one step farther and seeking where the 
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responsibility for the war lay. 
But for nationalist scholars and opinion leaders, the question of the responsibility 
for the war is a nonissue. They severely attack the Murayama statement, arguing that 
Japan fought a war accepted by then-existing international law. Not only unlawful 
activities under military law but also the dubious crimes against peace had already 
been punished; therefore, why should Japan apologize once more, and all the more, 
why should Japan give further thought to ‘‘war responsibility’’? 
Despite a growing trend toward nationalist discourse, many center-to-left opinion 
leaders have recently raised the question of ‘‘responsibility for the war.’’ They point 
out that Japan itself has never faced this issue on their own, and argued that the 
Japanese people themselves must address the issue of war responsibility. Top leaders 
of the two major newspapers, Yomiuri and Asahi, each arguably representing 
right-center and left-center, respectively, debated the necessity of analyzing the 
issue of war responsibility and attracted huge media attention in January 2006.39 
Yomiuri Shinbun made a two-year research project on the question of war responsibility 
and published the outcome in both Japanese and in English, naming the 
names of those it deemed responsible for leading Japan down a mistaken path.40 
Asahi Shinbun also published recently the result of their research.41 I also argued in 
my writing on Yasukuni that the key issue that must be resolved on the issue of 
historical memory is to face the issue of war responsibility and draw Japan’s own 
conclusion.42 
Even within the Japanese government, there has emerged an interesting 
phenomenon hardly noticed by the media and public opinion. Pro forma, things have 
not changed. The long-standing government position has been not to get involved in this 
matter, a policy formally confirmed by Prime Minister Abe. On October 2, 2006, in 
answering a Diet question on the responsibility for the war of Class-A war criminals, 
Abe stated that ‘‘there are various views on the issue of war responsibility, and it is not 
appropriate for the government to make a judgment.’’43 On October 6, the Cabinet 
responded to a formal question by other Diet members on this issue with the same 
message.44 
But at the parliamentary debate that took place practically over the same period, 
the government made statements that went beyond its previously noncommittal 
position. On October 5, Abe stated before the budget committee of the Lower 
House that ‘‘As the result of the war, many Japanese have lost their lives and members 
of their families. It left grave consequences upon the Asian people. I think that the 
leaders of the period including my grandfather [Nobusuke Kishi, who was the 
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Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Tojo Cabinet,] were responsible.’’45 
On the following day before the same committee, Abe reconfirmed that ‘‘Japanese 
leaders had naturally grave responsibility for the war of the Showa period.’’46 
What does all this mean? It is hard to draw any definite conclusions. The issue 
has 
not died down. There may be some more impetus among scholars and opinion leaders 
to continue this debate, but there are no signs that newly elected Prime Minister 
Yasuo Fukuda may take it up. 
 
Yasukuni Shrine 
It is fresh in our memory that six successive visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to 
the Yasukuni Shrine halted summit meetings for five years between Japan and China. 
China’s objection is simple and almost exclusively based on its protest of the 
enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni:47 Class-A war criminals are the 
leaders who led Japan into the war of aggression against China, causing tremendous 
damage and suffering to the Chinese. Since mourning war dead at Yasukuni has the 
inevitable consequence of mourning Class-A war criminals, China cannot accept it. 
On the part of those who agree or sympathize with China’s criticism, the solution 
so far discussed is either to de-enshrine Class-A war criminals from Yasukuni, or to 
build a nonreligious memorial to mourn the war dead. 
From supporters of Yasukuni, these proposals are clearly nonstarters. Class-A 
war criminals were punished in accordance with the IMTFE judgment. But the Japanese 
people have not treated them, beyond accepting judgment by the IMTFE, as criminals 
in accordance with their domestic law. The enshrinement was done based on a 
generally shared feeling that even with an incorrect policy, they worked for their 
country. Furthermore, the Japanese do not have a cultural tradition of prosecuting a 
person after his or her death. Shinto theology also dictates that once enshrined, it is 
impossible to separate one’s spirit from the holistic whole of the universe of spirits. As 
for the neutral memorial, one is free to construct such a place, but it would never replace 
Yasukuni, where soldiers swore before death: ‘‘When we die, let us meet at Yasukuni.’’ 
In my effort to find a synthetic approach, I proposed in my writing on Yasukuni 
that we should introduce a period of moratorium.48 As stated above, I strongly 
argued that Japan should come to its own conclusions on ‘‘war responsibility.’’ 
We can then judge the appropriateness of enshrining 14 Class-A war criminals, not 
based on the IMTFE decision, but based on our own evaluation. I also proposed that 
we should de-ideologize the Yasukuni Shrine and the Yasukuni war museum 
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(Yushukan), and further that we should resolve the current constitutional impasse 
around Article 20 during this moratorium period. Article 20, which strictly separates 
the state and religion, obliges Yasukuni mourners not to perform a state function. 
Many scholars and some court judgment considered it unconstitutional for a prime 
minister to mourn the war dead in his official capacity for this reason. 
Prime Minister Abe adopted a policy of ‘‘No confirmation no denial,’’ that is to 
say, to avoid making it clear whether he intends to visit the shrine or not, and 
whether he actually went or not. It succeeded in extinguishing the fire from China 
and Korea, while not arousing excessive anger among nationalist politicians and 
opinion leaders. One may argue that an undeclared period of moratorium emerged 
during Abe’s tenure as prime minister. 
One might conclude that the passionate debate on the Yasukuni issue in the last 
years under Koizumi substantially calmed down during Abe’s period in office. In fact, 
in July 2007, I strongly argued that more efforts should be made to resolve the 
Yasukuni issue during this moratorium period.49 But under a careful observation, one 
might observe several developments during Abe’s term. In August 2006, Foreign 
Minister Taro Aso proposed the idea of ‘‘nationalizing’’ Yasukuni. In December 2006 
Makoto Koga, President of the Japan War-Bereaved Association (Nippon Izokukai), 
stated that Yasukuni needs to be studied regarding the appropriateness of enshrining 
Class-A war criminals, and the Association started its study meeting in May 2007.50 
Above all, successive memos written by former grand chamberlains of the Showa 
Emperor, Tomohiko Tomita, Kuraji Ogura, and Ryogo Urabe all indicated that the 
Showa Emperor stopped visiting Yasukuni since 1978 to show his displeasure against 
the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals. These memos are provoking serious 
discussions about the Yasukuni issue among some scholars, historians, and opinion 
leaders.51 What does all this mean? It is hard to draw any definitive conclusions. Yasuo 
Fukuda, Abe’s successor, is known for his sympathy toward a neutral nonreligious 
place for mourning. At a press conference on September 15, 2007, he expressed his 
intention not to visit Yasukuni and confirmed his support for a neutral nonreligious 
memorial but said that ‘‘it has to be supported by the people and that choice of 
timing is very important.’’52 Nothing substantial may happen in terms of Yasukuni 
reform during Fukuda’s tenure, but his quiet views as expressed above may be seeds 
for further discourse sometime in the future. 
 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
On all issues so far discussed (apology, war responsibility, Yasukuni, and even 
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textbooks), in terms of a general understanding of prewar history, the IMTFE plays an 
essential role.  
As stated at the first part of this chapter, by accepting the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, the Japanese government also accepted the judgment given by all tribunals for 
Class-A, B, and C war criminals and is not in a position to reverse the verdicts that it 
accepted. As far as I know, no serious politicians, government officials, or opinion 
leaders seek the abrogation of the IMTFE’s judgment or the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty.  
And yet, the IMTFE does not cease to be the central issue for the debate on 
Japan’s historical memory. The key issue is the validity of the IMTFE’s indictment of 
‘‘crimes against peace’’ and its judgment that the war criminals had waged and 
conspired in a war of aggression. War has always been an accepted action allowed 
for sovereign states as a continuation of diplomacy and international politics. The 
difficult question here is how does one define ‘‘aggression’’ and what kind of ‘‘war 
of aggression’’ should be considered criminal? 
Some Japanese scholars and intellectuals concurred, accepted, and supported the 
notion of a ‘‘crime against peace.’’ Despite its retroactivity, they found a way to 
justify the IMTFE judgment. Well-known postwar international lawyers Kisaburo 
Yokota, Michitaka Kaino, and Shigemitsu Dando accepted the IMTFE’s verdict, 
and Yasuyuki Onuma inherited this position to date.53 Apologizers, however, 
consider that the IMTFE did not pay sufficient attention to Asian sufferings.54 
But this view has been challenged by the nationalists, who have increasingly and 
loudly come to voice the total rejection of the judgment of ‘‘crime against peace.’’ 
Practically all nationalist scholars are united on the points that the IMTFE’s 
judgment was victor’s justice, that the IMTFE applied international law retroactively, 
and that, without punishing the victors’ crime, it was unfair justice. Defense lawyers 
at the IMTFE continued to speak out for their causes after the trial. Many of the 
scholars who participated in the international symposium on the IMTFE in 1983 
shared nationalists’ view.55 Professors Keiichiro Kobori and Shoichi Watanabe have 
been particularly vocal in recent years.56 
The views of these opposing camps are poles apart. Now that we are approaching 
the 70th anniversary of the IMTFE in 2008, the polarization seems to be even wider. 
Nationalist opinions are heard more loudly, and their leaders are probably more 
confident that their causes are gaining popularity, but no concrete proposal has been 
made to harmonize in any way their views with postwar reality. 
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IS RECONCILIATION NOT A MUTUAL ENDEAVOR? 
 
China, Korea, and the United States’ historical memory issues, as discussed in 
this chapter, are primarily Japanese issues. Japan is primarily responsible for 
overcoming the challenge that these issues pose. But ultimate reconciliation with each 
neighboring country can only be done as a two-way process. Apology is, in principle, a 
oneway action done by the perpetrator’s side, whereas reconciliation can be achieved 
only through two-way actions. The positions on history taken by China and South 
Korea in many ways are still very distant from the position Japan is now taking. 
Ultimate reconciliation is a long way ahead. Still, in concluding, I can point to two 
recent examples that give hope for the future. 
In the case of China, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, during his official visit to Japan 
in April 2007, made a landmark speech at the Parliament on April 12, 2007. He 
stated in his speech: ‘‘Since the establishment of diplomatic relations the Japanese 
government and Japanese leaders expressed many times their position on history, 
officially acknowledged aggression, and expressed deep remorse and apology toward 
victim countries. The Chinese government and people positively appreciate this 
position.’’ It was the first instance of official acknowledgement and appreciation by 
the Chinese government of repeated Japanese apologies.57 
In the case of South Korea, at the grassroots level many positive developments 
are taking place. One such development is the Korean cultural boom in Japan called 
Kanryu and the stunning popularity of the Korean actor Pe Yong Jun (called in Japan 
Yong-sama). In relation to historical memory, books written by Professor Park Yuha 
have caught the attention of many researchers and opinion leaders by her efforts to 
present both positive and negative aspects of the postwar Japanese society with 
respect to its attitude toward Korea, as well as to cast an objective light on Korean 
mentality and behavior toward Japan.58 
Last but not least is the question of the United States. Issues thus far raised were 
issues connected primarily with China and Korea. But, as seen in the analysis of 
the IMTFE, the United States inevitably plays crucial part in Japan’s historical 
memory. This analysis inevitably extends to the issue of how Japan fought the war 
and ended it, with Soviet intervention and U.S. atomic bombings. I am firmly 
convinced that whatever debate Japan might have on these issues, these exchanges 
have to be conducted in a way to strengthen the alliance. Above all, we must avoid 
politicizing the debate. This is an issue that academics and historians might 
cautiously take up and continue calm and mutually informative debate for many 
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decades to come until such time as the maturity of the debate engenders mutually 




The issues on historical memory dealing with comfort women, the Nanjing 
Massacre, forced labor, POWs, and Unit 731 have been the subjects of intense debate 
in Japan. All these issues still meet with anger and dissatisfaction from the victims 
and their countries. Although I believe strongly that there is a general feeling of 
remorse and apology in Japan for prewar atrocities, this feeling has not found 
meeting ground with the other urge to protect pride and honor in Japan and, thus, 
is unable to produce a synthesis. But as I have discussed above, in all issues there 
are hopeful signs for a synthesis, although the degree of such hopeful signs varies with 
each issue. 
With regard to the five issues that address overall aspects of war and its 
memory— textbooks, apology, responsibility for the war, Yasukuni, and the 
IMTFE—the textbook and apology issues seem to have made certain progress toward 
synthesis. What I proposed on war responsibility and Yasukuni has not gained political 
support. Opinions are starkly divided on the IMTFE issue. There is a need to make 
further serious efforts on these issues to seek a synthesis on conflicting views. 
With the nationalist views becoming increasingly vociferous and influential, how 
Fukuda, considered to lean toward the apologizers’ position, would manage all these 
issues of historical memory is yet unknown at this point. It is my strong hope that 
synthetic patriotic/internationalist views would gain further strength. For this objective, 
such centrist and international scholars as Takashi Inoguchi, Makoto Iokibe, 
Shinichi Kitaoka, and Akihiko Tanaka, who continue the good tradition ofMasataka 
Kosaka, Masamichi Inoki, Shinkinchi Eto, and Seizaburo Sato, should gather 
strength to express and support synthetic views to guide the basic direction of the 
debate on historical memory in Japan. 
 
NOTES 
1. Masao Maruyama is the most famous scholar to have analyzed this system of 
pressure from above. See his work, Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo, 2 vols (Tokyo: 
Miraisha, 1964). See also Koguma Eiji, Minshuto Aikoku (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 2002), pp. 
29–66. 
2. Togo Kazuhiko,Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 44 
 606 
3. Among those who are quoted, Kishi and Nakasone may be known as nationalist 
prime ministers. But Kishi laid the foundation of Japanese policy toward Southeast Asia 
based on economic cooperation and friendly relations. Nakasone wanted to conclude the 
postwar era by officially visiting Yasukuni but suspended it when he felt that it created 
genuine difficulty in the Chinese leadership. 
4. See Togo Kazuhiko, ‘‘Japan’s Strategic Thinking Second Half of the 1990’s, ’’ in 
Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and 
Joseph P. Ferguson (New York, Palgrave, 2007) pp. 79–108. 
5. See Chapter 7 in this volume. 
6. Typical examples are his statements that he would not go to Yasukuni (Asahi 
Shinbun, September 15, 2007) and that he is interested in the establishment of secular 
war memorial in the long run (Asahi Shinbun, September 16, 2007). 
7. Totsuka Etsuro, Asahi Shinbun, March 29, 2007. For more detailed discussion on 
comfort women, see Chapter 7 in this volume. 
8. Motooka Shoji, a socialist parliamentarian, Asahi Shinbun, March 28, 2007. The 
same kind of law was supported and contemplated by a group of human rights 
advocates and lawyers as early as 1999. Asahi Shinbun, August 1,1999. 
9. AWW-NET Japan,Q&A Josei kokusai senpan hotei (Tokyo: Akashi, 2002), p. 9. 
From 1991 onward, 3 cases from Korea, 4 cases from China, 1 from Taiwan, 1 from the 
Philippines, and 1 from the Netherlands have been filed. 
http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-japan/slavery/courtcase.html (accessed April 4, 
2007). 
10. Hata Ikuhiko, Ianfuto senjono sei (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1999); ‘‘Maboroshi no jugun 
ianfu o netsuzoshita Kono danwa wa konaose’’ Shokun May 2007, pp. 138–51. 
11. Daishido Tsuneyasu, Ianfu kyoseirenko wa nakatta (Tokyo: Tentensha, 1999); 
‘‘Abesori, Konodanwa no torikeshi ketsudan o,’’ Seiron, May 2007, pp. 105–37. 
12. Sakurai Yoshiko, Komori Yoshihisa, Nishioka Tsutomu, Watanabe Shoichi, 
Kobayashi Yoshinori, Kamisaka Fuyuko (Will, August 2007), Yagi Hidekatsuin 
(Sankei Shinbun, February 10, 2005), and Fujioka Nobukatsu (Seiron, May 2007, 
pp.128–37; Sankei Shinbun, February 2, 2004) are also well-known opinion leaders. 
13. It was established in February 1997 (Daishido, 1999, p. 95) and currently headed by 
Nariaki Nakayama. 
14. Yoshiaki Yoshimi published a book and stated that it is not confirmed that such a 
slave chasing operation was conducted to collect comfort women in Korea and Taiwan. 
Yoshimi Yoshiaki,Jugun ianfu, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995); Yoshimi Yoshiaki and 
Kawada Fumiko, Jugun ianfu o meguru 30 no uso to shinjitsu (Tokyo: Otsuki shoten, 
 607 
1997), p. 24. 
15. The New York Times, April 28, 2007. 
16. I argued in ‘‘Jugun ianfu ketsugi wa ‘nihongyokusai’ no josoka?’’ Gekkan Gendai 
(September, 2007, pp. 48–55) that while Abe’s statement in March was inadvertent and 
the June advertisement created a completely opposite result from what was intended, the 
Congressional Resolution would not help change the Japanese government’s position 
and that Japan should take a new approach, based on their own moral thinking and 
taking into account the situation after April 27, 2007. 
17. The Asian Women’s Fund compiled their activities in a Web site: www.awf.or.jp. 
18. Togo Kazuhiko, ‘‘Sengohosho hanketsu, wakai eno shintenki ga otozureta,’’ Asahi 
Shinbun, May 17, 2007. 
19. See Kasahara Tokushi and Yoshida Yutaka, ed. Gendai rekishigaku to Nanking 
jiken (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo, 2006). See also Kasahara Tokushi, Nankin daigyakusatsu 
hiteiron 13 no uso (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo, 1999). These scholars and activists have 
been holding symposiums for one year starting in March 2007 in nine countries to 
discuss the Nanjing massacre (‘‘Nankinjiken giron sainen,’’ Asahi Shinbun, August 23, 
2007.) 
20. Takemoto Tadao & Ohara Yasuo,The Alleged Nanking Massacre (Tokyo: 
Meiseisha, 2000). 
21. Asahi Shinbun, August 23, 2007. 
22. ‘‘Shogen niyoru Nankin Senshi’’ Kaiko, March 1985, pp. 9–18. 
23. Ibid., p. 18; Aoki Hiroshi, Nihon, Chugoku, Chosen, kingendaishi, (Tokyo, 
Gento-sha, 2003), p. 231. 
24. Kyosei renko. http://ryutukenkyukai.hp.infoseek.co.jp/kyoseirenko1.html (accessed 
April 27, 2007). 
25. Mainichi Shinbun, April 27, 2007. 
26. Kyosei renko http://ryutukenkyukai.hp.infoseek.co.jp/kyoseirenko1.html (accessed 
April 27, 2007). 
27. The international agreement referred to in relation to China was the 1972 Joint 
Communique´ between the People’s Republic of China and Japan. 
28. Yomiuri Shinbun, April 27, 2007. 
29. Article 16 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 
30. Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003, pp. 202, 279. 
31. Cabinet Office in Charge of External Affairs, Heiwa yuko koryu keikaku, junenkan 
no katsudo hokoku, April 12, 2005. In the case of the British, this figure includes POWs 
and private sector detainees (p. 17). In the case of the Dutch, this figure includes mainly 
 608 
former POWs (p. 18). In the case of the Australians, this figure includes scholars or war 
museums and history education–related people (p. 16). 
32. Saburo Ienaga, who fought against the Japanese government on the textbook issue 
for 32 years, maintains that Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and the 731 form the trio of 
‘‘intentional extreme atrocities’’ duringWorldWar II Ienaga Saburo, Senso sekinin 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 2002), p. 86. Morishima Seiichi, The Devil’s Gluttony 
(Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1982). 
33. Asahi Shinbun, April 25, 2007. 
34. Asahi Shinbun, December 30, 2006. 
35. Ienaga, Senso sekinin, p. 51. 
36. Ibid., pp. 409–11. 
37. Ibid., pp. 133–35. 
38. Chugoku kikoku renmei. http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-site/other/ 
gaiyou.htm (accessed April 28, 2007). 
39. Aera, February edition 2006. 
40. Yomiuri Shinbun Senso Sekinin Kensho Iinnkai, Kensho—Senso sekinin, 2 vols 
(Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 2006); Yomiuri Shinbun and James Auer, Who Was 
Responsible? From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 
2006). 
41. Asahi Shinbun Shuzaihan, Rekishi to mukiau, Vol. 1 Senso sekinin to tsuito, 
(Tokyo: 
Asahi Shinbunsha, 2006); Rekishi to mukiau, Vol.2 Kako no kokufuku to aikokushin 
(Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2007). 
42. Kazuhiko Togo, ‘‘AMoratorium on Yasukuni Visit,’’ Far Eastern Economic Review, 
June 2006, pp. 5–15; ‘‘Yasukuni Saihen Shian’’ Gekkan Gendi, September 2006, pp. 
42–51. 
43. Yomiuri Shinbun, October 3, 2006; Mainichi Shinbun, October 13, 2006. 
44. The question was raised by Mizuho Fukushima (Socialist Party, Lower House) and 
Masayoshi Kano (Democratic Party, Upper House), Yomiuri Shiunbun, October 7, 
2006. 
45. Mainichi Shinbun, October 6, 2006. 
46. Yomiuri Shinbun, October 7, 2006. 
47. For more details on the Yasukuni issue, see Akihiko Tanaka’s Chapter 6 in this 
volume. 
48. Togo Kazuhiko, ‘‘A Moratorium on Yasukuni Visit,’’ pp. 5–15; ‘‘Yasukuni Saihen 
Shian,’’ pp. 42–51. 
 609 
49. Togo Kazuhiko, ‘‘Yasukuni mondai no shikoteishi o ueru’’ Gekkan Gendai, July 
2007, pp. 58–67. 
50. Asahi Shinbun, December 23, 2006, May 9, 2007. 
51. Kazutoshi Hando, Ikuhiko Hata, Masayasu Hosaka argue for de-enshrinement of 
Class-A war criminals from the major part of Yasukuni and transfer the spirits to 
Chinreisha, where the spirits of war dead of all the past wars are enshrined. See 
‘‘Showatenno no ‘ikari’ o ikani shizumerubekika,’’ Gekkan Gendai, July 2007, pp. 
44–57. 
52. Sankei Shinbun, September 16, 2007. 
53. Ienaga, Senso sekinin (2002), pp. 394–99. 
54. Ibid, p. 400 
55. Sato Kazuo,Sekaiga sabaku Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo: Meiseisha, 2005). 
56. Kobori Keiichiro, Tokyo Saiban Nihon-no benmei: Kyakka miteishutsu bengogawa 
shiryo (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1995); Watanabe Shoichi, Tokyosaiban o saibansuru (Tokyo: 
Chichishuppan, 2007). 
57. Kokubun Ryosei, ‘‘Chugoku no taisei henkaku: Nihon no sokumen shien kagini,’’ 
Asahi Shinbun, April 21, 2007. 
58. Park Yuha, Han-nichi nashonarizumu o koete (Tokyo: Kawade, 2005); Wakaino 





Bibliography of the Four Articles in the Annex 
 
Aoki Hiroshi, Nihon, Chugoku, Chosen, kingendaishi [Modern History of Japan, China, 
Korea] (Tokyo: Gento-sha, 2003). 
 
Aoyama Rusa, “Reisengo Chugoku no taibei ninshiki to Beichu kankei [China’s view of 
the U.S. and Sino-U.S. Relations after the Cold War]” in Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Chugoku 
Seiji to Higashi Ajia [Chinsese Politics and East Asia] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 
2004). 
 
Alagappa, Muthiah “Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Challenges,” in 
Muthiah Alagappa ed., Asian Security Order, Instrumental and Normative Features 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
 
Arai Toshiaki, ASEAN to Nihon, Higashiajia Keizaiken-no Yukue [ASEAN and  
Japan: How far does the East Asian economic sphere extend?] (Tokyo: Nichyuu  
Shuppan, 2003). 
  
Armacost, Michael H., “Japan: Tilting Closer to Washington.” in Richard Ellings, Aaron 
Friedberg and Michael Willis ed., Strategic Asia 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003). 
 
Armitage, Richard “Higashiajakyoudoutaiheno Sankaha Kokuekininarunoka [Does 
joining the East Asian community suit national interests?]” in Wedge (Tokyo, May 
2005). 
  
Asahi Shinbun Shuzaihan,  
-----Rekishi to mukiau, Vol. 1 Senso sekinin to tsuito [Facing the History: Vol.1 War 
Responsibility and Mourning] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2006);  
-----Rekishi to mukiau, Vol.2 Kako no kokufuku to aikokushin [Facing the History: Vol.2 
Overcoming the Past and Nationalism] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2007). 
 
Ashizawa Kuniko “Japan’s Approach toward Asian Regional Security: From  
‘Hub-and-Spoke’ Bilateralism to ‘Multi-Tiered’ ” Pacific Review 16 (2003). 
 
AWW-NET Japan, Q&A Josei kokusai senpan hotei, [Q&A Women’s International 
Criminals’ Tribunal] (Tokyo: Akashi, 2002). 
 
Berger, Thomas, 
-----“Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Co-operation in East Asia,” Review of 
International Studies (Spring 2000); 
-----“The Construction of Antagonism: The History Problem in Japan's Foreign 
Relations,” in G. John Ikenburry and Takashi Inoguchi ed., Reinventing the Alliance, 
US–Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York: Palgrave, 2003); 
-----“Japan's Internal Relations: the Political and Security Dimensions,” in Samuel S. 




Cabinet Office in Charge of External Affairs, Heiwa yuko koryu keikaku, junenkan no 
katsudo hokoku [Report for its Decade Activities by Peace, Friendship, and Exchanges 
Program](April 12, 2005) 
 
Christensen, Thomas “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East 
Asia,” in Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, ed., The Rise 
of China (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
 
Chugoku kikoku renmei [Union of Returnees from China], 
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-site/other/gaiyou.htm (accessed April 28, 2007). 
  
Curtis, Gerald “For the United States and Japan Multilateralism Is the Key,” Foreign 
Affairs (March-April 2004). 
  
Council of the East Asian Community (CEAC), Seisaku-houkokusho [Policy report]  
(August 2005), available at www.ceac.jp/j/pdf/policy_report.pdf (accessed August 17, 
2005). 
  
Daishido Tsuneyasu,  
-----Ianfu kyoseirenko wa nakatta [There was no Enforced Recruitment of Comfort 
Women] (Tokyo: Tentensha, 1999);  
-----‘‘Abesori, Konodanwa no torikeshi ketsudan o [Prime Minister Abe, Determine to 
abrogate this Statement],’’ Seiron (May 2007, pp. 105–37). 
 
Dower, John, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1999). 
 
Doyle, Michael, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 
 
Fukada Yusuke and Kin, Birei Tekiha Chuugokunari [China Is the Enemy] (Tokyo: 
Kobunsha, 2001). 
 
Fukushima Akiko, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism 
(London: Macmillan, 1999). 
 
Fukushima Akiko, Capie, David, and Evans, Paul, Rekishikon, Ajiataiheiyo 
Anzenhoshotaiwa [The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon] (Tokyo: Nihonkeizai Hyoronsha,  
2002). 
  




-----Domei Hyouryuu [Alliance Adrift] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1997). 
-----“Shusho Hashimoto gaiko o kataru [Prime Minister Hashimoto speaks about his 
 612 
foreign policy],” Asahi shinbun (July 30, 1998). 
----- “Sensosokininwo doyatte Owearaseruka [How to End the Issue of War 
Responsibility],” Chuo Koron (February, 2003). 
 
Gilson, Julie, “Complex Regional Multilateralism: ‘Strategising’ Japan’s Responses  
to Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review 17 (March 2004). 
  
Green, Michael J.,  
-----“Defence or Security? The US–Japan Defence Guidelines and China,” in David M. 
Lampton ed., Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Win-Win or Zero-Sum Game 
(New York and Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2001).   
-----Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
----- “Balance of Power,” in Steven K. Vogel ed., U.S–Japan Relations in a Changing 
Worl. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002). 
 
Hando Kazutoshi, Hata Ikuhiko, and Hosaka Masayasu ‘‘Showatenno no ‘ikari’ o ikani 
shizumerubekika [How to appease Emperor Showa’s Anger],’’ Gekkan Gendai (July 
2007, pp. 44–57). 
 
Hata Ikuhiko,  
-----Ianfuto senjono sei[Comfort Women and Sex in the Battle Field] (Tokyo: 
Shinchosha, 1999);  
-----‘‘Maboroshi no jugun ianfu o netsuzoshita Kono danwa wa kakinaose [Rewrite 
Kono Statement , which fabricated the Kono Statement,’’ Shokun (May 2007). 
 
Hatakeyama Noboru, “Higashiajia Kyodotaino Gensowo Suteyo [The illusion  
of the EAC should be forsaken],” Chuo Koron (Tokyo, September 2005). 
  
Heginbotham, Eric, and Samuels, Richard, “Japan,” in R. Ellings, A. Friedberg and M. 
Willis ed., Strategic Asia 2002-03, Asian Aftershocks (Seattle: National Bureau for 
Asian Research, 2002). 
 
Ienaga Saburo, Senso sekinin (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 2002). 
 
Iida Masafumi, “Chuugoku-ASEAN Kankeito Higashiajia Kyouruoku [China-  
ASEAN relations and East Asia cooperation],” in Kokubun Ryosei, ed., 
Chuugokuseijito Higashiajia [Chinese politics and East Asia] (Tokyo: Keio University  
Press, 2004). 
 
Ikeda Tadashi, Kanbojiawaheiheno Michi [The Road to Cambodian Peace] (Tokyo:  
Chuou Seihan, 1996). 
 
Ikei Masaru, Nihongaikoushi Gaisetsu [Overview of Japanese Foreign Policy] (Tokyo: 
Keio University, 1997). 
 
Ikenburry, John G. and Inoguchi Takashi ed., Reinventing the Alliance: US–Japan 
Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York: Palgrave, 2003). 
 613 
 
Ikenberry, John and Mastanduno, Michael ed., International Relations Theory and the 
Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
 
Iokibe Makoto, 
-----ed., Sengo Nihongaikoushi [Post-War Japanese Foreign Policy]. (Tokyo: 
Yuuhikaku, 2001). 
-----“Hanchu genrishugiha yugai mueki dearu [Fundamentalist anti-Chinese thinking is 
harmful]”, Chuo Koron (May 2004). 
-----“Nichyuuno Mizoha Umarunoka? [Would the gap between  
Japan and China be bridged?],” (as a participant of a debate), Gaiko Forum (Tokyo, July 
2005). 
  
Iwami Takao, Jitsuroku Hashimoto Ryutaro[Real picture of Hashimoto Ryutaro] 
(Tokyo: Asahi Sonorama, 1995). 
 
Jain, Purnendra, “Japan and South Asia: Between Cooperation and Confrontation,” in 
Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra Jain, ed., Japanese Foreign Policy Today (New York, 
Palgrave, 2000). 
 
Kamiya Matake, “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” in Takashi Inoguchi 
and Jain Purnendra, ed., Japanese Foreign Policy Today (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 
 
Kaikosha, ‘‘Shogen niyoru Nankin Senshi [War History of Nanjing by Testimonies]’’ 
Kaiko (March 1985). 
 
Kasahara Tokushi, Nankin daigyakusatsu hiteiron 13 no uso [13 Lies of Nanjing 
Denials] (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo, 1999). 
 
Kasahara Tokushi and Yoshida Yutaka, ed. Gendai rekishigaku to Nanking jiken 
[Contemporary Historiography and Nanjing Incident] (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo, 2006). 
 
Katzenstein, Peter and Sil, Rudra, “Rethinking Asian Security, A Case for Analytical 
Eclecticism,” in J. J. Suh, P. J. Katzenstein and Carlson Allen ed., Rethinking Security in 
East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2004). 
 
Kawashima Yutaka, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, Challenges and 
Options for the Twenty-First Century, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 
2003). 
  
Kelly, Jim, interview in Asahi Shinbun (June 18, 2005). 
 
Kim, Samuel S. ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia ( Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2004). 
  
Kin, Birei, “Dokuritsunokonkyoha aidentitida [Identity Is the Cause of Independence],” 
Chuo Koron (April. 2004). 
 614 
 
Kitaoka Shinichi, “Sengo Nihongaikoushini Nokoru Seikoudearu [It was a success to be 
remembered in the post-WWII foreign policy],” Chuo Koron, (November 2002). 
 
Kobayashi Yoshinori, Sensoron 2 [Theory of War 2] (Tokyo: Gento-sha, 2001). 
 
Kobori Keiichiro, Tokyo Saiban Nihon-no benmei: Kyakka miteishutsu bengogawa 
shiryo [Rebuttal from the Japanese side at the Tokyo Tribunal] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 
1995).  
 
Koguma Eiji, Minshuto Aikoku [Democracy and Patiotism] (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 2002). 
 
Kojima Tomoyuki, “Sogo hokan no Nitchu kankei [Mutual dependence of 
Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Chugoku seiji to Higashi Ajia, 
Chinese Politics and East Asia] (Tokyo, Keio University Press, 2004). 
 
Kokubun Ryosei,‘‘Chugoku no taisei henkaku: Nihon no sokumen shien kagini [System 
of Reform in China],’’ Asahi Shinbun (April 21, 2007). 
 
Komori Yoshihisa, Chugoku Hannichino Kyomou [Lies and hollows of China’s 
‘anti-Japanism’] (Tokyo: PHP, 2005). 
  
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution,  
Characteristics, and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia (April 1, 2005, 11). 
 
Lampton, M. David, 
-----Same Bed Different Dreams, Managing US-China Relations 1989-2000 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001). 
-----“What Growing Chinese Power Means for America,” statement prepared for 
testimony presented before the U.S. Senate (June 7, 2005). 
  
Maeno Toru, Boukokunihonheno Ikarino Shougen [Testimony of anger at Japan’s 
disintegration] (Tokyo: PHP, 2004). 
 
Maruyama Masao, Gendaiseijino Shisoutokoudou [Thought and Action of 
Contemporary Politics] (Tokyo: Miraisha,1964). 
 
Masumoto Teruaki, deputy director general of AFVKN, in Asahi Shinbun (November  
10, 2002). 
 
Midford, Paul, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism:  
The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance,” Pacific Review 13  
(2000). 
 




Miura Yuji, “Nihonwa Higashiajiakeizairenkeijidaini Ikanitaiousubekika [How  
should Japan respond in the age of East Asia economic partnership?],” in  
Toshio Watanabe, ed., Higashiajia Keizairenkeino Jidai [Partnerships for economic  
development in East Asia] (Tokyo: Toyokeizaisha, 2004). 
  
Mochizuki, Mike, “Japan, between Alliance and Autonomy.” in Ashley Tellis and 
Michael Willis ed., Strategic Asia 2004-05, Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of 
Power (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004). 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J. and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: the Struggle 
for Power and Peace, 6th edition (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948). 
 
Morishima Seiichi, Akumano Hoshoku [The Devil’s Gluttony] (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 
1982). 
 
Murata Koji, “Chapter 5,” in Makoto Iokibe ed., Sengo Nihongaikoushi [Post-War 
Japanese Foreign Policy] (Tokyo, Yuuhikaku, 2001). 
 
Murata Ryouhei, Naze Gaimushouwa dameninattaka [Why Did MOFA Deteriorate?] 
(Tokyo, Fusousha, 2002). 
 
Nakajima Mineo, “Nihonkindaishi no shounintoshite kanshasubekisonzai [Grateful as a 
Witness of Japan’s Modern History],” Chuo Koron (April, 2004). 
 
Nakanishi Hiroshi, 
-----“Chapter 4,” in Makoto Iokibe ed., Sengo Nihongaikoushi [Post-war Japanese 
Foreign Policy](Tokyo: Yuuhikaku, 2001). 
-----“Reisen shuryogo no Nihon no henyo [Japan’s Changes after the end of the Cold 
War],” in Soeya Yoshihide and Masaaki Tadokoro ed., Nihon no Higashiajia Koso 
[Japan’s East Asia Initiatives] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004). 
 
Namiki Yorihisa, “Taiwanno rekishiha tairikuchuugoku no ichibudehanai [Taiwan Does 
Not Constitute a Part of Continental China's History],” Chuo Koron (April, 2004). 
 
Nishioka Tsutomu, vice president of NARKN, in Asahi Shinbun (December 8,  
2002). 
  
Nishioka Tsutomu, Kinshojitsugashikaketa “Tainichi Daibouryaku” Rachino  
Shinjitsu [The truth of abduction: “Great stratagem” by Kim Jong Il] (Tokyo:  
Tokuma, 2002). 
  
Obuchi Keizo no 615 nichi [615 Days of Obuchi Keizo] (Tokyo, Koshinsha, 2000). 
  
Okazaki Hisahiko, “Taiwanno senryakutekikachi wo shirukotokosojyuuyou [The 
Importance of Taiwan's Strategic Value],” Chuo Koron (April, 2004). 
 




Park, Yuha,  
-----Han-nichi nashonarizumu o koete [Overcoming anti Japanese Nationalism](Tokyo: 
Kawade, 2005) 
-----Wakaino tameni [For the Reconciliation](Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2006). 
 
Ravenhill, John, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
Rozman, Gilbert, 
-----“A Chance for a Breakthrough in Russo-Japanese Relations: Will the Logic of Great 
Power Relations Prevail?” The Pacific Review 15(3) (pp. 325-57, 2002). 
-----Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of 
Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
Sato Kazuo, Sekaiga sabaku Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo: Meiseisha, 2005). 
 
Sato Kazuo and Komaki Yoshiaki, Nichiro shuno kosho [Summit Negotiations between 
Japan and Russia] (Tokyo, Iwanami, 2003). 
 
Shambaugh, David, “China Engages Asia, Reshaping the Regional Order,”  
International Security 29 (Winter 2004.5). 
  
Smith, Steve, “Reflectivist and Constructivist Approach to International Theory,” in 
John Baylis and Steve Smith ed., The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001). 
 
Soeya Yoshihide, “Higashiajia Anzenhosho Shisutemuno Nakano Nihon  
[Japan inside the East Asian security system],” in Yoshihide Soeya and Masaaki  
Tadokoro, ed., Nihon-no Higashi-Ajia Kousou [Japan’s East Asian initiatives]  
(Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004). 
 
Suettinger, Robert, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations 1989-2000 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003). 
 
Suh, J. J., Katzenstein, Peter, J. and Carlson, Allen ed., Rethinking Security in East Asia: 
Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004). 
 
Takahara Akio, “Japan’s Political Response to the Rise of China,” in Ryosei Kokubun 
and Wang Jisi eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asia Order (Tokyo: Japan 
Center for International Exchange, 2004). 
  
Takemoto Tadao and Ohara Yasuo, The Alleged Nanking Massacre (Tokyo: Meiseisha, 
2000). 
 
Tamba Minoru, Nichiro Gaiko Hiwa [Untold Stories of Japan–Russia Negotiations] 
 617 
(Tokyo: Chuo Koron, 2004). 
 
Taniguchi Makoto, Higashiaajia Kyoudoutai [East Asian Community] (Tokyo:  
Iwanami Shinsho, 2004). 
  




-----“Japan–Russia Relations in the Early 21st Century,” Proceedings of the Conference: 
Japan and its Neighbours, European Japan Experts Association (5) (2004). 
-----Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy (Leiden: Brill, 
2005). 
-----‘‘A Moratorium on Yasukuni Visit,’’ Far Eastern Economic Review (June 2006. 
pp.5-11). 
-----‘‘Yasukuni Saihen Shian [A proposal for Yasukuni Reform],’’ Gekkan Gendai 
(September 2006, pp. 42–51). 
-----‘‘Japan’s Strategic Thinking in Second Half of the 1990’s,’’ in ed., Gilbert Rozman, 
Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson Japan’s Strategic Thought toward Asia (New 
York, Palgrave, 2007). 
-----‘‘Sengohosho hanketsu, wakai eno shintenki ga otozureta [A new opportunity has 
appeared by the verdict on post-war compensation],’’ Asahi Shinbun (May 17, 2007). 
-----‘‘Yasukuni mondai no shikoteishi o ueru [Deploring amnesia on Yasukuni],’’ 
Gekkan Gendai (July 2007, pp. 58–67). 
-----‘‘Jugun ianfu ketsugi wa ‘nihongyokusai’ no josoka? [Is the comfort women’s 
resolution a symptom of Japan’s explosion?],’’ Gekkan Gendai (September, 2007, pp. 
48–55) 
 
Totsuka Etsuro, Asahi Shinbun (March 29, 2007). 
 
Wang, Jiangwei, “Adjusting to a ‘Strong-Strong Relationship’: China’s Calculus of 
Japan’s Asian Policy,” Takashi Inoguchi ed., Japan’s Asian Policy, Revival and 
Response (New York: Palgrave, 2002). 
 
Watanabe Shoichi, Tokyosaiban o saibansuru[Judging the Tokyo Tribunal] (Tokyo: 
Chichishuppan,2007). 
 
Weatherbee, Donald, Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (New York:  
Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 
  
Wendt, Alexander,  
-----“Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” The American Political 
Science Review 88(2) (1994). 
-----Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
 
Yomiuri Shinbun, Senso Sekinin Kensho Iinkai, Kensho—Senso sekinin [Inspection: 
 618 
War Responsibility], 2 vols (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 2006). 
 
Yomiuri Shinbun and James Auer, Who Was Responsible? From Marco Polo Bridge to 
Pearl Harbor (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 2006). 
 
Yoshida Haruki, “Higashiajaisamittoha Nichibeidoumeiwo Sokonauka [Does  
the EAS harm the Japan-U.S. alliance?],” Sekai Shuuho (April 26, 2005). 
 
Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jugun ianfu [Comfort Women] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995). 
  
Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Kawada Fumiko, Jugun ianfu o meguru 30 no uso to shinjitsu [30 









































Groeiend zelfvertrouwen en nationalisme in Japan. 
 
 
Na het grote geestelijke vacuüm dat ontstond bij de nederlaag in de Tweede 
wereldoorlog ontwikkelden zich  twee fundamentele breukvlakken in Japan. 
In de eerste plaats op het gebied van de buitenlandse politiek. Tegen het door de 
conservatieve regering omarmde realisme stond een sterk idealistisch pacifisme dat 
bepleit werd door de oppositiepartijen en de media. Deze breuklijn bleef bestaan tot het 
einde van de koude oorlog. 
In de tweede plaats raakten de Japanners met betrekking tot de oorlog in Azië 
geleidelijk meer bekend met de gepleegde wreedheden waarvoor Japan zich diende te 
verontschuldigen. De bestaande opvatting in die tijd om het verleden totaal te af te 
wijzen veroorzaakte echter ongemak bij veel Japanners. Het vraagstuk van de verloren 
identiteit werd niet beantwoord gedurende de koude oorlog. 
Toen de koude oorlog ten einde was begon Japan zich te bewegen in de richting van een 
meer verantwoordelijke en zelfbewuste veiligheids- en defensie politiek. 
Een aantal initiatieven om tot duidelijker verontschuldiging en verzoening te komen 
werden echter geconfronteerd met een versterkt nationalisme en de kwestie van de 
verloren identiteit bleef aan het eind van de negentiger jaren onopgelost. 
Koizumi heeft er goed aan gedaan om een meer verantwoordelijke, proactieve, 
realistische en zelfbewuste veiligheids- en defensie politiek in te voren. In het bijzonder 
zijn de banden met de VS aanzienlijk versterkt. In Oost Azië echter kwam de kwestie 
van de verloren identiteit terug met als resultaat dat de Japanse buitenlandse politiek 
ten opzichte van Rusland, Korea en China zich verhardde. 
Japan moet de moed hebben om dit onopgeloste punt op te lossen. Een groter begrip van 
andere landen over een bewegend Japan in de richting van een nieuwe identiteit zal dit 








De strategie van Japan in de tweede helft van de negentiger jaren. 
 
 
Hashimoto was de eerste prime minister die geconfronteerd werd met de opkomst en 
het gewicht van China en de noodzaak om in verband hiermee de betrekkingen met de 
VS in balans te houden. Deze laatste betrekkingen immers vormden de hoeksteen van 
de Japanse buitenlandse politiek. De fundamentele keuze van Hashimoto was voor de 
VS in geval zich een echt conflict zou voordoen tussen de VS en China. Zijn grootste 
politieke nachtmerrie was zo’n conflict want dit zou Japan dwingen een vijandelijke 
positie tegen China in te nemen.  Zijn tweede angst was “Japan passeren” wat zou 
kunnen gebeuren als gevolg van verbeterde betrekkingen tussen die twee landen ten 
koste van Japan. 
Hashimoto was zeer zorgvuldig om deze twee extreme posities te vermijden. Hij zag het 
gevaar van het VS-China conflict tijdens de Taiwan crisis in 1996. Dit leidde tot de 
herbevestiging van het bondgenootschap in 1996 en de overeenkomst van een nieuwe 
defensie richtlijn in 1997 maar tegelijkertijd besteedde hij aandacht en energie om 
China niet buitensporig te provoceren. Hij bezocht Yasukini in 96 maar schorste latere 
bezoeken om  niet te veel tegen het historisch geheugen van de Chinezen te schoppen. 
Zoals we kunnen zien in het Hopporyodo boek, deed Hashimoto zijn best in 97-98 om 
een doorbraak te vinden met Yeltsin over de territoriale kwestie teneinde de externe 
positie van Japan ten opzichte van de VS en China te verstevigen. 
 
De belangrijkste prestatie van Obuchi lag in Azië, met name in Korea en China. Kim 
Dae-jung’s bezoek in 98 markeerde het belangrijkste moment van verzoening. Bij die 
gelegenheid maakte Obuchi de duidelijkste verontschuldiging ooit aan Korea. Het 
bezoek van Jiang Zemin dat daarop volgde was niet zo succesvol. Hashimoto en Obuchi 
hebben beiden positieve stappen ondernomen tegen de financiële crisis in Azië en 
Obuchi slaagde er in een tripartite bijeenkomst te organiseren onder de auspiciën van 
de ASEAN plus drie in 1997. 
Mori’s belangrijkste prestatie was lag misschien wel in de overeenkomst die hij sloot 








Japan en de nieuwe veiligheidsstructuren in de Aziatische multilaterale betrekkingen. 
 
ASEAN Regional Forum werd in 1994 opgericht met als primair doel het proces van 
confidence-building in het Oost Azië te versterken. De Japanse regering gaf hieraan 
krachtige leiding. Japan wilde een normaal land worden met een politieke rol die haar 
economische macht weerspiegelde zonder echter terug te gaan naar de vooroorlogse 
militaire macht.  Hierbij kon een forum in Oost Azie zoals de ARF nuttig zijn om die 
intenties uit te leggen. 
Aan het einde der negentiger jaren speelde dit forum een beperkte maar nuttige rol bij 
het betrekken van China in een meer open veiligheids dialoog. 
Na de financiële crisis in Azië van 1997-1998 werd ASEAN plus 3 opgericht. Dit 
samenwerkingsverband stond een functionele aanpak voor in het bijzonder ten aanzien 
van niet traditionele veiligheidsaspecten zoals piraterij en terrorisme. Het bleek echter 
dat de werkelijke veiligheidskwestie China was. De twee landen begonnen hun op 
gezonde competitie berustende samenwerking binnen het APT raamwerk, maar toen de 
bilaterale betrekkingen in 2000 en de jaren daarop verslechterden vanwege de 
Yasukuni bezoeken ontstond er een duidelijke strijd tussen de twee staten. Japan nam 
de leiding bij het formeren van een meer inclusieve organisatie gegroepeerd om de East 
Asian Summit terwijl China trachtte de leiding te houden over de APT. Deze strijd 
schijnt sedert 2006 wat afgezwakt te zijn nadat de bilaterale betrekkingen zich 
verbeterden. 
De Noord Koreaanse nucleaire crisis barstte uit in 2002. De weigering van President 
Bush om rechtstreeks met Noord Korea te onderhandelen leidde tot de oprichting van 
het Zes Partijen Overleg in 2003 maar vanwege de sterke publieke opinie die gefixeerd 
was op de ontvoeringkwestie nam Japan de krachtigst mogelijke houding aan ten 
opzichte van Noord Korea. Deze positie kwam goed overeen met de positie van de VS 
maar nadat de VS hun strategie hadden verlegd naar die van onderhandelingen in 2007 
werd de positie van Japan binnen het Zes Partijen Overleg  een geïsoleerde positie. 
De auteur concludeert dat Japan’s onvermogen de kwestie van het historische geheugen 
met China op te lossen en de fixatie op de ontvoeringkwestie de positie van Japan in 
Oost Azie verzwakken. Deze verzwakte positie is niet  bevorderlijk voor het versterken 
van het bondgenootschap en Japan – dat in staat is een sterk regionaal leiderschap op 
zich te nemen – zou daardoor meer geleid kunnen worden door de belangen van de VS, 





De herinneringsgeschiedenis van Japan: van polarisatie naar synthese 
 
Dit artikel gaat terug naar 1945 en beschrijft het geestelijke vacuüm dat ontstond door 
de precedentloze totale nederlaag en de interne tegenstellingen die daarop volgde 
tussen degenen die de moderne Japanse geschiedenis totaal ontkenden en degenen die 
de stelling handhaafden dat sommige aspecten van de moderne Japanse geschiedenis in 
verschillende graden elementen bevatten waarop de Japanners zich terecht trots 
konden voelen. 
De auteur voert argumenten aan voor de stelling dat hoewel er een groot verschil was 
tussen beide extreme posities er toch voortdurend pogingen waren om tot een synthese 
te komen. 
 
De auteur onderzoekt vijf verschillende specifieke onderwerpen van geschiedkundige 
herinnering: troostvrouwen, de Nanjing slachting, gedwongen arbeid, krijgsgevangenen 
en Eenheid 731. Al deze onderwerpen roepen nog steeds woede op bij de slachtoffers in 
andere landen. Hoewel de auteur een krachtig gelooft dat in het algemeen bij de 
Japanners een gevoel leeft van wroeging en spijt voor de (voor)oorlogse wreedheden , 
heeft dit gevoel geen aansluiting gevonden bij een ander gevoel namelijk hun behoefte 
om trots te zijn op de dingen die bereikt zijn in Japan sinds de Meji restauratie. Deze 
disconnectie maakt het voor de Japanners onmogelijk om tot een synthese te komen. De 
auteur stelt echter dat in bijna alle hierboven genoemde onderwerpen er hoopvolle 
tekens zijn voor zo’n synthese hoewel die hoopvolle tekens verschillen per onderwerp. 
 
Met betrekking tot de vijf onderwerpen welke de meer algemene aspecten van de oorlog 
betreffen en de herinnering er aan – geschiedenisboeken, verontschuldigingen, 
verantwoordelijkheid voor de oorlog, Yasukuni en het Internationale Tribunaal voor het 
Verre Oosten (IMTFE)- schijnen de geschiedenisboeken en de verontschuldigingen 
voortgang te hebben gemaakt om tot een zekere synthese te komen. 
Wat de auteur voorstelt over de verantwoordelijkheid van de oorlog en de kwestie van 
Yasukini heeft geen politieke steun in Japan gevonden. De meningen over de IMTFE 
kwestie zijn sterk verdeeld. De auteur concludeert dat er een noodzaak is om verdere 
serieuze pogingen te ondernemen om tot een synthese te komen bij de bestaande 
tegengestelde meningen. 
 
